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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There was a time in the not too distant past, when it was
a relatively simple matter to serve as a member of a board of
education.

The task of making policy for a school system, while

subject to certain community pressures, was manageable, partly
because the public school district, being a creature of the
state, enjoyed some legal privileges.

The oldest of these

privileges was the principle of immunity from certain tort
liability actions, an immunity shared with other government
bodies.
This doctrine, like many other traditional prerogatives
of a board of education, has been subject to review by the
courts in the past few years, so that now, in order to know
what their legal position may be, the study of school district
tort liability is essential to everyone who would act as a
board member or a school administrator.
A.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The primary emphasis of this study revolves around the
modification of immunity of school districts from tort liability for negligence.

School districts are sometimes found
1

2

liable for some torts, such as the maintenance of a nuisance
or for the trespass to property.

However, in this study only

the tort of negligence on the part of employees of a school
district, which resulted in property damage or personal injury
to pupils or others, received treatment.
which are covered

by

Injuries to persons

Workmen's Compensation were also outside

the scope of this study.
Related subordinates of this problem are:

govemmental

vs. proprietary functions, "safe place" statutes, "save harmless" statutes, the effect of carrying liability insurance, and
bars to recovery.
progresses.

All of these come into focus as the study

More specifically, the investigation sought to

answer the following questions:
1.

What is the rationale behind the immunity doctrine?
What are the reasons advanced for its growth and
perpetuation in the United States? What is its
current status?

2.

What is the rationale behind the trend toward
nonimmunity? What is the present status of nonimmunity of &ci1ool districts in the United States?

3.

Does this trend seem to be increasing or decreasing?
What is the future probability of nonimmunity?
What guide lines for educational administration
can be noted? What steps can be taken by the
administration so as to prevent litigation? What
steps can be taken so as to mitigate the awarding
of damages? How can public confidence be maintained?

4.

Is there a conflict between the role of the courts
and the legislature in this area? How does this
affect modification?

3

5.

!low do the courts interpret the legislative attempts

6..

Does the purchase of liability insurance remove the
immunity of the district? If so, to what extent?
If the district is immune from suit, is the purchase
of liability insurance an authorized legal expenditure?

to limit the liability of the school districts?

It is the aim of this inquiry to examine primary authorities, such as the cases and statutes, in relation to the
above questions so that the answers will be accurate statements
of the law in a given jurisdict1.on.
B.

DEFINITIO!l OF TERMS

Since the field of law utilizes a technical vocabulary
unfamiliar to the average lay reader, an attempt is made at
this point to define these terms in an appended glossary.

It

was with the avere,ge reader in mind that the definitions are

given so that one not familiar with the legal terminology can
still reasonably well understand the meaning thereof • 1
C.

DATA GA.THBRD'G AHD PROCESS IHG

In general it can be said that the procedure used in
tllis study is the typical system :folloV1ed in legal research.
Various research books such as the American Di;est System.
American .!!!, Reports and Shef!rd's C1tator were used to compile

a bibliography of cases.
Literature and the Index

--------

The Beader•s Guide to Periodical

!!. Leel

Periodicals were used to
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iocate 0ther pertinent information.

Various legal encyclopedia

were studied for cases and major subdivisions of the larger
area of negligence and tort liability of the school district.
In the field of school law several textbooks were available
which touch upon the subject at hand.

----

-

Garber's Yearbook of

School Law which is published every year was an excellent source
of recent cases of import.

-

The National School Law Reporter

-

was also another reliable and current source of cases and
statutes.

After compi U.ng a bibliography of cases and statutes,
note cards were prepared for each, and after carefully reading
them, a brief was prepared on each case.

Bach brief contained

the citation, the date of the case, and the identity of the
court hearing the case.
examination in each case:

The following items were subject for
who the plaintiff and defendant

where, if the case was being appealed, from what court did it
originate, the facts of the case, the points of law, the points
of fact, the congruity or discongruity with past decisions,
the dissenting opinion and other related dicta.
D.

P..EVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH

.& number of studies were found, which in some cases
related to the problem at hand.

The bulk of the studies dealt

with the larger and less clearly defined area of immunity as
a whole.

In some material.$ a chapter or section was devoted

5

to the modification of the immunity doctrine.
In

1~58

Davis studied the status of governmental immunity

in the area of tort liability of school districts for negligence
as it related to pupil injuries. 2 Davis pointed out the increasing amount of litigation and a general relaxation of the
harsh rule of immunity.

The writer defined torts, negligence

and attractive nuisance in their legal usage.

Later Davis

traced the origin and development of governmental immunity
from liability for negligence on all levels.
devoted to reasons for allowing recovery.

One chapter was

In oue chapter the

various states that permit recovery were discussed with their
applicable statutes.

In a summary of the states allowing re-

covery, five-sixths of the allowable cases were found in California, New York and Washington.

Davis discussed the liability

of certain states under special statutes dealing with transportation, "safe places,'' courts o1 claims, and other similar
state agencies.

At the time ot the research, in fourteen of

the c 0111mon law states which denied liability, only twenty-two
caaes were decided in favor of the injured party.

Of these

twenty-two cases, sixteen were based upon a statute of some
type (such as authorization for the purchase of insurance),
guarantee of a "safe place," small tort claiu act, special
recovery allowed by the legislature, and an
act.

e~ployee's

liability

A distribution of the cases granting recovery against

school districts was made.

This chart showed that, of the 126

cases studied, thirty-two were in California, forty-seven were

in New York, and seventeen were in Washington.

The remainder

of the cases were in the states which had provisions for special

applications of liability as outlined abo'\·e.

In another chart

showing the reasons tor granting recovery, the abrogation of
immunity by statute accounted for eighty-five of the 105 cases
reported.

Other reasons, which were mentioned frequently by

the courts, were:

failure to supervise properly, sufficient

knowledge of the defect, improper use of certain equipment, and
the mai11 tena nee of a nuisance.

lu tbe suiumary, New York was

noted as the most liberal of the states in granting recovery,

although there was no express statutory provision for such
liability.

Washington was one of the first states to pass an

act abrogating i:nmuni ty in 1869, but this was somewhat re-

stricted by a later amendment.

California in 1923 passed a

statute which abolished immunity and by future enactments the
schools now occupy the same position as that of a private

corporation in the field of tort liability.

In only these

three states had the immunity doctrine been changed to any
degree.

In some of the states various means of circumventing

the immunity principle have been devised, but the principle
still remains largely intact.
A dissertation by Moss in 1960 compared the status of

7

school district liability for torts in Oklahoma, California,
and NeW York.3

His purpose was to identify the principles of

law affecting the tort liability of school districts in the
above states and to compare the status of these three states.
He categorized these principles into four groups:

statutory

enactments, court interpretations, court determination of the
essential elements of liability, and the reasons for voiding
immunity.

In his findings he noted that New York has had the

so-called New York rule since 1906 which holds districts liable
for their own torts.
statutory enactments.

California has abolished its immunity by
Both New York and California have classi-

fied the functions of a school as being either governmental or
proprietary.

If the function is governmental, immunity results;

if the function is proprietary, liability attaches.

The courts

have held that substantial compliance with the statute is all
that is required.

If construction of a statute is required by

the courts, they will attempt to determine the intent of the
legislature.

If the decision is in keeping with common law

holdings, the courts are prone to liberal findings.

Oklahoma

was holdi.ng firmly to the immunity rule, although there was a
permissive statute allowing the purchase of insurance.

This

statute allowed direct suit against the insurer without first
securing a judgment against the insured.

Although this is

contrary to general insurance law, it was followed in Oklahoma,

since the insurance companies were
knowledge of the law.

presu~ed

to have full

Since there was no statutory authority

to the contrary, the Oklahoma. courts felt no right to change
this ruling.

Schaerer in a doctoral dissertation completed in 1959
studied the status of Indiana. school district liability and
compared this with the insurance practices of the Indiana
schools.4

He analyzed the statutes and court decisions in

Indiana, the standard type liability insurance policy, and
surveyed the school corporations having a superintendent and

a board of education.

He found that there were three cate-

gories of liability as far as the other states were concerned.
The liberal states, such as California, New York, Washington,
and, to a lesser extent, Connecticut, Colorado, New Jersey, and
Wiscousin, were so called because of their waiver of immunity.
The conservative states, such as

Alaba~ua,

Arizona, and West

Virginia, were so called because they upheld immunity and did
not authorize the purchase of insurance.

The compromise states,

such as Indiana, were so known because they retained the immunity
doctrine but permitted the purchase of insurance.

The Indiana

school districts were immune unless expressly stipulated by
statutes (such as Workman Compensation Laws).

The schools

purchased eleven types of policies and twelve different types
of liability insurance coverages.

Seventy-two per cent of the

policies named either the board of educati.on or the school

district as the sole insured.

Although the reviewing court

:.ield i;o the immunity doctrine, the lower courts were permitting

1~ecovery if the board of education did not inject the defense
of Jover:muental imr1uni ty.

Schaerer also found that insuranca

companies were making out-of-court settlements even though the

school districts were immune from liability.

An increase in

the frequency of suits filed and in the nuaber of out-of-court
settlements was noted.
pul"'Cl1ased

He concluded that school districts

liability insurance for the following reasons:

moral

obligation, the protection of school off icc:rs, appointees,

agents, and employees against catastrophic judgments, and public

.relations.
It should be pointed out that the use ·-:.>f an agent presents
some special considerations.

Unlike some employees, an agent

does not share in any immu11ities that tile employer may have,
lJut the principal or employer may be liable :f 01" torts committed
by his agent.

In 1949 Satterfield. investigated the legal aspects <.'f
tort liability in school districts as evidenced by recent court
Jecisions. 5

He discussed the nullification of ir.imunity by

statutory enactments and he found that while no state constitution mentioned the tort liability of school districts, many
cases held the school district responsible for the acts of its
teacher employees under the rule of respondeant superior.

It is: interesting to notf' a ls e>, that alt hough the majority of
American states enjoy iM;iitmity, Er.;~land and Germany, frocii whom

we modeled so much of our school system, did not extend this
right to school districts. 0
!n 1930 Weltzin studied the snbject of tort liability
of scho.,l districts, of the off ice rs, and of the members of
the instructional staft.7

was:

Among the questions that were stated

When is the school district responsible in suits for

1all'.aG°es?

Sources of materials were the statutes, reports of

cases, and other related data.

In the chapter dealing with

the tort liability of the school as a quasi corporation, it

was stated that the general rule in New York and some other
states was that a school district would be liable for torts
such as trespass or nuisance, but would not be liable for the

actions of its servants.

The disti.nction seems to be in that

a school district might rass rules or star1 activities which
result in a tort, (such as trespass) in which case it could
be held liable, while an employee is liable tor hie own torte
and if it is for negligence and results in in.jury to another,
the

employee cannot share in the school district immunity from

such act ion.

The statutes of a few states such a.s California,

Minnesota, oregon, and Washington explicitly provided tor action
against the school district.

However, in Minnesota, Oregon,

and Washington, the constructton of these statutes has been

severely restricted.
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A study of the liability for accidents occurring in
£._hzsica;,1 education activities was made b)' Leibee in 1952. 8

He

discussed the role of negligence in such liability and the
essential ingredients of a charge of negligence.

Be enumerated

the principal defenses to negligence as being contributory
negligence, assumption of risk or volenti !2.'2. fit inJuria,
and tlle g;overnmeutal immunity of school districts.
to avoid the barrier of 1maunit7, actions

a~inat

In order
the school

district were sometimes broU&ht on the charge of maintaining a
nuisance.

The courts were divided on this cha.J:'ge but the

majoritJ extended the cloak of immunity to the area of nuisance.
The abrogation of tam.unity in the states of California and

New York waa noted, and various statutes and cases were cited.
The llew York Court of Claims Act abolished the imaunity of the
state to the degree that the state may be aued in
for the acts of its

offio~u·s

!!!, 1937 • ns !!,. addition

l2.

or employees.

tha~

court

Thia act. passed

the liability of school districts

under the New York rule.
Hindle inquired into the realm of the f inaneial responsibilit7 for inJuriea to fUfils of the public achoola.9

Be

concluded that there .... a strong trend toward the assumption
by the school district of liabil.ity for personal injuries

occurring under the responsibility of the school.

He stated

that this assumption would not be a :tinancial burden to the
schools.

Be reconunendecl that the stat• paas lecialative

12
enactments

111"oviding

for the asaumptio11 of this re$pon&:l.billt1.

and that the cost of aucb be conei<krcd

;t;.Q int~gral

expenae

o.f r.-ublic educution.

A par1phlet by Scha-.tftr av.d McGhebey on the tort ltabil:l.t1
of school ditJtricta • school otf1ciala• and s~ool tnaplo1eea

nas published in 1960. 16 Amons tbei ~ny Quntiona tbis stud7
a.slied. was one which tried to diat 1ncu:t.ah between acte of
t!egli&once on the part of the aehool district itself (auch u

trespass). and acts of negltgence of thei.'r' employees for Which
the school districts might also be held liable.

After a

general diacUMion ot the problem, the "tudy took up tbe
exceptions to the rule ot liabil1t7.

Tile Mhoola have beeu

held liable for nu!aancee, but thia na an unclear area with
div!ded opinions.

8011e

atates peJ."Mltted

reeov~ry u•4-~

'V&Jl"ious

statutes such aa "safe placea," ''save baralesa" and &!&'all tort
claims acts.

At t i - tho court •de a diatin4·tion betwHn

governmentl'.l a.ad proprietar, 1'unct1ona oi the sehool d1st1•icta.

Such a diatiDGtion was difficult to •ke and ne not trecuontl.7
uaed.

In e:a.ld.niag liability 1n the var1oua stat.a, five

states he.d bJ exp..._. atatutee iapoaed l1ab:Ll.it1 on the achool

far personal injuries.

Theae atatea were l'ew York, California,

l'lashiqt on, Orecon, anti IU.naeaota. There wre three atatn
(Alaba•, Arlau•aa and Wat Vtrgini.'I.) wtich bad clauses in

their constitut10Wil which forbade the the bringing of autt
against the atate.

m.ac. the aohools were conaiden4 uteawlou
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of the state, this coverage was automatically extended to them.
The remainder of the states fall into a compromise category
where immunity was held, but liability insurance could be
purchased.

The carrying of liability insurance did not waive

the immunity of the school district in most cases.

At the time

of writing only three states (Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee) had deviated from the general rule and had allowed
recovery to the extent of coverage.
A pamphlet published by the Research Division of the
National Education Association in 1950 dealt with the subject
of who is liable for pupil injuries. 11 The pamphlet stated
the legal philosophy behind tort liability and negligence.
The second part of the publication dealt with the school board's
responsibility for personal injuries to students.

It docu-

mented the common-law immunity of school districts and gave
reasons for this rule.

The states of New York, California,

Washington, Oregon, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Connecticut
had enacted statutes which imposed liability upon the school
district.

Wisconsin had a "safe place" statute but this rule

was confused and subject to different interpretations by the
courts.
An annual compilation of cases relative to school law
was published by the Research Division of National Education
Association.12

Of the seventy-six cases reported in the year

1961, pupil injuries gave rise to twenty-two of these actions.

------------------------------~--------------~--------------~-14
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CHAPTER II
LEGAL STATUS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 'roRT
LIABILITY IN GENERAL AND NEGLIGENCE IN PARTICULAR
A.

THE LEG.AL STATUS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT

In order to comprehend intelligently the problem of
this investigation, it is necessary to understand where a
school district is situated in the legal scheme.

It is

axiomatic that school districts are creatures of the state,
but what type of creatures are they?

Upon this classification

rests the courts• and legislatures' manner of dealing with
the school district.

It is generally held that a school district is a corporation.

Chief Justice Marshall in the famous Dartmouth case

defines a corporation as follows:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the character of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated
to effect the object for which it was created. Among the
most important are immortality, and, if the expression
may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a
perpetual succession of many persons are considered as
the same, and may act as a single individual. 'lb.ey enable
a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold
property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous
and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyance for the
purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is
chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in
succession, with these qualities and capacities, that
16
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corporations were invented, and are in use. By these
means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable
of acting for the promotion of the particular object,
like one immortal being.
Black's~

Dictionary defines a corporation as:

An artificial person or legal entity created by or
under the authority of a state or nation • • • ordinarily
consisting of an association of numerous individuals, who
subsist as a body politic • • • , which is regarded in
law as having a personality and existence distinct from.
that of its several members, and which is, by the same
authority vested with the capacity of continuous succession,
irrespective of changes in the membership, either in
perpetuity or for a limited term of years, and of acting
as a unit or single individual in matters relating to the
common purpose of the association, within the scope of
the powirs and authorities conferred upon such bodies
by law.
Courts have held the school district to be bodies
corporate, 3 political subdivisions of the state,4 and as public
or political corporations.5

Since this is the case the school

district bas only the powers expressly granted it by the state.
Now that it has been established that a school district
is a corporation with the powers of a corporation, it is

necessary to determine what type of corporation the school
district is.

Corporations are of many kinds and may be classi-

fied in different ways.a
The courts of the majority of the states have held that
strictly speaking, school districts are quasi corporations.7
Quasi corporations are not full corporations in the eyes of
the law but have a restricted being.

They possess some of the

powers of a corporation but they are primarily subdivisions
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of the state.

Counties, townships, school districts, and

irrigation districts are examples of this involuntary division
of the state.

'lb.e school corporation was created for the express

purpose of education without regard to the wishes of those who
become members of this corporation.

B.

THE THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY

The word tort is of French origin derived from the Latin
"torquere" which means to twist or bend.

It is quite diffi-

cult to define the word tort in all of its ramifications.

In

its simplest form it is a civil wrong perpetrated upon another,
exclusive of contract.

Prosser defines tort aa:

A civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for
which the courts will provide a remedy in the form of an
action for damages • • • It is not a crime, it is not
a breach of contract, it is not necessarily concerned
with property rights or problems of government, but
it is the occupant of a large residuary field remaining
if these are taken out of the law.8
Another classification of torts if made by Prosser in
which he sets up three basic grounds for tort liability.
1.

2.
3.

'lbere must be an active intent to interfere with
the plaintiff's interests. 'lbese are usually the
basis for criminal action such as assault, battery,
trespass, defamation, etc.
Negligences, the act or the failure to act as the
reasonably prudent man would act.
Strict liability which is usually imposed as a
manner of statute or policy such as with steam
boilers, elevators, and automobiles. On this ground
it is up to the defend.ant to prove that be has been
careful in his conduct. The burden of proof is upon
the defendant, since the Brincipal of res ipsa
loquiter is here applied.
---
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Research done by Rindle indicated that school districts
were rarely charged with intentional acts to interfere with
a plaintiff's interest.10

One can certainly agree that the

majority of injuries are not caused by any deliberate act of
commission or omission.

The natter of strict liability is

beyond the scope of this investigation.

Ergo, the acts of

alleged negligence of the school district provide the focal
point of this study.
C.

THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE

Negligence is defined as any conduct that does not
measure up to the standards established by law for the protection of others.

Salmond defines negligence as follows:

Negligence is the 0taission to do something which a
reasonable man guided upon those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do,
or the doing of sy•ething which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. l
The American Law Institute states that:
Negligence is any conduct, except conduct recklessly
disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below
the standards established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.12
Negligence implies the unintentional omission or commission of
an act which results in injury or damage.

Such actions are

not in agreement with the standards established by the law.
In order to base a court claim upon the charge of
negligence it is necessary to show the existence of four
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elements necessary to a cause of action based upon negligence
are:
1.
2.
3.

4.

A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
A failure to conform. to the standard.
A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct
and the resulting injury.
Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of
another.13
The legal duty must be present and recognized by the

courts.

One cannot be negligent if he does not owe any care

toward the injured party.
If the duty is present, the actor is obligated to act
in a manner so as not to cause any unreasonable risks to the
other party.

It is in this area where the legal fiction of the

reasonable and prudent man reigns supreme.

Prosser discusses

the reasonable man at length.
The standard required of an individual is that of the
supposed conduct, under similar circumstances of a hypothetical persQn, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence,
who represents a community ideal of reasonable behavior.
The characteristics of this imaginary person include:
(1) the physical attributes of the actor himself, (2) normal
intelligence and mental capacity, (3) normal perception and
memory and a minimum of experience and information, common
to all the community, and (4) such superior skills and
knowledge as the actor has or holds himself out as having,
when he undertakes to act.
In the case of children and aged persons, a special
standard of mental capacity is applied, based upon what it
is reasonable to expect of one of the actor's age, intelligence, and experience.14
Related to the prudent man is the other test for negligence and that is the test of foreseeability.

When a reasonably
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prudent person would have foreseen the possibility of injury,
the failure to act in accordance with this danger is considered
negligent behavior.

Even if a third party enters into the act,

although innocently, and causes the direct injury, the second
party inay be liable for prior negligence if this was something

that a reasonable and prudent person might have foreseen.
Application of this principle is seen when a child does something that injures another child which a teacher might have
fo~eseen

and prevented.

The DeBenedittis case involved a boy

who was injured while P.xtricating a piece of metal from a
machine when another boy started the achine • 15 The teacher
was only ntne feet away but the legal cause of the accident was

the negligence of the teacher in failing to lock the machine
and in not keeping other students away from the machine.
In our judicial scheme the determination of what a
reasonable and prudent man is and whether a given act is foreseeable is a point of fact to be determined by the trier of
fact.

Each case is relative to place, time, and the cir-

cumstances at hand.

According to Bohlen the reasonable man is

the personification of the social conscience of the court or
jury, whichever it is which passes authoritatively upon his
acts and omissions.16
The proximate or legal cause is the leaven which produced the event.

There must be an unbroken causal chain

between the act or omission and the result, without which the
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aftermath would not have occurred.

The factual cause of an

injury is usually simple to ascertain but the proximate cause
is another matter.

Many insignificant intervening acts may

occur without breaking the chain.

If a new, independent, and

supersecing cause breaks the chain, the negligent actor is
relieved of his legal responsibility.

For example, a boy who

was standing on the playground was knocked down by three other
boys and injured his hand on a clinker on the playground.

The

plaintiff attempted to collect from the district, charging the
maintenance of the playground in an unsafe condition.

The court

held that the proximate cause of the injury was the intervention
of the three boys rather than the maintenance of the playground in an unsafe condition. 17 Frequently, the courts use
the "but for" test to determine the proximate cause of an injury.
That is to say, that the injury would not have taken place "but
for" the negligent act of the defendant.
As previously stated the facts of negligence are specific
and relative to each case; however, an abstract of some of the
general principles of negligent behavior are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

It is not properly done; appropriate care is not employed
by the actor.
The circumstances under which it is done create risks,
although it is done with due care and precaution.
The actor is indulging in acts which involve an unreasonable risk of direct and immediate harm to others.
The actor sets in motion a force, the continuous
operation of which may be unreasonably hazardous to
others.
He creates a situation which is unreasonably dangerous
to others because of the likelihood of the action of
f
e fore s
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6.

7.

s.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

He entrusts dangerous devices or instrumentalities to
persons who are incompetent to use or care for such
instruments properly.
He neglects a duty of control over third persons who,
by reason of some incapacity or abnormality, he knows
to be likely to inflict intended harm upon others.
He fails to employ due care to give adequate warning.
He fails to exercise the proper care in looking out
for persons whom he has reason to believe may be in the
danger zone.
He fails to employ appropriate skill to perform acts
undertaken.
He fails to make adequate preparation to avoid harm to
others before entering upon certain conduct where such
preparation is reasonably necessary.
He fails to inspect and repair instrumentalities or
mechanical devices used by others.
His conduct prevents a third person from assisting persons imperiled through no fault of his own.
His written o~ spoken word creates negligent misrepresentations. IS

The school district is involved actively in many of these
possibilities of negligent behavior, and it behooves the district to be congnizant of these considerations.
Assuming that the essential elements of negligence are
present asset out on page 20, what defenses are available to
the defendant school district?

The following have been ad-

vocated as reasons in law for denial of recovery:
1.

The doctrine of immunity from tort liability in
negligence of a governmental body while performing
a governmental function.

2.

Statutory non-fulfillment of conditions precedent to
liability, enacted by the legislature such as the
date of filing the claim and form of the claim.
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3.

Contributory negligence means any causal want of
care on the part of the injured party.

The con-

currence of want of care on the part of the plaintiff,
and the negligence on the part of the defendant, are
essential elements in a defense utilizing contributory negligence.

The courts are usually quite harsh

on the defense of contributory negligence on the
p~

rt of infants because of th.air tender years.

That

is, the court will not hold an infant to the same
standard of care as it will hold an adult.
4.

Valenti non fit injuria or assumption of risk is
sometimes utilized but rarely so in the case of
schools.

Either by express agreement or by impli-

cation the plaintiff takes his chances and thereby
relieves the defendant of any responsibility.
5.

~major,

act of God, or pure and unavoidable

accid£nt, is another defense used.

These are the

events such as an uncontrollable s.1owstorm or rain-

storm. In a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision it
was suggested that it was time to abandon this defense as being an example of loose usage of something
that is beyond the comprehension of man.19

"The

unavoidable accident is an unintentional occurrence
which would not have been prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care.20

If this is the case, no
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liability usually attaches.
All matters involve a certain amount of risk.

So it is

with negligence for the actors and the courts must balance the
riskS against the benefits derived therefrom.
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CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S IMMUNITY
F~OM

LIABILITY FOR THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION

A.

THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT IMMUNITY

In order to comprehend fully the modification of tort
liability of school districts for the ·tort o.f negligence, it
is necessary to examine the historical development, rationale

and philosophy behind the concept of governmental immunity.
This approach will be a general discussion of this issue without

any attempt to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but merely to
set the stage for subsequeut discourse.

There are many sources

of inf ormationl on this subject if the reader wishes to pursue
this vein of thought.
Ample evidence is available at this moment to justify
the statement that generally speaking, school districts, as
quasi corporations, are immune from suits in the area of tort
liability.

More specifically, the districts are usually held

immune from suits charging negligence.

"Although there is

authority to the contrary, it is a general rule that school
districts or their governing boards are not liable for torts
or for injuries resulting from their negligence, unless such
28

liabllitY is imposed by statute. 112

According to Edwards, "The

common-law principle, almost universally applied by American
courts, is that school districts and municipalities are not
liable to pupils for injuries resulting from the negligence of
the officers, agents, or employees of the district or municipality. " 3

Weltzin states the rule as follows:

The school corporation as a branch of the state engaged
in the execution of the governmental function of furnishing
education to the public, a duty involuntarily imposed upon
it by the state, is in the absence of statute to the contrary, protected to the same extent a~ is the sover~ign state
from responsibility for its own torts or those of its servants, resulting either from misfeasance or non-feasance in
the execution of. public duty.4

As previously stated school districts are extensions of the
state and therefore are not liable for torts committed while
exercising their governmental functions.5

To state it in a

different way, no action can be maintained against a school
district for personal injuries by charging negligence unless
there is a statute or judicial ruling to the contrary.
The doctrine of immunity from torts had its origin in
the Middle Ages.

This stemmed from the Divine Rule of the kings

or as sometimes expressed "the king can do no wrong. "

The

state has assumed the sovereign powers of the king and has inherited this immunity.

The school district, being an arm of

the state has traditionally shared the principle that it can
do no wrong.6
As a historical fact, the first time the doctrine of
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sovereign i,nmunity was applied to a subdivision of the state
was

l·n

the case of 1ussel v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671,

100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).

It might be noted that the English

courts later overruled this case and by 1890 the schools of
England were held liable for torts. 7

The infiltration of this

doctx-ine of sovereign immunity into the law controlling the
liability of local governmental agencies has been described as

one of the ,nysteries of jurisprudence. 8
the developrnent of our lega 1 system the

l!1 the early stRges of
~uling

of Russell v.

--

Men of Devon was taken over, and under the concept of stare
decisis became a barrier to bringing any action against a govern
mental a:.:;cncy such as the school district.

The United States Supreme Court stated that no action
could be brought against a sovereign without its permission.

It is an established primciple of jurisprudence in all
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by
individuals or by another state. And as this permission is
altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty, it
follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions on
which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the
suit shall be conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that justice to the public requires it .9
Such was the thinking of the SupreMe Court in 1857 in reference
to immun;_ty of the state.

There are hundreds of cases that support this doctrine
of immunity based upon the theory of "the ld ng can do no wrong." O

Some cases are given in the footnote. 1 1

...
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REASONS GIVEN FOR THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

B.

Different authors give varying reasons for the continuation of the doctrine of immunity.

Davis listed a total

of eighteen reasons for the maintenance of this doctrine after
the Civil War. 12 Fuller in his analysis of court decisions
listed ten reasons given by the courts for school district
immunity.13

Some of the leading causes will be abstracted and

discussed briefly as follows:
1.

The most fundamental and the one most frequently
cited is that the school is an agent of the state
carrying out a governmental function and therefore
shares the sovereignty of the state.

This is an

extension of "the king can do no wrong" doctrine.
Governmental functions are done for the benefit of
the public, and the school does not receive any
benefit from such functions.14
2.

The rule of precedent or stare decisis which implies
the following of previously decided cases of a
similar nature has meant that the court continues
to apply the immunity of quasi corporations.

Lower

courts are bound to follow the rulings of higher
courts and a doctrine, once settled, is very difficult to alter.
3.

Reasons related to finance, trust funds, impairment
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service, and expense of litigation are given as
other reasons for immunity.

The prohibitive costs,

the legal inability to pay these claims, the number
of law suits, etc. are items that could seriously
affect the operation of the schoo1.1 5
4.

The principal of respondeat superior does not usually
apply to school districts.

This principle means

that the master or principal (not used in an educational sense) is responsible for the acts of his
servant or agent.

It is enunciated in some courts

that this principle is not applicable to school
districts.16

"If a school district is not liable

for the negligent acts of its officers, it is not
liable for the negligence of its employees.~ 17
5.

The defense of ultra vires is stated as a reason
for maintaining the immunity of a school district.
An ultra vires act is an act above and beyond the
power of the school district.

It is held that since

tne school district has only those powers delegated
to it by the legislature, the district is not authorized to commit a tort.

One is not liable for acts

committed ultra vires.18
6.

School districts which are acting nolens volens
are sometimes considered as being immune from suit.
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Nolens volens means that no profit or advantage
obtains to said actor from the performance of his
duties .19
7.

Some authorities cite the reason that the schools
will be embarrassed and lose rapport with the public
if court actions are allowed and damages are awarded
for alleged negligence on the part of the school
district.

While this may be a true statement, it

does not seem to justify the suffering inflicted
upon individuals which the immunity rule now permits.

C.

MODIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY

While the doctrine of immunity from

~

liability of

governmental agencies. such as school boards, seems to be almost impregnable, the last hundred years, and in particular,
the last six decades have seen the wall beginning to crack and
in a few cases completely crumble.

Many legal experts have

denounced immunity as being unjust and illogical.

Some of the

following quotations illustrate this point of view:
The doctrine of state immunity in tort survives by
virtue of antiquity alone •••• The doctrine is not only
an historical anachronism, but, under our present rules,
works gross injustice to all parties concerned and manifests an inefficient public policy. The nonresponsibility
of the employing state, accompanied by the theoretical
responsibility of the mistaken or wrong-doing employee the limit of the vaunted "rule of law" - is unfair to
the victim of the inquiry, to ~Be subo
icer or
employee and to the community.
~\fJ \ S To v,..,

"

~'?
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The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from
liability for torts rests upon a rotten foundation. It
is almost incredible that in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightenment and in a republic, the
medieval absolution supposed to be implicit in the maxim,
the king can do no wrong, should exempt the various
branches of government from liability for their torts,
and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the
wrongful acts of the government should be imposed upon
the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than
distributed among the entire community, constituting the
government, whe.:.·e it could be borne without hards~f P
upon the individual, and where it justly belongs.
It may be that the common-law rule of immunity is
harsh and unjust in requiring the individual to suffer
the wrong in the instant case, and that society, in
keeping with the modern trend, should offer relief A but
this is a legislative and not a judicial question.~2
The Illinois Supreme Court in the leading Molitor case
had

this to say about immunity:
We are of the opinion that school district immunity
cannot be justified on this theory. (The theory of
sovereignty). Likewise, we agree with the Supreme Court
of Florida that in preserving the sovereign immunity
theory, courts have overlooked the fact that the Revolutionary War was fought to abolish that "divine right of
kings" on which the theory is l:>ased.
We do not believe in this present day and age, when
public education constitutes one of the biggP-st busi~1esses in the country, that school immunity can be
justified on the protection-of-public-funds theory •••• Nor
can it be properly argued that as a result of the abandon
ment of the common-law rule the district would be
completely bankrupt. California, Tennessee, New York,
Washington, and other states have not been compelled
to shut down their schools •••• Neither are we impressed
with the defendant's plea that the abolition of immunity would create' grave and unpredictable problems of
school finance and administration •••• "Tort liability is
in fact a very small i~~m in the budget of any wellorganized enterprise."

t•.

..

0.J

We are of the opinion that none of the reasons advanced in support of school district immunity have any
true validity today.24
There does appear to be a trend toward relaxation of
immunity in the United States as will be
followinr; chapters.

docu~ented

in the

The development of governmental liability

is on tte increase, witness the Federal Tort Claims Act, so
stat tJ42, passed in 1946.

Other contributing factors are the

increase in tlle number of private corporations doing governmental work and the need to protect them in some way and the

increase in tJ1e amount of liability insurance being purchased
by

these bodies in an attempt to protect against negligent suits.
It is somewhat of an anomaly that in the United States

the

doct~ine

of immunity has been retained while in other

countries closely allied with the Western European culture the
concept has been abolished.

In England, the school
have been held liable for their torts since 1890. 25

dist~icts

In Germany

the schools under the Weia1ar Republic are held liable for their
torts. 26

nln fact practically a 11 the western countries of

Europe have abandoned the rule of immunity." 2 7

The

Canadian

school boards do not enjoy the freedom from tort liability that
the majority of the states of the union have traditionally
helct.23

As Lincoln said on the occasion of his first annual
message, December 3, 1801, "It is as much of a duty of govern-

ment to render proper justice against itself, in favor of its

-
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citizens, as to administer the same between private individuals."

D.

STRUCTURAL FORMS OF MODIFICATION

It is the prime purpose of this dissertation to point
out and analyze the various means that are being developed and
used to change the traditional doctrine of governmental immunity
on the part of the school district.
Two forms of classification relating to the modification
of immunity rule are made.

One categorization relates to the

genesis of the power allowingBJits to be brought against the
school board.

In this system the source of the authority may

be in the hands of the legislature of the state, or the source
may come from the rulings of the courts.

For the sake of

brevity these are referred to as either statutory or judicial
authority.
The second form of classification relates to the speci.f ic
charges that are brought against the school board.

The type

of activity engaged in by the defendant at the time of the
act, the place where the act was committed, and the relation
of the school district to the act determine what form the modification may take.

Examples of this type are:

"safe places"

statutes, "save harmless" statutes, governmental or proprietary
functions, nuisances, and trespass to property.
Of

course the two classifications are not dichotomous :f.n

actual practice.

G\:.'nerally, a case will Livolve firms fro:n

both categories as they are applicable to the instant case.
"The greatest abrogation of goverm:iental immunity has
been .;n
... the area of school (bus)

compensation.

transportation and work1nen 's

These two special areas have been singled out by

the legislat\.lres as special fields of injury and have been
graute-.i relief and protectio .. : for damages. " 29

The field of

workmeu's compensation is not a part of this investigation.

Pupil injuries in addition to school bus accidents provide the

major causes of court act ion against school boards for negligence.

It is the purpose of the rer.ia.ining chapters to examine

the various forms of mod if icat ion of immunity by er.ch state
that has so modified.

In this examination the philosophy and

rationalt2 of the legislatures and courts are analyzed.
the opinions and dictas

{Jf

.:·ram

the courts the operational procedure

necessary to defend against a charge ol negligence are found.
Different authors have viewed this classification in other
lights.

Davis ga.ve the following reasons found in case law for

allowing recovery against a school district for personal injury:

Recovery against school districts has been granted
under four distinct sets of circur:1Sta:1ces, three under
which immunity had not been abrogated and one under which
it had. School ,Jistricts have been held liable for
pupil injuries (a) in New York in spite of the existence
of t!le immunity doctrine, (b) in California, Hashington. and New York where statutes have abrogated common
law imu1unity, (c) because special statutes in states
adhering to the common law doctrine have been interpreted
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to allow recovery, and (d) because of special circumstances arising in states adhering to the common
law doctrine. The arguments raised in the cases allowing recovery were identical in many instances to those
used in the cases denying recovery. However, whereas
in the cases where recovery was denied, the courts were
often over-zealous in interpreting statutes to exclude
recovery, in the jurisdictions where recovery has been
favored every effort seems to have been made to interpret facts and statutes to grant recovery.30
The following chapters study the states which grant
recovery under statutes and case law.

These statutes have pro-

visions which directly impose liability on school districts to
pay claims, damages, or judgments stemming from personal injuries.

The states which by judicial interpretations have

allowed recovery are also analyzed.

Also the states which per-

mit the purchase of liability insurance but maintain the immunity doctrine are studied.

Finally, the states which by some

special circumstance or ruling have granted recovery receive
analysis.

The above examination of the various states and their

types of recovery allowances provide the outline for the remainder of the investigation.
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CHAPTER IV
VARIANT AND SPECIFIC FORMS OF MODIFICATI<liS
In a number of states and in certain specific areas,
recovery from the school corporation was permitted.

Two special

areas, which were frequent sources of litigation, were school
bus transportation and workma1's compensation laws.

investigation these

~areas

In this

were not studied except in an

incidental relationship to the larger field of tort liability.
In some of the states express statutory actions had been taken

to abolish the i1nmuni ty doctrine.

For example, in Alabama,

Mississippi, and North Carolina, claims for transportation
injuries were handled by a special agency established by the
legislature.

In the opinion of the writer this area would be

a fertile field for further research.

Different states allowed

claims under certain specific instances.

It was difficult to

generalize from these specific applications.

Some of these

areas of special ap,lication were: "safe place'' statutes,
"save harmless" statutes, proprietary aild governmental functions
and the waiver of liability due to the purchase of liability

insurance.
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A.

SAFE PLACE STATUTES

In states such as California and New York the school
district was held liable for maintaining buildings, grounds,
and premises in an unsafe manner.

~ashington

restricted this liability for a "safe place."

has partially
Two states,

Colorado and Wisconsin, have enacted special statutes which
impose liability upon the school district to build and maintain its buildings and/or equipment so as to render them safe
for general usage.
The state of Wisconsin had established a definite statute
converning a "safe place."

The "safe place 0 statute of Wis-

consin defined the place of employment, employmemt, employer,
and a frequenter.

Some of the applicable subsections are:

The employer shall mean and include every person,
firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, village,
school district, sewer district, drainage district, and
other public or quasi public corporations ••••
The term "owner" shall mean and include ••• school
district ••• 1
In keeping with the general trend of strict interpretation by the courts, schools in Wisconsin were exempt from
suit until the above amended statutes which expressly mentioned
school districts were passed.
consin allowed recovery.

In one case the court of Wis-

The plaintiff fell down some stairs.

At the bottom of the stairs a door was closed suddenly by
another student.

The district was held liable for the danger-

our condition of the stairs and door.

The boy injured his hand
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bY ramming it through a glass panel of the door.

The shutting

of the door by another was not the proximate cause.2

In

another case in which a child was injured while playing with a
flagpole that was on the school grounds, the court held that
the f J.agpole was not part of the building as defined in sectiOD 101.01. 3

A boy was killed when struck by a falling flagpole on
the evening of OCtober 11, 1938.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court

affirmed the decision of the circuit court whichlDd dismissed
the case.

The court held that a flagpole was a true structure,

but that it was not used as a place of resort assemblage as
indicated in section 101.01.

The doctrine of the immunity of

a municipality in the performance of governmental functions was

In another Wisconsin case the plaintiff was enrolled
in a vocational school. 4 As a result of operating an unguarded

affirmed.

wood planer the plaintiff injured his arm, which was later
amputated below the elbow.

He asked damages of $30,000.00.

The case was appealed from the circuit court which had over-

ruled the defendant's demurrer.

reversed the circuit court.
was unsafe, not the building.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court

The court stated that the machine
A student was not an employee nor

was a school a place of employment for a student.

This ruling

upheld the immunity of the school while discharging its governmental functions, and the school district was not liable for the
acts of negligence of its employees.

In a case tried in 1957
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the court ruled that:
Under Wisconsin law an absolute duty is imposed on
the occupant to make the place as safe as the nature
and place of employment will reasonably permit and performance of the commonglaw duty to make it reasonably
safe does not suffice.
As it appeared, the courts of Wisconsin did allow recovery for violations of the

'~afe

place" statutes, but the

construction of the statute was of the strictest character
thereby resulting in limited recovery.

In a decision banded down June 5, 1962 the Wisconsin
supreme Court upset the theory of municipal tort immunity. 6
This decision abolished the 125 year old doctrine of immunity
when the agency was performing a governmental function.

How-

ever, in its ruling, the court said that its judgment did not
apply to school districts.

It would therefore appear that

school districts still come under the old doctrine of immunity.
By

comparison, the applicable statute of the State of

Colorado reads :
Any person, firm, corporation, or association operating a •••• school house •••• or place of public assemblage,
or any kind of establishment wherein laborers are employed or machinery used ••• shall provide safeguards •••
and if machine:::,y is not aafe:;uarded as provided by this
act, the use thereof is pr~nibited.
It also provides that in order to establish liability
of the defendant and to recover damages, it shall be
sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that death or
inquiry resulted from the use of machinery for which
the defendant failed to provide safeguards as required
by statute.7
However, as yet, no cases have tested this statute in this state.

B.

SAVE HARMLESS ST.1\TUTES

Another technique, which was developed recently, was the
enactment of "save harmless" statutes.

These statutes bave

indirectly made the board of education liable for negligence.
BY the enactrllE'nt of this type of law the board of education
assumed the financial responsibility for the liability of certain
school employees while acting within the scope of their duty.
The purpose of this type of act was "to save harmless and protect all teachers and members of supervisory and administrative
staff from financial loss •••• n8 ''These statutes are based on
the assumption that the business of education has become so big
that it is unfair to saddle teachers and administrators with

liability risks which may be involved in their respective
positions. 119

It has been a generally accepted point of law

that teachers are liable for their acts of tort.

Four states

(Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Wyoming) have "save
harmless" statutes

effectiv~

at this time.

California does

not have a "save harmless" statute, but "the governing body of

any school district is liable as such in the name of the distric
or its officers or employees. 1110

The effect of the "save harm-

less" statute in New York is studied in Chapter

v.

In 1949 Connecticut passed its "save harmless" act.
was very similar to the statutes of New Jersey and New York
but appeared to be more comprehensive.

It reads as follows:

It

r
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Each board of education shall protect and save harmless any member of such board or any teacher or other
employee thereof or any member of its supervisory or
administrative staff and the state board of education,
the board of trustees of each state institution and each
state agency which employs teachers, and the managing
board of any public schools, as defined in sec. 10-161,
shall protect and save harmless any member of such board,
or any teacher or other employee thereof or any member
of its supervisory or administrative staff employed by
it, from financial loss and expense, including legal
fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand,
suit or judgment by reason of alleged negligence or other
act resulting in accidental damage to or destruction of
property, within or without the school building, providing such teacher, member or employee, at the time of
the accident resulting in such injury, damage, or destruction, was acting in the discharge of his employment or under the di~·ection of such board of education,
board of trustees, state agency, department, or managing
board. For the purpose of this section, the term 'teacher'
shall include any student teacher doing practice teaching under the direction of a teacher employed by a town
board of education or by the state board of education.11
Section 10-236 gave the power to insure against the liability
of the above section. 1 2
In searching the citator the only germane case was heard
in 1955. 13 The court named the principal, the school board, and
the members of the board as defendants.
principal was assault and battery.

The charge against the

The principal slapped a boy

on the ear when the boy was whistling at his desk.

The Superior

Court of Connecticut, Litchfield County, sustained a demurrer
dismissing the action against the board and its members.

The

court held that a judgment must first be secured against the
Principal.

The purpose of the statute was not to abolish .

immunity but to protect teachers from loss by civil misconduct.

The statute was a statute of indemnification

-

~

loss, not

frorn liability.
In 1937 New Jersey enacted a statute which allowed the

board of education to provide legal counsel at the expense of
the board for legal action brought against teachers. 14

An

action which alleged the use of corporal punishment on the part
of the teacher was excluded from this benefit.
Jersey enacted its "save harmless" statute.
identical to the other states.

In 1938 New

It was almost

New Jersey passed this act one

year after New York and it was as follows:
It shall be the d~ty of each board of education in
any school district to save harmless and protect any
person holding office, position or employment under the
jurisdiction of said board from financial loss arising
out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason
of alleged negligence or other act resulting in accidental bodily injury to any person or damage to property
within or without the school building; provided such
person at the time of the accident, injury or damage was
acting in the discharge of his duties within the scope
of his office, position or employment and/or under the
direction of said board of education; and said board of
education may arrange for and maintain appropriate insurance with any company created by or under the laws of
this State or in any insurance company authorized by law
to transact business in this State, or such board may
elect to act as self insurers to maintain the aforesaid
protection.15
The New Jersey courts have held that the "save harmless"
statute did not create a liability on the part of the school
district, and the courts have upheld the immunity of the district. 16

This statute did not create a new cause of action

against a school board even if the board of education failed
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to insure against such liability.
In 1955 Wyoming passed a permissive statute authorizing
the school district to "save harmless" and protect teachers from
civil liability.

This act was as follows:

Each board of directors in any school district is
empowered and authorized to save harmless and protect
all teachers and members of supervisory and administrative staff from financial loss arising out of any
claim, demand, suit, or judgment by reason of alleged
negligence or other act resulting in accidental bodily
injury to persons within or without the school building;
provided such teacher or member of the supervisory or
administrative staff at the time of the accident or
injury was acting in the discharge of his duties within
the scope of his employment or under the direction of
said board of directors, and said board of directors may
arrange for and maintain appropriate insurance with any
company created by or under the laws of this state, or
in any insurance company authorized by law to transact
business in this state, or such board may elect to act
as self-insurer to maintain the aforesaid protectior..
This act (21-158, 21-159) shall not be construed as
creating or tending to create a liability of the school
district so protecting or insuring its teachers or staff
members, nor shall the failure to procure such insurance
as is authorized by this act be constr¥ed as creating
any liability of the school district.
The total impact of the "save harmless" statutes upon
the immunity of the school district has been negligible in two
of the four states while in New York it has been coupled with
a more widespread move toward abrogation.
C.

GOVERNMENTAL AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS

In order to successfully bring a suit against a school
district, plaintiffs sometimes used the technique of attempting
to divide the functions of a school.

The two functions were

r
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governmental and proprietary.
Recognizing that a school district cannot, under
the common law, be held liable for the negligence of
its agents or employees in the performance of a governmental function, plaintiffs in numerous cases have
claimed liability on the ground that the school district
was engaged in the performance of a proprietary or
private function.18
If engaged in a proprietary function, vicarious liability may
attach.

Some jurisdictions attempted to apply this distinction;

others did not.

Corpus Juris Secundum comments:

The immunity of a school district or other local
school organization from liability for tortB applies to
torts committed in the course of the exercise by the
district of governmental functions. Some authorities
held that such immunity exists regardless of whether
the torts were committed in the exercise of gov~rnmental
functions, but other authorities held a school district
is liable for torts committed in t~g exercise by the
district of proprietary functions.
One of the chief disadvantages of this approach was the
difficulty of distinguishing between the two functions.

It

was viewed as a "distinction without difference" by many courts

and was not applied because of the problem of uniformity.

The

test, frequently used, was whether the act"is for the good of
all without any element of special corporate benefit or
pecuniary profit.'~o

The fact that a function yielded a

pecuniary profit or produced revenue did not mean that this

was a proprietary function.21
While the jurisdictions that applied this ruling appeared to be in the minority, it is of some interest.
has a statute as follows:

Pennsylvania

r

--
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.:i1unicipal and quasi-municipal corporations, such as
school districts, are not immune from liability in tort
for the negligent acts of their servants committed in
the course of proprietary functions of the municipal and
quasi-municipal corporation.22
A school district which operated a swimming pool as a summer
recreation program was held liable when a boy drownect.23

The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this was a proprietary
function.

When a school district purchased a tax delinquent

house and the tenant, an eight year old girl fell, the school
was engaged in a proprietary function for buying, maintaining,
and possessing property.24

However, the court held that a

football game was an educational activity and therefore was a
governmental function. 25 Also, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a school district was not liable for negligence in
performing the governmental function of maintaining the school
grounds and fences.26
A case heard in Arizona held the school district liable
for a proprietary function. 27 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the lower court which had upheld immunity.

The defendant

had leased the football stadium to another school and had received a fee of $300.00.
faulty handrail.

A paying spectator fell because of a

The court ruled that the school district

had leased, received compensation, and was therefore engaged
ir1 a Droprietary function and liable.

The school districts of

Arizona are immune as governmental agencies.

The dicta of the

court implied that it did not wish to extend the doctrine of

r
,,,unitY any further than necessary.
i m, ..

Judge Windes, dissenting,

did not support the governmental proprietary distinction.

He

believed that other decisions showed that all functions are
governmental.
Two cases heard in Illinois during 1961 and 1962 ref used to make the distinction of dividing the functions.28

In

the Thompson case tried in New Jersey, the distinction was
l)C

made. ,,,;;.i

In Oregon the district was held liable for performing

the proprietary function of painting a flagpole. 30
The amount of litigation based upon this count is small
in comparison to the total picture of tort liability.

Within

any one given jurisdiction, prudence would indicate the nAed
for ascertaining if this division was attempted.

D.

THE EFFECT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE

Another enigma that is difficult to unravel is the effect

of liability insurance.

Many states have statutes which permit

the purchase of liability insurance.

In some states liability

insurance is purchased without the express statutory power to
do so.

It is doubtful if this expenditure would stand if sub-

jected to a judicial interpretation.

In the field of insurance

law it is common knowledge that the mere possession of liability
insurance does not imply the recognition of potential liability.
In fact, in many jurisdictions the fact that the defendant may

r
have l·nsurance is not admissible in evidence.

Jr.e of the reasons advanced for the immunity doctrine
was the protection of the trust funds; however, if these funds

were adequately protected by insurance, it might seem that
this argument would be voided.

'~he

great weight of authority

seems to hold that the purchase of liability insurance does
not waive governmental immunity, although there are some exceptions. " 31 A Kentucky court has said that "a statute giving
a school district permission to carry liability insurance to
cover torts • • • in no way makes the district itself liable
for such torts. 032
Despite this fact there were some exceptions to the
rule.

American Law Rt:ports had this to say about removal of

immunity to the extent of the coverage.

In a few jurisdictions the courts have taken the
view (which is worthy of characterization as enlightenment) that to the extent that a liability insurance
policy protects a governmental unit against tort liability, the otherwise existing immunity of the unit is
rernoved. 33
Tennessee and Kentucky were two states which have
pioneered in this new legal area.

Illinois allowed recovery

at one time under insurance but has since changed to an even
more liberal modification of tort liability.

allowed recovery to the extent of the policy.

Oregon in 1961
At the time of

Writing the picture in Indiana appeared to allow recovery.

In a leading case heard in Tennessee during 1932 the
court did not allow the d fense of

r
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because the plaintiff a 11d the :f.nsurance company had a6reed to

waive any excess da.mages over the limit of the policy. 34

In

1936 a similar ruling was made which removed immunity to the
extent of the coverage which protected the public funds of
the school. 35

In 1945 the court held that the reason for the

immunity doctrine was that there were no funds available to pay
the claims, but,

if insurance was carried, recovery could be

had, but only to the limits of the policy.36

Kentucky has taken a similar view.

In the Taylor case

where a child was injured in a bus accident, the school had a
policy with the immunity waiver clause. 37
to the extent of the policy.

Recovery was allowed

Kentucky has taken the middle

ground and "does not make the board liable for the torts of
its agents and employees but does permit suits and a judgment
to be obtained which, when final, shall measure the liability
of the insurance carrier to the injured party for whose benefit
the insurance policy was issued. n 38

This is a subtle dist inc-

tion in that in effect, Kentucky is not admitting liability,
but is allowing the case to be heard so that recovery can be

made against the insurance carrier, and the amount of recovery
is fixed by the court.

An interesting case was heard in 1947.

A school board member was legally riding a school bus and was
killed in an accident.

The defendant had a policy with the

waiver of immunity rider attached.

The deceased was held to

be within the coverage of the policy and immunity was removed
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to the extent of the coverage. 39

In another case an appeal

beard in 1952 allowed a jury trial against a school district

which had liability insurance. 40
In Indiana the Hummer case heard in 1953 ruled that the
statute permitting the purchase of insurance was not a waiver

of imrnunity. 4 1

However, in 1960 in an action against a county

board of commissioners, the liability for a proprietary function
was set at the policy limits. 42

The Indiana Supreme Court dis-

approved of the Hummer ruling by stating:

•'The opinion of

the Appellate Court in the case of Hummer v. School City of
Hartford City (1953), 124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N.E. (2d) 891 is
disapproved insofar as it is inconsistent with the views herein
expressed."43

In other words, that while the purchasing of

insurance is not a waiver of immunity, it does allow recovery,

but only to the limits of the policy.

Hummer allowed full

judgment recovery.
In Illinois the doctrine of immunity was modified for
a period of time so as to permit recovery to the amount of
insurance.

The permissive statute allowing the purchase of

liability insurance was passed in 1947•
to public schools in 1952.44

It was first applied

The Illinois appellate court

held that it was public policy to protect public funds.

If

the funds were protected there was no need for immunity.
"Liability insurance, to the extent that it protects the public
funds, removes the reason for, and thus the immunity to auit.'45

r

5('

Jn 1059 the

~olitor

case further modified immunity in Illinois

as will be discussed in a later chapter.
The Vendrell case heard in Oregon in 1961 constructed
the statute allowi.ng the purchase of insurance to mean that
the inrnunity of the district was lifted only to the extent of

the policy. 46
still

i~mune

If a district did not purchase insurance, it was
and not negligent for failure to do so.

It was apparent that a few states have taken this route
as a means of alleviating some of the injustices of immunity
without the violation of the trust funds or public money.

It

was a safe middle of the road technique which has had some
limited application.

E.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

In the bulk of special legisla.tion, the emphasis has
been upon the field of transportation.

Alabama and North

Carolina have a special agency to handle these claims.

Miss-

issippi has established a special fund from which payment of
not more than $500.00 can be made for bus accidents.

In

Louisiana a legislative resolution allowing a suit did not have
the effect of waiving the state's immunity. 47
In several jurisdictions which theretofore have been
immune, the doctrine has been shaken to some extent.

In 1956

a Maryland court hinted at the liability of a school district.
The court of appeals speaking to the appellant's contention
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that the school board was a body corporate and a body Politic
which may not be sued in tort for the negligence of its
employees and agents stated:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether this
contention is correct and assume, without deciding, that
it is, because, as we see it, the evidence shows no
negligence on the part of Choate, the agent and servant
of the board, and therefore no liability gn the part of
the board even if it is subject to suit. 4
As reported earlier in this chapter Wisconsin in 1962 over-

threw the immunity of a municipal corporation.

In 1961 the

Supreme Court of Michigan handed down a decision relating to
municipal corporations.

The court "overruled the doctrine of

governmental immunity for future cases by a majority of the
court. 049
It was concluded that the rule of immunity has been
chipped away in some states with some far-reaching decisions.
The inevitable lag was also at work, and it will undoubtedly
be many years before immunity disappears, if ever.
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CHAPTER V

LIABILITY IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK

The state of New York although not the first state in
the United States to grant recovery under judicial or statutory

authority was one of the leading states in the number of suits
allowing recovery. 1

Schaerer in his classification rated New

York as one of the liberal states in the field of modif i2
.
ca t ion.

Of the sixty-four court cases reported in The Pupil's

Day in Court:
---

Review of 1961, twenty-two cases dealt with
_.._..._

pupil injuries of which fourteen came from the state of New

York. 3

A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Davis stated the following regarding the development of
liability in New York:
New York has been the most liberal state with
respect to granting relief to injured parties. It
is the only state where tort liability has been imposed
without statutory provision. over a half century before
its immunity from suit was abrogated, New York Courts
held that a school board which is responsible for providing and maintaining school buildings cannot escape
liability on the basis of governmental immunity. The
school district is responsible for the torts of its
officers (that is, for its own torts), but not for the
torts of its servants or employees; that is, the doctrine
61
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of respondeat superior does not apply.4
At the time of writing New York did not have a statute
which expressly ma.de the school district liable for tort
actions.5

Accordingly, New York was one of the few states

which imposed liability by judicial authority.

However, this

condition has been modified by "save harmless" laws, a court
of claims act, and a comprehensive education statute.
Development of tort liability in the state of New York
followed rather an unusual path as compared with the majority
of the other states.

However, certain elements of this develop-

mental pattern are being duplicated in other jurisdictions as
they move toward the modification of immunity.

New York at one

time adhered to the doctrine established in Russell v. Men of
Devon and followed this ruling under stare decisis.

Two early

cases were the vanguard of the coming change in judicial thinking in the statt of New York.

In the case of Bassett v.

~,

tried in 1878, where trustees were being sued individually,
the court held that the school district was a complete corporation and therefore liable.6

This meant that if the trustees,

acting as a board, committed an act which was judged to be
negligent, they were liable for their tort,

as a whole board

of trustees and not just individually as members of the board.
In other words, you had to sue the whole corporation.
later reversed in 12 Hun. 209.

Decision

In another case heard in 189:1

against the city of New York, the ruling was that a city was

&3

never authorized to commit a tort· in discharge of its govern~ental functions but may be liable for proprietary functions. 7
The leading and precedent case in New York which literallY broke the back of immunity was the Wharman v. Board of
8
Education case decided in 1907.
A twelve year old boy while

-sitting in a classroom was struck on the
falling plaster.

head by a piece of

This blow fractured the skull of the boy.

Action was brought against the school board for negligence in
maintaining and permitting students to frequent a dangerous
building.

The defendant claimed that the repair of buildings

was in charge of subordinates and that the rule of respondeat
superior was not applicable to school districts.

The court

agreed with this point but held that the board had the power
to close the school and remove the pupils from an inherently
dangerous situation.

A jury held the board negligent for per-

mitting a dangerous building to be occupied by students.

A

governmental agency which must provide and maintain buildings
and equipment cannot escape liability on the ground that it is
a governmental agency.

This decision was appealed to the

Appellate Division and then to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial court's verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
From the ruling in this case the torts of agents, employees and
servants were not imputed to the school district because
respondeat superic..i.· did not apply.
the school district was held liable.

But for its own torts
This condition held until

r
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the enactment of the "save harr:iless" statutes in 1937 and their
subsequent construction.
In 1910 New York legislated a comprehensive act which
had

applicable sections dealing indirectly with the tort

liability of school districts.

One subdivision of section 1709

provided that boards of education of every union free school
district shall "establish such rules and regulations concerning the order and discipline of the schools, in the several
departments thereof, as they deem necessary to secure the best
educational results. " 9 In other words, the school district was
charged with the duty of being in full control of not only
the students and the educational program, but also with
establishing a safe environment in which to carry on a program
of education.

A subsequent subdivision of the same section

empowered the school district "to pay any judgment levied
against the school district, and in the event there are no
moneys otherwise available, to levy a tax upon the taxable
property of the district to pay the same." 10 Yet another subdivision ma.de it the duty of the school district to furnish
proper equipment and supplies. 11 The definition of equipment
has been interpreted rather liberally in the case of Edkins v.
Board of Education of City of New York. 12 Another subdivision

-

---------

of section 1709 mandated the care and provision of school
property to the local board of education. 13 "This section
has been the basis of recovery on the part of pupils injured

due to the dangerous con1ition in which school buildings have
been maintained when the condition is directly imputable to
the negligence of the board." 14 It was in section 1709 that
the beginning of the "save harmless" statutes had their origin.
From this section the board was given the mandate to establish
rules and regulations, provide safe buildings and equipment,
and pay claims arising from their negligence to comply therewith.

But as a point of law the principle of respondeat sup-

erior was untouched.

The board being liable for its own neg-

ligence but not for that of its agents, employees or servants
was termed

the "New York rule."

In McCarton v. City of New York, a rotten flag pole fell
upon the decedent and killed him. 15 The pole was on the school

---------

grounds but suit was brought against the city and the school
district.

The action was dismissed against the city, but the

board was held liable for not performing its statutory duty
to provide proper repairs.

Another reason for holding the

school liable was that, if the school had knowledge of the
pole's unsafe condition, the district was maintaining a

nuisance.
The philosophy and reasoning of the New York courts can

be seen from two cases heard during the Twenties.

In the first

case a boy who was operating a power saw as part of the regular
school program received injuries.

A jury unanimously found

the school district guilty of negligence in purchasing and

operating a dangerous instrument without proper safeguards.
To the defense that the board was a governmental agency the
court said:
The board of education is a governmental agency
of the state. It is not liable for the torts of its
agents. Such agents, like policemen of a city, are
personally liable for their torts done in the course
of their employment, but the corporation is not chargeable with their defaults. It, however, remains liable
for its own negligence.
When the state surrendered to the board a portion of
its sovereign power and delegated to it a duty imposed
upon the state by the constitution, and it accepted the
trust, it undertook to perform with fidelity the duties
which the law imposed upon it. It is not immune from
suit. The state has not created an irresponsible instrumentality of government and invested it with the
power to put ch:i.ldren at work at dangerous machinery
which it would be a statutory gffense against its laws
to use in private industries. 1
Further, the court held that the board of education is a body
corporate which may be sued.

State and civil divisions while

in the discharge of governmental functions are immune from
tort actions.

However, the board of education is a govern-

mental agency not a civil division, and the board is liable
for negligence and its own derelictions.

The court of appeals

upheld the appellate court's sustaining the trial court's
decision in favor of the plaintiff.
In the second case, Williams v. Board of Education No. !_,
the board of education had contracted for a farm woman to drive
a wagon with an. P."l{posed rear wheei. 17 In this device, children
were transported to and from school.

A child fell or was

pushed into the wheel and was permanently injured.

The court

beld the school district liable for negligence in failing to
foresee the hazards of such an omnibus.

That the court was

fully aware of the incongruity with the immunity doctrine and
cognizant of the far-reaching implications of this decision

is clear from its statement:
We fully appreciate the far-reaching effect the
principle we have stated as to the liability of school
districts may have on the matter of expense of rural
education, and the particular consequences which
necessarily fall on the residents and taxpayers of the
district. But we deem the protectio11 of small, help~ess childrig from avoidable injury of still greater
importance.
Because of the rule that the district was liable for
its own torts but not for those of its employees, recovery was
limited. That is, the board could not be held liable for the

negligent acts of employees, and yet, most suits were the
product of employee acts.
for many wrongs.

Consequently there was no recovery

Therefore, in 1929 New Yor.k passed the Court

of Claims Act, Section 12-a.

This act provided for tort claim

against the state for the negligence of its officers

~

employees on the same basis as an individual or corporation.
This statute has been held to subject the state to liability
for the negligence of its employees under respondeat superior.
Filing must be accomplished within ninety days unless a written
notice of intention is filed and proceedings started within two
years.

The primary emphasis of this enactment rested upon the

liability of the state, not upon the liability of the school
district.
A somewhat similar effect was brought about when the
state of New York passed the "save harmless" statutes in 1937.
These enactments placed the financial responsibility for the
negligence on the part of teachers directly upon the board of
education.

These acts protect the teacher from financial

loss as a result of injury caused by the alleged negligence of
the said teacher while acting within the scope of his duties.
New York has two "save harmless" statutes.

One is applicable

to cities having a population of more than one million;l9 the

other is applicable to cities of less than one million.20

In

the Reeder case the statute applying to cities of more than one
million was interpreted to impose direct liability upon the

board, and it was not necessary to secure judgment against the
teacher as a prerequisite.21

In another case the court ruled

that this statute was passed for the benefit of teachers, and
this right cannot be subrogated. 22 Here, a teacher who had
been negligent injured a student.

The teacher's insurance

company paid the damages and then sued the board of education
to recover in the name of the teach er.
this claim.

The court did not a "'.low

In the case of Massimilian, section 3023, dealing

with cities of less than one million in population, was held to
be only a statute of indemnification.23

Thus it will protect

the actor from loss only after actual financial loss baa been

r
Tbe status of liability of school districts in the state
of New York for torts of itself and of its employees has stabi25
lized, and many of the cases now deal with procedural :natters.

B.

RELEVANT STATtITES

In the historical development some of the New York
legislative acts and their provisions were noted.

In this

section a more comprehensive picture of the existing statutes
will :-::ie given.

Sect ion 1709 charged boards of education with the
responsibility to establish rules and regulations concerning
discipline and to supply adequate supervision.

other sub-

divisions of this act made it the duty of the school board to
furnish proper equipment and supplies and to provide and care
for

~chool

property such as buildings and grounds.

A subsequent

subdivision empowers the district to pay any judgment and, if
necessary, to levy a special tax to pay the same. 25
Section 2560 dealt with the liability of a board of
education of a city with more than one million population.
This act provides that the board shall be "liable for, and shall
ass•rn1e

liability to the extent that it shall save harmless, any

duly appointed member of the teaching or supervising staff,

o:.Cficer, or employee of such board ••

. ."

This liability

Shall be for the negligence "resulting in personal injury or

property damage •• • •

,,27

Of

course the in Ji vidual raust !:;e

worldng within the scope of his duties.

sonnel

Section 2561 provided "save harmless" benefits to perworking with needy children. 28
Section 25G2 stated that claims against a board of

education of a city having a population of four hundred thousand or more must allow thirty days before commencing legal

action.

This gives the board or its officers an opportunity to

act on the claim before litigation. 29
Section 3023 prescribed the liability of a board of
e<luca ti on, trustee, trt1stees, or board of cooperative educa-

tional service in cities having a population of less than one
million.30

This act was to "save harmless" teachers, student

teachers, members of supervisory and administrative staff or
employees from financial loss.

It was noted that both "save

harmless" statutes dealt with neglii;ence of personnel.

Section

3023 does not mention property damage as does sect ion 2560.

Section 2560 provided that the board shall be liable and shall
assume liability; however, section 2560 was construed as an
indemnification statute. 31 Thus, it will indemnify personnel
only after actual loss.
Section 3813 outlined the presentation of claims against
the governing body of any school district.

The claim must be

filed within ninety days, and the board must have thirty days
.
32
in which to act before court action is taken.
Subdivision

two stated that the clai:n must l'e filed in compliance wtth

section 50-e of the General Municipal Law. 3 3

The General

~,funicipal

Law, section 50-e, gives the pro-

cedural plan for filing a claim based upon a tort.34

The

not ice rmst be made in writing within ninety days of the in1

jury.

A sworn statement giving the name and address of the

claimant, the nature of the claim, the circumstances of the
injury, z.nd the items of damage or injury was mandated.

The

notice shall be served personally or by registered mail.

The

court may grant leave to serve a late claim if the claimant

is an infant, dies, or certain representations are made with
authorized officers or insurance carriers.

Such a late claim

must be initiated within one year of the time of injury, and

an affidavit must be filed stating the reason for delay.
C.

CASE LAW IN NEW YORK

Liability in general.

In the jurisdiction of New York

the school district is held liable for its own torts.35

The

board of education is liable for negligence in the exercise of
its powers or in the fulfillment of its statutory duties.

'fhe

board cannot plead on the grounds that respondeat superior is

not applicable to school districts.36

When the state waives

its immunity, it may become liable for injuries to a state

ec~·iool pupil ca.used by the negligence of its teachers • 37
Alth::>ugh the state has a duty to provide competent teachers,

'72

this provision may not he adequate to avoid liability.38

In

the state of New York this liability has indirectly been imposed
by statute. 39

Liability for torts of
--------

officers, agents, and employees.

-

In the majority of jurisdictions, school districts, in the
absence of statutes, are not liable for the torts committed by
its off ice rs, agents, and employees in the discharge of their
duties.

The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable

to school districts.
tiit:

tyi.)ic:al one.

However, the situation in New York is not

With the passage of the "save harmless"

statutes, the indemnification of loss on the part of an employee

was imputeJ. to the board of education.

Thus, while the board

cannot be sued for the negligence of its employees, the employee
can, and they in turn must be indemnified for their loss,

the

~oard.

by

These statutes cover practically all the individuals

who work for the school as long as they are within the scope of
their duties.

held to be only a statute

In the case of Massimilian v. Board of Education of (;ity

----

of Niagara Falls, section 3023 was
of indemnificatiou. 40

A young boy, who was injured while play-

ing under the supervision of the board and teachers, alleged
t l1c ir negligence.

The supreme court reversed a lower court 's

denial of dismissal of suit.

The major question posed was

whether section 3023 gives a cause of action against the school

r
district or is it a means of indemnification to protect the
individual teacher, etc., from financial loss.

The court said

that it was the intent of the legislature only to protect the
individual teacher from loss, and not to give a right of action
to the injured party.
').

A leading case in this area is the Reeder case.

41

The

court of appeals in New York affirmed the lower court and its
decision.

A boy who was helping a teacher move a car motor on

a dolly injured his hand.
and $200.00 to the father.

A jury awarded $5,000.00 to the boy

This case interpreted section 2560.

The court held that responsibility is imposed upon the board
of education, first to the injured person and, secondly, to

the employee by the way of indemnity.

The statute is clear

and unambiguous leaving no room for judicial interpretation.

The statute states that the board is "liable and shall be liable
for

...

Since this case was heard, it has been followed

in the state of New York.
The court held in the Sun case that section 2560 was
passed for the exclusive benefit of teachers.

Only the par-

ticular teacher may sue the board for indemnity as this right
cannot be extended by

~brogation,

and cannot be assignect. 43

and the statute is personal

The plaintiff, an insurance company,

had insured the teacher against liability while teaching.

A

pupil was injured by an act of negligence on the part of the
teacher and collected from the insurance company by an out of

r
court settlement.

The plaintiff tried to collect

iro~

the

school district, but the court ruled this right could not be

An appeal was denied by the appellate court and

subrogated.

also by the court of appeals.

It would seem that there is no

need for a teacher to have insurance or for an insurance company
to sell it to teachers.
The school district is responsible for the negligence
of its employees if they are acting within the scope of their
duties.44

In order that a school district be lia.ble the

ordinary rules of determining negligence must be followed.
there is no negligence there is no liability.

If

In other words,

respondeat superior is applicable, but by statutory action. 4 5
Essential elements

~~negligence

clain.

A

legal duty

must rest upon the school board before a claim of negligence
will be allowed.

Not only must there be a duty but a failure

to conform to the standard expected must exist.

An omission

or commission of some act either general or particular is
essential to negligence.

In the case of Scully v. State the

court helcl tbat statutory duties must be perform€d with care. 46
The state was responsible for the provision of a safe building.

As will be shown in the section dealing with supervision, the
scliool board has a duty to adequately supervise students while

at school. 47

The board of education has a duty to establish

adequate rules to protect students against preventable accidents

75

In the Gove! case the failure to do so was considered a vioiation of statutory requirements and imposed a liability upon
the district. 48 The plaintiff, a boy, broke his leg while
doing au extremely difficult acrobatic stunt.

While this was

not the cause of the suit, it was introduced in the case to
try and show a history of negligence on the part of the school
since the plaintiff claimed that there were not proper safety
precautions taken in the gym.

One month later he received a

gunshot wound when a gun accidentally discharged.
was being repaired in an industrial arts class.

The gun
The court held

that the board was negligent because of its failure to establish
rules concerning the inspection and regulation of dangerous
instrumentalities.
appeals.

In the

This decision was upheld by the court of

the plaintiff brought action against
t.b.e school board charging negligence. 49 A small girl was
~case

asked by her teacher to pick up a paper sack lying on the ground.
She cut her hand on a broken pop bottle inside the sack.

The

city court awarded damages of $3,388.25 to the child and $124.50
to the father.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed

this decision and dismissed the complaint.

The appellate court

denied recovery because of the failure to "establish that the
latent danger was reasonably foreseeable in the exercise of
reasonable care in supervising the infant plaintiff under the
circumstances. u 5o In a similar decision the court held that,
if the injury could not be reasonably foreseen, the school is

76

absolveJ of liability. 51

A boy was struck in the eye by an

eraser thrown by another boy.

The teacher was out of the room.

fhe boy had committed this act twice before, and the teacher
11ad required him
arrived.

to stay out of the room until the teacher

This rule was enforced for one nnd one-half months,

at which time the boy was allowed back into the room even when
the teacher was not there.

The supreme court reversed the trial

court's judguent on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The RIJI)ellate court held that it was an error to ask the jury
whether
bac~

the school authorities were negligent in allowing him

into the room.

The fact that the child was allowed

into the room was not causally connected to the injury.

bacl~

The

question that a new trial must answer is whether the teacher
could have reasonably foreseen the injury and so was negligent

in aot better supervising the room.
The Weiner case exemplified the second essential element
of a claim for negligence.

There must exist a close causal

connection or proximate cause between the act and the resulting
. .
.
t h i s case.
lnJury
or d amage, 52 an d none was f oun d 1n

In the

DeBenedittis case, an industrial arts student was trying to
extricate a piece of metal from a !!lachine when another student
ster•ped

on th(> activatinr; button.

was only nine feet away.

At this time the teacher

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

affirmed the lower court's decision holding the teacher neg-

ligent.

The teacher was negligent because of not warning the

77

student to stay away from the machine and not exercising minute
enough supervision. 53

In another case a boy was injured while

standing on the playground by the conduct of three other boys
in pulling him down on a clinker lying on the ground. 54 The
plaintiff attempted to secure a judgment against the school
board, alleging negligence in not maintaining the playground
in a safe condition.

The court held that the proximate cause

of the injury was the unforeseen act of the three boys, not the
condition of the playground.

In a split decision the Supreme

eourt, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's decision
of dismissal.

In another case the plaintiff, an eleven year

old girl, was injured when stepping over a wire fence which
was raised by another student.55
supervise.

No teachers were assigned to

Negligence was charged against the school board.

The trial court entered a verdict for the plaintiff.

However,

the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed and dismissed
the complaint.

The proximate cause of the injury was the un-

foreseen act of the student raising the wire, not the lack of
supervision.

An older case held that a school board is not

liable to a pupil injured by another on the grounds that it had
failed to provide guides for the safe conduct of pupils while
playing, where no such duty was imposed by statute. 56 Under
section 2560 no new rules of negligence were created, and the
teacher must use only such reasonable care as a prudent parent
would.

A third person's act was unforeseeable as the proximate

78

cause. 57
pencil.

In this case a boy was struck in the eye by a thrown
The pencil was thrown to another boy who ducked and

the pencil hit the plaintiff.
absent obtaining supplies.

The teacher was temporarily

Conflicting evidence placed the time

of the absence from a few minutes to seventy-five minutes.

The

court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the
trial court's decision for the plaintiff.

Judge Conway in a

dissenting opinion stated that the jury apparently believed
that the teacher had been gone for a long time, and that there
was much chaos and disorder.

If so, this absence was the cause

of the accident and could have been foreseen and prevented.
Such a question is a question of fact to be determined by the
jury.58
The evidence must clearly show that negligence was
present, and many cases

ha~e

been dismissed for lack of evidence

Some of the following cases demonstrated the rationale of the
courts.

In the case of Pelcak v. Board of Trustees of Common

School District No. 10 a dog bit a child while the child was
~~~~

~

~

playing on the playground.

59

This was a rural school with

only two teachers assigned to the building.

The child's

teacher, the only one present at the time, was inside having
a conference with the parent when the injury
jury trial held for the plaintiff.

occur~ed.

A

The Supreme Court, App-

ellate Division, reversed and dismissed the complaint.

The

court held that the evidence was insufficient to show that

r

79

!

the teacher was negligent; therefore, the board was not liable.
In another case the fact that the teacher was talking to another
teacher in the hall while her class went up the stairs was

not negligenct.

60

The passage of the class was orderly, and

she could not have anticipated the misbehavior.

In an action

against a school district and an eleemosynary association a
cerebral palsy child became petulant when refused permission
to go with some other boys and fell over in his specially
constructed chair. 61

The Supreme Court of Nassau County ruled

that there was no evidence of inadequate supervision or maintenance of a defective chair.

Mere testimony by a child was

held to be insufficient evidence establishing inadequate super62
vision.

A comparison of the record made at the time of the injury
and at the trial exhibited some discrepancies causing the court
to hold insufficient evidence. 63 ~In the case of Vitagliano v.
f

Board of Education of City of New York, a suit was brought

----------

against the board for injuries incurred by a pupil when struck
in the eye by an eraser.

The verdict of the lower court was

reversed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, as against
the weight of evidence. 64
Standards of care.

The courts of New York have con-

sistently held that the school must exercise only ordinary care
in the operation of the schools, and that the schools are not

80

insurers of the safety of the child.

The board of education

18 held to reasonable standards of care and is required to take
onlY those steps reasonably calculated to protect the students
and personnel.

A jury had awarded $4,500.00 to the plaintiff,

a teacher, for injuries incurred while settling a fight in the
school cafeteria. 65 In the Cambareri case a fifteen year old
boy injured his knee when a mat slipped during a relay race. 66
The complaint alleged the boy was rather awkward, the floor
was slippery, and the mat was not secure.

The Supreme Court

reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

The£!!_

curiam opinion of the court stated that the defendant was not
the insurer of the plaintiff's safety and many hazards surround
individuals.

Injuries are suffered in spite of reasonable care

and for which no legal liability can be attached.

In the

Leibowitz case a twelve year old girl had descended stairs and
walked across the gym under supervision. 67 In a small outer
exit hall she fell or was pushed down three stairs.

The Supreme

Court, trial term, dismissed the claim of failure to supervise
the outer exit hall.

The court said, "The duty did not devolve

on the defendant to have supervision every single step of the

way.

There were guards up to within a few feet of the doors

leading to the three step staircase. " 68
could get into the hall at one time.
to time, place, and circumstance.

Only a few children

Negligence is relative

The district owed reasonable

care such as a parent of ordinary prudence would have exercised

r

81

I

under like circumstances.

To hold negligence in this case

demanded a responsibility greater than reasonable caution.
When a child fell from playground apparatus, the court held
that the school was not required to provide specific supervision.

General superintendence would not have prevented the

accident. 69 ~ In the Conway case the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, reversed the jury award of damages in the sum of
$2,500.00 for the infant and $75.00 for medical expense.70

The

plaintiff was standing in a line extending from the vice-principal 's desk out into the hall.
the moment.

A monitor was in the office at

Several boys were scuffling and the plaintiff was

thrown backwards into the jamb of a closing classroom door.
The complaint alleged inadequate supervision.

The court held

that all movements of pupils need not be under constant scrutiny,
and closer supervision might not have prevented the accident.
Furthermore, negligence is relative to time, place, and circumstance.

In the Sanchick case to impose negligence would be
tantamount to insuring the safety of the child. 71
Buildings, playgrounds,

~equipment.

In New York the

statutes impose a duty upon the board of education to provide
and maintain buildings, playgrounds, and equipment in a reasonably safe condition.

In fact, the Wahrman case, which was the

first case to depart from the immunity doctrine, pertained to
the unsafe condition of a building. 72 Another leading case in

B2

this area is the Lessin case.73

This decision held that the

maintenance of school premises and facilities in a reasonably

safe condition cannot be delegated, and the school is liable
for the nonperformance of such maintenance.

The court had

this to say:
The Board of Education of New York is a governmental
agency, not a civil agency of the State. Even where the
rule is maintained that civil divisions of the state,
when engaged as delegates of the state in the discharge
of governmental functions are not liable for the acts
of their agents and contractors, the rule has not been
extended to exempt a governmental agent from liability
for its dereliction. The state has created the board
of education as a corporate agent to discharge governmental functions. No exemption from responsibility for
dereliction in the discharge of a corporate duty has been
granted. The responsibility of the individual agents
and officers of the state has been transformed into a
corporate liability.
The members of the board cannot discharge that duty
collectively without the intervention of agents or
employees, but the duty of the board is not complete
when it appoints such agents or employees. It acts
through them. If they fail to discharge property the
functions assumed by the board, the board is responsible
for such failure, aside from any rule of agency. The
board has in such case failed to perform a duty imposed
upon it by law. and liability may be predicated upon
its own wrong • 1 4

tln the Scully case an elderly woman fell while descending the
steps of an auditorium after watching a movie held at night.75
The complaint alleged the maintenance of the building in a dark
and unsafe manner.

The lower court held the state responsible;

however, the appellate court reversed the decision because there
was no defect in the stairs.

When a six year old boy was injure

while playing on a defective fire escape door, negligence on

r

83

the part of the school was shown and so the board was held
liable. 76 In the Edkins case an apron was defined as equipment
to be furnished by the district. 77 A fifteen year old boy
while working on a lathe caught his sweater in the machine.
trying to extricate himself his thumb was amputated.
was furnished although this was the general practice.
trial court found for the plaintiff.

In

No apron
The

The Supreme Court,

Appellate Division, reversed on the law and directed dismissal.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the statute required

the board to furnish such apparatus, maps, globes, books,
furnitures, and other equipment and supplies as may be necessary
for the proper and efficient management of the school.

It

was its duty to provide such equipment, including aprons.

When

the school contracted for the use of an unsafe wagon as a means
of transportation, the board was liable for failure to provide
proper equipment. 78 A kindergarten student fell from the stage
of an auditorium while practicing rhythms.

The court held the

district not liable for maintaining a dangerous condition.79
The furnishing of a standard wheel chair was held to be permissible, if it was not defective. 80 School districts were
required to use ordinary care in maintaining school property. 81
-'" Supervision ~ students.

Under the statutes in New

York it is the duty of the school to supervise the conduct of

the students while on the school grounds. 82

In the Ferrill

case a seven year old girl was on the slides during the noon
hour recess under the supervision of two teachers. 8 3 Near the
top, the lead child did a "belly whopper" and kicked the defendand off the slide.

There were between 125 and 150 children

on the playground under the supervision of two teachers.
teacher saw the accident.

Neither

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

reversed the lower court and ordered a new trial.

The court

held that the school district owed no duty to provide more slides
than now present.
supervision.

It was the board's duty to provide adequate

The question of adequate supervision was a ques-

tion of fact to be determined by a jury.

The case was reversed

because the appellate court could not determine if the jury
found against the school district for failure to provide more
slides or to provide adequate supervision.

In another case the

board was held not liable when it had appointed competent personnel.

The board was not required to segregate a mentally
retarded pupil into a spec.ial class. 84
A more fundamental question is the adequacy of the super-

vision.

Negligence is relative as previously noted.

In the

Silverman case the plaintiff had attended a physical education
class and was walking to the locker room. 85 The instructor
had gone into the locker room.
Present.

There were 200 to 250 students

Usually the "difficult" students were separated, but

not on this occasion.

Two of the students had a history of

r

J5

trouble.
plaintiff.

The municipal court awarded $900.00 damages to the
In an appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

affirmed the decision holding that the question of adequacy of
supervision was for the jury.

Further, tbere was ample evidence

to show the foreseeability of the incident and, with adequate
supervision, the accident would have been prevented.

In another

case a six year old boy was injured while playing on the defective door of a fire escape. 86 The facts were that at the
noon hour the class was playing outside without teacher supervision, although the superintecdent had so instructed.

The

classroom teacher supervised by looking out the window and
could not see the fire escape.

The jury found the board negli-

gent in not providing adequate supervision.

The trial court

set aside this verdict, which was iater upheld by the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, in a split decision.
Appeals reversed the appellate court.
negligent.

The Court of

The court held the board

The failure of the teacher to supervise did not

break the causal relation between the defendant's conduct and
plaintiff 'a injury.

The board was not responsible for the

negligence of the teacher except under section 3023.

The court

did not hold the teacher liable because of a lack of a motion,
but as a matter of law she was clearly negligent.

In the Fein

case a high school student injured himself when he fell from
a chinning bar.87

In an optional exercise he completed twelve

Chins and fell six inches to the floor.

He lost his balance

and twisted his tac:{ res•Jlting in a ten ;aonths' stay in the

hos Pi tal.

The complaint charged a lack 'Jf supervision and a

failure to provide mats.

The jury found for the plaintiff, but

the trial court dismissed for lack of evidence.

There appears

to be some discrepancy as to whether he fell or jumped.

The

supreme Court, Appellate Di\ision, upheld the dismissal, but

this was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

The court held that

there was adequate supervision, but the provision of a !llat was

properly a question for the jury.

The supervision of the noon

hour recess by a janitor was held to be inadequate.88

were no rules for the noon hour.

There

A boy broke his arm when he

fell seven feet from the mat after being propelled into the air
by

the janitor.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, re-

versed the lower court's dismissal of the suit.

The court

held that the board must select adequate persons to supervise.

The board is responsible for the acts of the janitor as he
was their representative.
question for the jury.

The reasonableness of this was a

When the teacher was taving a con-

ference with the parent, the evidence was insufficient to show
negligence on the part of the district. 89

When a boy was in-

jured in a scuff le while standing in a line and supervision

was present, the court held that it was impossible to guard
against every act. 90

In the Barbato case a class of twenty-

five kindergarten pupils was doing rhythms on the stage. 91

teacher was nearby playing the piano, when a child fell from

The

tl1l' S. ta.re.
~

The students were under control, had :.ecu l.i:structed,

and Lle teacher was expcrieuced.

The court held t Lai. t hi:::: uid

not coustitute negligence nor was the activity inherently

dangero,is.

In another case a boy was strucl: by a bat wbilE:

chasing a ball. 92

The supervising teacher was thirty f €et

away distributing milk.

The complaint charged negligence be-

cause the teacher was not actually supervising.

The jury found

for the plaintiff, but tl!e tri.al court reversed the verdict
stating that general supervision was adequate.

The teacher

could not foresee the accident, and it would have happened
evf;n

if the teacher were closer.

The teaclier is not required

to constantly supervise every aspect of play at all times.

In

an action against a school district, the trial court held for
the

plaintiff, a six year old who fell from a horizontal ladder.

The:

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, dismissed the claim on

the

grounds that more specific supervision was unreasonable and

the

apparatus was suitable for play. 93

In an opinion by the

counsel for the educational department the following was stated:
Where parents or other adults are used as chaperons
or assistants to the teacher on field trips by school
bus, and there is an accident causing injuries, the
school district, in an action against it for negligence,
may use the defense that the district had placed the
children und~i the supervision of trained and competent
individuals.
The presence of a «.!Or.1petent and qualified teacher is generally
construed as fulfilling the obligation of providing adequate
supervision.

In the Graff case a high school student was struck

r
in tJ1c eye by a SDft rubber ball. 95

The Supre.1e Court, A!;pel-

iate Court, reversed the lower court's judgment for the )Jaiatiff.

There appeared to be no actionable negligence on the

part of the instructor, and a rubber ball was held not to IJe
an inherently dangerous instrument.

In another case the county

court reversed the lower court's payment of medical damages to

the plaintiff. 96

While exercising on a "gym horse", a four-

teen year old boy fell and brol\.e his arm.

The complaint alleged

nagligence on the part of the defendant to provide adequate
supervision and instruction.

The facts showed that the boy

had been gtven instructions, and performed the exercise t::efore,
and the instructor was only five feet away.

The court held

that the district is only liable if negligence is shown.

Under

section 2560 the court held the district not liable for injuries to an infant incurred by hitting another swimmer under
the

In this case the court did not feel the instructor
was negligent. 97 An interesting point of law was discussed
in the Luce case. 98 A young girl who had a history of broken
w~ter.

arms previously had requested no rough games, but had not
obtained a doctor's certificate to that effect.

Wh:lle playing

"jur.ip the stick" relay, she fell and brolrn her arm.

The complain

alleged negligence on the part of the board, the supervising
Principal and the physical education teacher.

The Supreme

Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court's decision
for the plaintiff.

The court indicated that the rules must

89

be of a practical nature and cannot cover every detail.

The

principal did not have the authority to direct the gym class
since this was a separate department.

The physical education

teacher was under a direct duty io exercise r£asonable care
and foreseeability.

Such a question was for a jury; the other

points confused the issue.
court said:

In reference to section 3023 the

"In view of section 3023 to indemnify there seems

to be little practical value in distinguishing the liabilities
of the respective defendants.

However, this case calls for it

and individual liability must be determined without regards to
the indemnification statute. u99
Supervision relates also to the provision and enforcement of policies and regulations.

Several cases dealt with

this area and the board's responsibility therefor.

In a 1960

case the plaintiff brought action against the school board for
lack of alleged supervision. 100 A second grade girl was struck
in the face by a baseball bat, which was swung by another girl.
The girl that swung the bat was from an older group.

The

second grade teacher was standing nearby when the accident
occurred.

The older girls, who had been excused from study

hall, had obtained the softball equipment without procuring the
permission required by the rules of the board.

Contrary to the

rules of the board, no teacher was supervising these older girls.
In a lower court the jury found the district liable and awarded damages of $5,000.00.

The reviewing court modified the

decision by

orde1~1ug

a new trial unless the hoard agreed to

tnc 1•ease the damages to $10,000.00.

The court said:

"The

-ndate of the Legislature to establish rules means more than
to write them 111 a book.....

Reasonable efforts must be made

bY the Board to enforce salutary and adequate rules; and a

liability may be incurred for a failure to enforce as well
as uiaiie a rule. ulOl

In a case where the plaintiff wa3 injured

by the accidental discharge of a gun, the board was held liable

for failure to establish adequate rules. 102

The board must

establish rules coucer11ing the inspection and regulation of

dangerous instrumentalities.

Generally, when the board of education

UUlkes

no ef:fort

to supply after school supervision, the board is not liable for

any accidents that may occur.

The contention invoked in many

of these cases was that the plaintiff assumed the risk himself

when committing the act resulting in the injury.

In a case

where a nineteen year old boy was injured while playing basketball, he should have Jmown the conditions under which he
played. 103

The plain ti.ff had played there many times.

Assump-

tion of risks consists of actually doing a deed with foresight
of consequences.

The boy, no infant, had knowledge of the

physical arrangement of the gym and had an appreciation of the

dangers involved.
the defendants.

The court dismissed the complaint against
In another case a seventeen year old boy came

onto the playground after school to play handba.11. 104

He was

91

struck by a bat slipping from the hand of a stick ball player.
The

Supreme Court, Appellate Di vision, reversed the tria 1 court's

jury verdict for the

plainti~.

The court held that, when the

school board kept the playground open after school, it was under
00

duty to supervise.

The school district is not liable for

damages caused by the .:ond:.ict of a participant on a playground
without supervision.
he

The plaintiff had assumed the risk when

entered the playground.

In another case a young boy was

injured in the school yard after school when struck by a
bicyclist. 105 The trial court left the question of negligence
to a jury which awarded damages of $250.00 to the infant and
$371.45 to the mother.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

reversed and dismissed the complaint.

The court held that there

was no duty on the part of the school board to prevent any
particular kind of play.

No supervision was attempted; no

pretense of supervision was made.

The parents knew of the

hazards involved in sending their child to the playground.
There are natural risks which are to be borne by whom they
happen to strike.
Procedural matters.

-

Almost fifty per cent of the cases

--------

reported in The Pupil's Day in Court: Review of 1961 pertained
_...._
to some phase of procedure. 106 The General Municipal Code
outlines the statutory requirements for filing a claim against
a municipal body, based upon the tort of negligence, in the

state of :{cw York • 107

In most cases the issues revolved around

the claim that was filed after the statutory deadline had elapsed
and the sufficiency of the claim notice.

In the Sunshine case the claim was filed after the ninety
108
daY statutory period had passed.
The plaintiff had injured
herself in a fall in the gym.

Since the statute gives the court

discretionary power to permit the filing of a late claim, the

claim was allowed insamuch as the claim was filed within eight
months.

year.

statute permits such claims if made within one

The

In one case the court allowed a suit even though a period

of three years and eight months had elapsed since the time of
injury. 109

After the statement of claims was made, the actual

particulars of the claim were not filed for another two years.
The statute which authorizes late notices stipulates that the
claim must be filed within ninety days.

The boy was injured in

a football game OCtober 17, 1952 and the final
served February 25, 1958.

~ummons

was

The lower court denied a motion to

dismiss the motion upon the grounds of a late claim.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld this denial.

The
The

court stated that the board of education knew about the suit
all the time.

Jn fact, the board was negotiating a settlement

most of the time; therefore, the rights of the board were not
prejudiced.

On the other hand a claim that was filed sixteen

months after the injury was denied.

110

In another late claim

case the court approved a late claim although no court order

bad authorized the filing of a late claim.111

The court noted

that the board of education had received timely information
about the case from several sources.

The claim was filed four

and one-half months after the accident, but the attorney forgot
to get the court's permission to file a late claim.

The court

noted that this usually nullifies a claim but permitted an
amended notice of claim because of the school's knowledge of
the accident.

In the Martin case a claim that was made nineteen

months after the injury was denied under the statute which
requires filing within one year. 112

This seems to be consistent

with the reaEoning in the Brown case where the claim was filed
sixteen months after the injury.

The father petitioned for

the service of the claim, nunc pro tune.

---

Appellate Division, unanimously
dismissal of claim.
Court of Appeals.

a~irmed

The

Supreme Court,

the lower court's

This action was later affirmed by the
The dicta of the case commented upon the

history of section 50-e.

The Judicial Council wanted the state

law to read, in the case of infants, that a reasonable time
after the cessation of the disability be allowed for filing.

However, the compromise bill which allowed one year was passed,
much to the disµprobation of the Judicial Council.

In the

Lambo case a late claim was permitted, but later reversed upon
the submission of new evidence.113

On

December 2,

plaintiff was injured in a fall during gym class.

1958 the
Upon the

evidence that the father had suffered a stroke February 2, 1959,

tllC

trial court permitted a motion to file a late clai:n.

Upon

alJl)eal the evidence showed the stroke lad occurred February 4,
1ssa.

It was n.Jt possible to ascertain whether this was an

erroneous belief on the part of the trial judge or a typographical error.

The appellate court ruled that the case must

be retried.

The sufficiency of notice accounted for a good share of
the procedural points upon which litigation was based.
subdivisions of this are found:

Two

(1) the proper receipt of the

notice, and (2) material content of the claim.

In the Salner case a suit was initiated against the city
of New York and the Board of Education of the City of New
Yorlt • 114

The claim was served upon the city cotu.ptroller.

The

lower court found for the plaintiff stating that the board had
immediate notice of the injury.

Tho Supreme Court, Appellate

Division, held that the claim was not received by the person
designated by the statute.

Accordingly, the lower court's

order was reversed.

In another case the court permitted a suit which was·
erroneously served on the city comptroller. 115

By inference

the court concluded that the school board had been notified in
sufficient time, since the board's attorney had examined the
plaintiff, and the item was verified by the secretary of the
board of education.

H5

After being assaulted by another pupil at school the
plaintiff sought permission to file a late claim against the
school board. 116

The attorney had filed a claim with the

comptroller, but his secretary had forgotten to notify the
school board.

The school was presumed to have knowledge of the

occurrence because a teacher was present, a conference with
school officials was held, and a letter was sent to the board
informing them of the incident.

Since the rights of the board

were not prejudiced, the claim was allowed.

In a similar case when an eighteen year old girl was
injured but neglected to file a claim within the ninety day
period, permission was granted. 117 The Oneida County Court
held that the school authorities had knowledge of the injury.
The purpose of the statute was to prevent fraudulent or stale
claims.

In this case the district had time to investigate

the claim.

Unless the school is definitely prejudiced by the

late claim, the court may use discretion toward the claimant.
The matter of her age is not too important, because she was
a minor and her parents or guardian had to do the filing for

her.
In another case the opposite ruling was given. 118

A

boy was injured in a bus accident, but no written notice was
ever filed.

The representatives of the district and the dis-

trict's insurer investigated, discussed, and negotiated with
the claimant.

In fact, they arranged for his medical care.

96

No action was commenced on the case for two years.

The court

held that the investigation did not waive the statutory requirements of the formal notice.

Certainly, it is the right

of the board and its insurer to investigate without a formal

claim.

It may be possible to waive some forms of irregularity

but not the notice itself.

An infant's statement of the accident was held not to
be a notice of claim under section 50-e. 119

The Supre~e Court,

Appellate Division, reversed the jury verdict for damages of
$1,500.00 for the plaintiff.

When a seventeen year old suffered injuries at track
practice, his guardian,

~

litem, sued for damages in the sum

of $150,000.00 for the infant and $20,000.00 for hiruself.

~he

complaint alleged negligence on the part of the board, its
agents, servants, and employees. 120 At a later date the plaintiff sought to amend the claim to include the teacher.

The

school sought to block this because. under section 3023 the
district was bound to "save harmless" teachers, if acting
within the scope of their duty.

Since the teacher was not

truly a real party to the case because of the above statute
it was not necessary to amend the claim.

In a like case it was

held by the Court of Appeals that it was not necessary to serve
the claim on the teacher when both the district and the teacher
were parties to the suit.

''For all practical purposes, even

though the suit is in the name of the teacher it is the school

J7

district which is the real party against who111 the claim is

nsa de. ul21 The court ~uranted leave to amend the notice of claim
,,ben a single ccpy of uotice had gone to the business manager
of the town. 122 The board received the notice from the business
inanager.

The school board was not prejudiced nor fraudent ly

victimized.

The court also permitted some change in the bill

of particulars but would not permit an increase in the amount

of damages asked.

-------

In the case of Horowitz v. Board of Education the notice
~-------

was sent by regular mail to the school board by the counsel for
the plaintiff • 123 The cour-t dismissed the claim on the grounds
that the service of the claim was improper because it was not
served <>n a member of the beard, nor any trustee or clerk thereof
The

failure to comply with the statute could not be waived in

any way by the court •

Abatement and/or diminishment £!..liability.

The New

York courts have established some principles which may be
relied upon as
negligence.

~eans

of defense against the suit based upon

In many cases these defenses are combined or

somewhat altered.

In several cases the courts have said that

the school is legally not responsible for the safety of the
Child. 124 Nor is the school responsible for establishing
elaborate and detailed rules of conduct .125

It is also held

that it is not necessary to be with the students every moment • 12

'l'be court in New York recognized the assumption of risk rule
and made it available to the school as a defense.127

The

school district is not liable for the acts of teachers, employee ,
agents and officers if they are acting beyond their scope.

And

in a few cases the court has ruled that pure accidents or "acts
of God" occurred.

Judging from the number of cases studied,

the prime defense employed was that the omission or commission
of the act must give rise to actionable negligence.

In the

final analysis the question of what is negligent behavior is
a question of fact t·.J be determined by the jury or the judge.
D.

INSURANCE PRACTICES IN THE STATE

Section 3023 authorizes a board of education to procure
insurance or to act as a self-insurer.

No mandatory provisions

are found for the purchase of liability insurance, but the
majority of school boards carry insurance.

Most of the policies

are of the owner, landlord and tenant public liability type.
Some of the awards of damages in New York have ranged from
$500.00 to

$45,ooo.oo.

In the latter case the board had a

policy with a $25,000.00 limit.

A tax levy was required to

pay the remainder of the suit brought by a boy injured in an
unusual bicycle accident.1 2 8
In 1949 the state comptroller said the following about
the purchase of insurance:

"Boards of education in a city

having a population of less than one million may insure against

itS net;ligence and that of its off ice rs and employc:es; such a
boa.rd is not a general insurer of safety of pupils. 11 1 2 9

The

IJ].lltter of carrying insurance or not has had little importance

in the development of tort liability in the state of New York.
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CHAPTER VI
LIABILITY IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
The state of california, which did not enact its first
abrogation statute until 1923, holds one of the leading positions in the modification of tort liability.

California was

the only state that expressly passed legislation to abolish
immunity and has maintained this role virtually unchanged since
inception.

Of the ninety-six cases granting recovery by

statutory authority Davis reported that thirty-two came from
the State of California. 1 In another classification Schaerer
rated California as one of the liberal states in the United
States. 2 ''Because of these statutes abrogating immunity, California, through the years, has usually led in the number of
damage suits brought against the school district, although it
contests with New York frequently for this distinction.'.3
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Prior to 1923 a number of lawsuits were being filed
against the members of school boards and school trustees on
the theory that the board members were personally liable for
any injury to students, due to negligence of any policy,
building or employee of the schocl system.
108

In some of these
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actions these officers were found liable for personal injuries
to pupils of the public schools.

Quite naturally, these in-

dividuals were becoming alarmed and apprehensive at this
development.

In addition to being a thank.less task and a job

•ithout monetary compensation, the possibility of a costly
court action was sufficient to cause many school board members
to resign.
In order to combat this alarming state of affairs, the
state of California enacted a series of statutes designed to
ameliorate this situation.

Two statutes were passed by the

legislature in the year 1923.

The ''Public Liability Act" made

the district liable for injuries to persons and property caused
by the dangerous or defective condition of buildings, grounds,

and property.

At the same session of the legislature, but at

a different time, the district was made liable for injuries to
any pupil caused by the negligence of the district or its
officers or employees.

A few years later the lawmakers passed

an act making the district liable for injuries or damages
caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned by
the school.
"As bas been the usual practice when the flood gates of
school immunity are open and the flood of court cases tends to

engulf the schools, some stopgap m.ethod must be made to plug
the hold and save the schools.'~

California reacted by passing
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a statute in 1931 which restricted the claims by establishing
procedural guidelines.

It was in this era that the school districts were given
• mandate to purchase liability insurance to protect the distric

-

against tort liability.

This was mandatory legislation as con-

trasted to the usual permissive provisions.
In 1931 the statute which made the district liable for
injuries to pupils for negligence was amended.

The words "to

any pupil" were deleted and the words "on account of injury to

person or property" were added, thus greatly broadening its
coverage.
California has long provided for the payment of claims
against the district.

The statutes also provide for legal

service.
In recent years California has added various acts to the

already complex field of tort law.
ment Code was added in 1959.
presentation of claims. In

Article II of The Govern-

This article deals with the
1961 further amendments were added

to this article.

It was not possible to anive at a precise general
statement of the law in California at this time.

In fact, the

area of claims procedures is vague, overlapping, and contradictory.

''The present law of California governing the pre-

sentations of claims is complex, inconsistent, ambiguous,
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difficult to find, productive of voluminous litigation, and
often results in the denial of just claims. 05

From the historical data it appears that California has
completely abrogated its immunity from tort liability, and in
th~

subsequent sessions of the legislature has sought to refine

and clarify its status.

At this moment it appears that further

clarification is needed.

The break with inmmnity has been so

thorough that the liability of the school district in Cali-

fornia is quite similar to the liability of individuals or
private corporations.
B.

RELEVANT STATUTES

When looking at the statutes of california many major
recodifications are found.

Originally, the school laws were

found in The Political Code in the year 1872.
in The Political Code until 1929.

They remained

Since the 1929 Code two

major recodif ications are found, the 1943 Education Code and

the 1959 Education Code.

Because of these major rearrange-

ments confusion results when looking for a given section under
cross referencing.

The location of desired materials was

difficult to find.
The first abrogation statute passed in 1923 is sometimes called ''The Public Liability Act."

This bill which is

similar to some "safe place" statutes read as follows:
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Counties> municipalities, and school districts
shall be liable for injuries to persons and property of
public streets, highways, buildings, grounds, works and
property in all cases where the governing or managing
board of such county, municipality, school district,
or other board, officer or person having authority to
remedy such condition, had l:nowledge or notice of the
defective or dangerous condition of such street, highway,
building, rrrounds, works, or property and failed or
neglected, for a reasonable time after acquiring such
lmowledge or receiving such notice to take such action
as may be reasonably necessary to protect the ~ublic
against such dangerous or defective condition.
During the same session of the state assembly, but at a
different time, the following statute was passed:

Boards of .school trustees, high school boards,
junior college boards, and boards of education are liable
as such in the name of the district for any judgment
against the district on account of injury to any pupil
arising because of the negligence of the district or its
officers or employee9, and they must pay any judgment
out of school funds.
In the Ahern case it was held that these two statutes
were separate entities and were to be construed individually. 8

Section 1623 dealt •::i th the negligence involved in injuries to
pupils while ''The Public Liability Act" dealt with the liability toward the general public.
In 1929 the school district was made liable for any
damage or injury to persons or property caused by the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle by any officer, agent, or employee
While acting within the scope of his duties.9

At the same time

that the district was made ltab1e for the negligent operation
of motor vehicles, the district was given the power to purchase
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109 urance to protect itself against the liability as given
above.

The payment of such a premium was considered a proper

cnarge against the school district.
Because of the apprehension existing among the board

members during the early part of the century, the statutes
passed were very explicit in absolving these officers of personal liability.

Two statutes were enacted in 1923 which per-

tained to the liability of board members.
necligence:

One dealt with

t'No member of any board of supervisors, board of

trustees, city council or board of school trustees, shall be
liable for the negligent act or omission of any appointee or
employee appointed or employed by him in his official capacity. nlO

In a similar vein and contained in tho same act,

"No member of the board of school trustees and city boards of
education shall be held personally liable for accidents to
children going to or returning from school or on the playcrounds in connection with school work."ll
In the same year the district attorney of the county
was instructed to defend the district or any members of the
board without fee or charge.
In 1931 the school district was given the power to
insure against the liability of the district or board members
for the negligence of the distri.ct or its officers, agents, or
employees while acting within the scope of their duty .12

The state assenbly, in 1331, amended The :Political

--

code of 1923, sec. 1623, p. 298.

Formerly, the liability was

limited only to pupils, but the new amendment expanded the

coverage to "persons or property. ul 3

In an act designed to accompany ''The Public Liability
Act" of 1923,

C~lifor!1ia

enacted in 1931 the method of filing

a claim based upon this liability.

It read as follows:

Whenever it is claimed that any person has been
injured or any property damaged as a result of the danger
ous or defective condition of any public street, highway, building, park, grounds, worlta, or property, a
certified claim for damages shall be presented in writing
and filed with the clerk or secretary of the legislative
body of the municipality, county, city, or school district, as the case may be, within ninety days after
such accident has occurred. Such claim shall specify
the name and address of the claimant, the date and place
of the accident, i~d the extent of the injuries or
damages received.
In a further effort to restrict the number of actions
being brought against the school board, the state of California passed a restrictive statute pertaining to the liability for negligence.
The governing board of any school district is liable
as such in the name of the district for any judgment
against the district on account of injury to person or
property arising because of the negligence of the district, or its officers, or employees in any case where
a verified claim for damages has been presented in
writing and filed with the secretary or clerk of the
school district within ninety days after such accident
has occurred. The claim shall specify the name and
address of the claimant, the date and nlace of the
accident, and the extent of the injuries or damages
receivect.15
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TbiS section was in effect until 1959 when the procedural
aspects were shifted to another section of the code.
As the reader may be beginning to understand, the state
of affairs in California is elusive and hard to elucidate with
any feeling of accuracy and thoroughness.

In fact an article

entitled "Claims Against Public Entities: Chaos in California Law" was an apt title. 16 The author of this article
stated that there are more than 170 separate tort liability
provisions dealing with the various types of government.
are of a great variety.

They

Some of them duplicate each other,

others contradict, and some establish variable requirements for
the same type of claim.

Since the beginning of the claim pro-

visions, litigation has increased four times.

There appears

to be a desperate need for new legislation in this area.
Primarily, the statutes pertaining to the tort liability
of school districts were found in two codes.
~

The 1959 Educa-

Code and The Government Code were the two major sources

although the statute relating to the liability of the school
district :ivr negligent operation of a motor vehicle was 1bund
in The Vehicle Code.

Some of the current enactments embodied

parts of the previous laws which have been discussed above.
In addition the new code utilizes a new and different numbering
system.

All of the following situations are from West's

Annotated California Code.

llC:
Section 903 of The Education Code, formerly Section 1007,

-

-

makes the district liable for negligence.
·~he

It reads as follows:

governing body of any school district is liable as such

in the name of the district for any judgment against the district on account of injury to person. or property arising be-

cause of the negligence of the district or its officers or
employees. " 17

-

This statute had its derivation in The Political

code of 1923, sec. 1623.
West's Annotated California Education Code, section 904,

outlines the payment of claims against the school district.IS
The board is given the power to pay claims out of the school
funds subject to the constitutional limitations.

If the claim

is too large to be paid in one year, the board may budget it
for the ensuing year.

If this presents an undue hardship on

the board, the board may amortize the payments over a three
year period,and the rate of interest shall not exceed four per
cent per annum.

(Rate of interest held unconstitutional in

Welch v. Dunsmire, 326, P. 2d. 633, 1958).19
also had its origin in

~Political

This section

Code of 1923, sec. 1623.

Section 906 makes it the duty of the district attorney
to defend suits against the district.

''The district attorney

of the county in which a school is located shall, without fee
or other charge, defend the district in any suit brought for
injury to any pupil for any cause. 1120

Section 806.5, which was

r
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added in 1961, authorized the services of an attorney and that
compensation of said attorney was a proper use of funds. 21
Very similar to the old statute was section 1041 which
dealt with the personal liability of board members.

"No member

of the governing board of any school district shall be held

personally liable for accidents to children going to or returning from school or on the playground or in connection with
school work. 1122
Another section held the members of the board of education

not personally liable ur-less there is negligence on their part.23
section 1043 made it the duty of the district attorney to de-

fend board members or district employees for any act, or
omission, in the line of his official duty. 24
The district was required to carry liability insurance
for negligence.

Section 1045 covers this area as follows:

The governing board of any school district shall
insure against the liability (other than the liability
which may be insured against under the provisions of
Divisions 4 and 5 of the Labor Code) of the district and
against the personal H.ability of the members of the
board and of the officers and employees of the district
for damages to property or damages by reason of the deat.h
of ,or injury to, any person or persons, as the result of
the negligent act by the district, or by a member of the
board, or any officer or employee when acting within
the scope of his office or employment, and may also
insure against the personal liability of the members of
the board of any officer or employee of the district as
an individual, for any act or omission performed in the
line of official duty. The insurance may be written in
any insurance company authorized to transact the business of insurance in the state, or in a nonadmitted insurer to the extent and subject to the conditions prescribed by Sec. 1763 of The Insurance Code.25
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Jn the case of cities having a population of more than 500,000,
theY may act as self-insurers and provide the money for the
liability of the district, officers, agents, and employees
from their own funds. 26
California imposed a strict manner of supervision upon
the teachers.

"Every teacher in the public schools shall hold

pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and
from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess. 02 7
West's Annotated california

Government~

spells out

other provisions relative to the tort liability of local entities.

In attempting to ascertain which statute is controlling,

the reader should remember that as a point of law the specific
statute usually is controlling over the general enactment.
However, various parts of The Government Code do pertain to
the school district.

-

-

At this time the procedural matters seem

to rest in this part of the California laws.

The old ''Public

Liability Act" also has been transferred into this code.
Section 53050 defined the terminology of the act.

A

person is defined so as to include school buildings, playgrounds
and property. A local agency means any school district. 28
Section 53051 makes the agency liable for dangerous or
defective conditions of public property.

This act is very

similar to "The Public Liability Act" passed in 1923.
reads as follows:

It
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A local agency is liable for injuries to persons
and property resulting from the dangerous or defective
condition of public property if the legislative body,
board, or person authorized to remedy the situation:
{a) Had knowledge or notice of the dangerous or defective condition.
{b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge or
receiving notice, failed to remedy the condition or
take action reasonably necess~9y to protect the
public against the condition.
In section 53052 the claimant is told the manner of
presentation of a claim.
When it is claimed that a person has been injured
or property damaged as a result of the dangerous or
defective condition of public property, a written claim
shall be presented in conformity with and shall be
governed by Chapter 2 of Division 3.5 of Title 1 of
The Government Code.30

At one time this procedure was given in sec. 53053 but is now
found in Chapter 2 of Division 3.5 of Title 1.
The Government Code sec. 53054 reads that "the fees and
expenses of defending the suit are lawful charges against the
local agency. 031
Section 53055 deals with the payment of claims and compromise of disputed claimso

''When a legal liability is ad-

mitted or disputed the local agency may pay a bona fide claim
or compromise a disputed claim out of public funds, if the
attorney for the local agency approves of the compromise. u32

,The
- Government -Code,

Title 1, Division 3.5, Chapter 2,

secs. 711, 715, and 716 are relevant to the filing of claims
against local entities.
in 1959, 1961 and 1963.

The bulk of these sections were passed
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Section 711, which was passed in 1959 and amended in
19 61, outlined the content of a claim.
A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a
person acting on his behalf and shall show:
(a) The name and post office address of the claimant;
(b) The post off ice address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent;
(c) The date, time, place, and other circumstances of
the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the
claim asserted;
(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation
injury, damage, or loss incurred so far as it may be
known at the time of the presentation of the claim; and
(e) The amount claimed as of the date of presentation
of the claim, together with the basis of computation
thereof.
The claim shall be signed by the claimant or by some
person on his behalf. Claims for supplies, materials,
equipment or services need not be signed by the claimant
or on his behalf if presented on a billhead or invoice
regularly used in the conduct of the business of the
claimant.
A claim may be amended at any time, and the amendment shall be ~onsidered a part of the original claim for
all purposes.33
In 1959 the State of California passed a new law concerning the deadline for filing a claim.

The prior statute

established the deadline as of ninety days from the date of
the occurrence complained thereof.

The new act sets one hun-

dred days after the occurrence as the deadline for filing.
A claim relating to a cause of action for death
or physical injury to person or to personal property or
growing crops shall be presented as provided in Sect ion 714 not later than the one hundredth day after the
accrual of the cause of the action. A claim relating
to any other cause of action shall be presented as provided in Section 714 not later ~han one year after the
accrual of the cause of action. 4
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Section 71G makes an allowance for presentation of
clai:ns after the expiration of the deadline, in the case of
claimants under disability.
The superior court of the county in which the local
entity has its principal office shall grant leave to
present a cla.irn after the expiration of the time specified in Section 715 if the entity against which the claim
is made will not be unduly prejudiced thereby, where no
claim was presented during such time and where:
(a) Claimant was a minor during all such tirae; or
(b) Claimant was physically or raentally incapacitated
during all of such time and by reason of such disability
failed to present a claim during such time; or
(c) Claimant died before the expiration of such time. 35
Undoubtedly, the change was precipitated in part by the

strict interpretation of the

deaciliu~ by

I.he courts of Cali-

f oruia.

In fact, one case was denied because it was filed on
the ninety-first day. 36 In this change of rationale the state

of California appears to be doing by statute what the judicial
authorities of New York are doing.
Section 801 describes the time and verification of
filing a clai•11 against an individual for his carelessness or
negligence concerning the dangerous or defective condition of
any public property. 37 A verified claim must be filed with
the proper officer within ninety days.

The contents of the

claim "shall specify the name and address of the claimant, the
date and place of the accident and the extent of the injuries
or damages received. ,,3S

West's Annotated California Vehicle Code, sec. 17001,

-
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contains the act concerning the school district's liability for
the

negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Any public agency owning any motor vehicle is
responsible to every person who sustains any damage by
reason of death or injury to person or property as the
result of negligent operation of the motor vehicle by
an officer, agent or employee or as the result of the
negligent operation of any other motor vehicle by any
officer, agent or employee while acting within the scope
of his office, agency or employment.39
Section 17003 grants the power to purchase insurance to

protect against the negligent operation of motor vehicles.

"Any

public agency may insure against liability under this chapter
in any insurance company authorized to transact the business
of such insurance in the State of California, and the premium
for such insurance shall be a proper charge against the respective general fund of the public agency. 040
C.

CASE LAW

As contrasted with New York, California has an elaborate
statutory framework upon which the tort liability of a school
district rests.

Due in part to the complexity and elusive

character of the statutes, California courts hear a large
number of tort liability cases each year.

New York and

California compete for the largest number of cases heard in
this area of law.
Liability in general.

A case heard in 1961 described
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the general feeling of the courts in California toward liability. 41

The court stated that the doctrine of immunity must

be discarded as an unjust anachrorism which exists only through
inertia.

Accordingly, the rule is that when there is negligence,

liability results.

In fact, nonliability was the exception.

In another case the court held that the district was liable for
all damages to persons or property caused by ordinary negligen-

ce.
the

42

The incident need not occur on the school grounds.

In

Grov~

case the plaintiff, who was a student, was injured
in an airplane crash while taking an aviation course. 43 Al-

though the operator of the airplane was a private independent
contractor, the district was held liable since it was deemed
that the district had sufficient control of the operator.
From the above examples and from the general tenor of
the statutory enactments, it may be said that California is one
of the most liberal states in its interpretation of the tort
liability of a school district.
Liability !£!:.torts £!._officers, agents

~

employees.

California statutes impose liability upon the district for the
torts of its officers, agents and employees provided that they
are working within the scope of their assignment.

The district

was held liable for injuries occurring to a person as a result
of negligence.44

This is a very unusual result becnuse Re-

spondeat Superior does not apply in relationship of an indepen-
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dent contractor.

In another case the district was held liable

for the negligent act of a teacher.4 5

In this case a small

group of junior college students practiced tennis after school

as part of their physical education course. Since
bUS

the school

had gone, arrangements were made for students to drive

these persona home, and the school would reimburse them for
thiS travel expense.

The car used in this case wall a sports

roadster, "a hot rod" with no fenders, no horn, no top, faulty
lights and in general poor condition.

accident occurred.

On the way

home a fatal

The basic question was whether the teacher

used ordinary care under the circumstances in permitting this
means

of transportation to continue.

The evidence disclosed

that the teacher knew of the unsafe condition of the car and of
its "reckless" driver.

The jury determined that this was neg-

ligence and that said negligence was the proximate cause of

the accident.

The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's

judgment of damages of $5,000.00 to the plaintiff and $1,500.00
to another rider.
When an instructor gave a student a defective oxygen
gau~e

on an oxyacetylene tank which exploded, the district was

helJ liable under the ''Public Liability Act.

lost an eye in the accident.

046

The plaintiff

The decision held that tbe dis-

trict was liable for maintaining a dangerous and defective

condition.
damages from

The supreme court upheld the decision but reduced

$35,ooo.oo

to

$1H,ooo.oo.

:Sven though the pilot who taught the cross-country
flyinG was an independent contractor, it was held that the district had sufficient control of his actions so as to make the
district liable for a student injured in a crash. 47
Generally speaking, the statutes and judicial interpretations of the State of California have imposed liability
upon the district for the negligent acts of its agents, officers,
and employees as long as they were acting within the scope of
their duty.

48

Essential elements £.!_

~

negligence claim.

In order to

maintain an action based upon negligence, the necessary ingredients must be present.

These elements are:

(1) a legal

duty, (2) a failure to perform up to standard, (3) the act
must be the proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.
Section 1623 of The Political

~

of 1923 imposed the

duty upon the school district to maintain its buildings and
property in a safe condition.

This act made the district

liable for negligent acts which injured pupils.

When the plain-

tiff lost two fingers in a saw, he charged negligence on the
part of the defendant.49

The actual determination of negligence

was put to the jury which awarded damages of $3,000.00.
supreme court affirmed the decision.

The

The statutes of California

impose a duty upon the schools to act in a reasonably safe and
Prudent manner.

12G

The Ballman case illustrated the reasoning of the court
·t pondered a negligence claim.50 The plaintiff, a student
as l
iD a physical education class, fractured her skull while doing
1

"rolling over two" acrobatic stunt.

The court specified the

(1) care is defined as what a

following test for negligence:

person of ordinary prudence would do under the same circumstances; (2) ordinary care is relative to the instant case; and
(3) no absolute standard can be determined, as individual

abilities must be considered.
damages

The superior court awarded

of $15, 000 .oo which, while affirmed

by the supreme

court, was reduced to $5,000.00.
When a fifteen year old girl was struck by a truck as
she was running toward the athletic field for class, the school
district was held negligent for allowing a dangerous condition
. t • 51
t o exis

The school permitted eighteen trucks a weelt to

cross the grounds without any precautionary practices.

The

court held that this was not the conduct of a prudent person,
and that the school must take steps to protect its students.
After a long legal battle with two reversals, the supreme court
affirmed· the judgment and damages of $20,000.00.
Ordinary care is determined by the facts of the instant
case.

While playing a supervised game at recess time under the

supervision of a teacher less than fifty feet away, the plaintiff was struck by a bicyclist. 52 The teacher and the school

1~:7

.as aware o.f this practice of riding bicycles
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the playground.

The r>laintiff alleged the r•intenance of an unsafe and dangerous

playground.

The court held that the teacher was negligent for

per11itting the boys to ride their bicycles. and that sufficient
evidence existed to permit recovery against the district.

Again the test was what would a person of ordinary prudence do
in the same situation.

The appellate court affirmed the superior

court's judgment and damages of $1, soo.oo.
Foreseeability is another factor that the courts look
for in the determination of negligence.

It is .not essential

that the specific event be foreseeable but that the possibility
of damage is present.

lVhile a group of 100 to 125 children were

playing under the supervision of one teacher, a boy had his leg

twisted and broken. 53

The trial court held the teacher negligent

for uot exercising ordinary care or prudence.

The children

were carelessly and improperly cared for and supervised; therefore, the district was negligent for not providing proper supervision.

The fact that a third party was the immediate cause

of the accident did not break the chain of causality.

Even

the willful lllisconduct of the actor did not absolve the district,
because adequate supervision may have prevented the accident.

Some of these cases seem to drift away from the concept
of foreseeability and into the concept of proximate cause,
Perhaps because there is relationship between these two
concet)ts.

In one sense, almost nothing is quite unforeseeable,
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since there is a very slight mathematical chance, recognizable
in advance, that even the most freakish accident will occur.
Jn another, nothing is entirely foreseeable, since the exact

details of a sequence of events never can be predicted with
comPlete omniscience.
two:

What is meant is something between the

that the consequence must be a normal, substantial part

of the risk, which a reasonable man would recognize as fairly
to be taken into account.

But while it is comparatively easy

to say that the aggregate of all possible consequences amount
to a risk against which he should guard, it is a much more
difficult thing to determine the importance of a particular
result as a material part of that risk.
As has been said, there must be some reasonable connection
between the act or omission of the defendant and the damages
which the plaintiff has suffered.

This connection usually is

dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called "proximate
cause."

This is merely the limitation which the courts have

placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of
his conduct.

As a practical matter, legal responsibility must

be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with
the result and of such significance that the law is justified
in saying that they were foreseeable.

It is not surprising

that courts have not found the problem easy of solution.
The negligence of a driver who struck and killed a school
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bOY was adjudged as not being foreseeable on the part of the
,cbool district. 54 The proximate cause of the injury was the
driver, not the failure of the school to provide transportation.
Nor was the fact that the boy was enrolled in theWt"ong school
sufficient to show negligence.
The court of appeals upheld the superior court's disJDissal of a case where the chain of events was broken by an
independent act.55

The plaintiff was injured by an explosion

of chemicals which he had received from two boys who had stolen
them from a high school supply room.

The court held that if

the defendant knew that the intervening act was likely, the
original act may be the proximate cause.

However, the stealing

of the chemicals could not reasonably be anticipated; therefore,
this broke the chain of events.
If a reasonably prudent person could not foresee the
event,

th~n

liability does not attach.

The plaintiff sought

to prove negligence on the district when he was struck by a
baseball bat while playing with other children. 56 The court
held that negligence must be proven and the school was not the
insurer of the safety af the child.
state the facts of negligence.

The charge must clearly

The appellate court affirmed

the superior court's sustaining of a demurrer to the plaintiff's
claim, and the supreme court refused to hear the case.
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The question of the proximate cause cacie up on the Ziegler
case. 57

A thirteen year •?l<l boy fell or was pushed while sitting

on a railing above a stairwell.

The bi1y died from injuries.

Th• school authorities !mew that students would sit on this
rail and had warned the:n of the dangers tbei.·eof.

held that 1t was not necessary to foresee the

but o,1ly a general type of t:-ouble.

The court

si~ccific

accident

Mor i.vas the fellow student's

intervening act :nore than a concurring cause.

The case was

first heard in 1959 where it was alleged that the school pre-

mises were in a dangarous or defective con<lition.

This action

was dismissed but a retrial was heard on the charge of inadequate

supervision.

In the second trial the critical question con-

cet"ned the assumption of rislt instruct ion tl:at had been given
the jury.

The court held that t hie evidence indicated that the

boy knew of the danger involved and had accepted this rislc •

.:Jrdinary negligence may be the proximate cause of an

accident as was held in the Lehmuth case. 58

The student body

of a junior college had arranged a homecoming parade.

A

student employee was to pull a sound trailer behind his car.

The driver failed to attach the safety chains as required

by

statute and the trailer broke away from the car and injured
several pedestrians.

The college

'1.'aS

exercising supervision

but it failed to see the lack of saf cty chains.

The superior

court bad a.warded damages in the sum of $277, 844 .oo for
Virgi.:1ia Lch::imth and $5, 178.00 for Marcel V. Naret.

The court
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beld that the district was liable for all damages to persons
and property caused by ordinary negligence and this negligence
iS not limited to acts committed on the school grounds.

school must reasonably supervise the student body.

The

An eighteen

year old is not yet mature of judgment and needs supervision.
The failure to require the safety chain constituted direct
negligence and was the proximate cause of the accident.
However, the proximate cause must be under the control
of the school district.

A girl who was waiting for class to

begin jumped up on a window ledge which was approximately three
feet above the floor. 59 While securely seated, another girl
came by and pulled her off, breaking her leg.

In this case

the court ruled that the proximate cause was the willful misconduct of a third party.
The fact that the coach was not present when a boy was
hit in the eye with a handball was held not to be the proximate
cause. 60 The game was not an inherently dangerous activity,
nor were conditions such as to warrant stopping the game.
The question of the adequacy or inadequacy of supervision is a point of fact, and its resolution will determine
whether supervision is the proximate cause.

See the infra

section on supervision.
Substantial evidence must be introduced before the court
Will allow a case based upon negligence to come to trial.

An
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elelllentary child became sick at school and the officials called
)lollle• 61

An older brother who was also home ill answered and

.,as told to come and get his younger brother.

The older boy

came on a bicycle and while on the way home overturned and
injured himself.

The plaintiff alleged that the boy was comply-

ing with the instructions of the school and was under the control,
care and management of the district.

The court rejected this

claim because there was no evidence to indicate that the officials
knew

of the illness nor of the means of transport at ion.

It

was not held negligent to assume that the boys would walk.

Al-

though sec. 13557 holds teachers to a strict account of pupils
for their conduct to and from school, the court said" • • • this
section does not impose

dt~ty

on the teacher or the district to

supervise the pupils on the way home."52

This section refers

to the behavior of children, not to their safe conduct to and
from school.

The court of appeals upheld this verdict upon

appeal.

A superior court awarded damages of $17,000.00 to a boy
for the loss of an eye when struck by a piece of metal in a
shop. 63

The count charged the district with failure to provide

a safe place to work.
finding.

The court of appeals reversed this

The court held that recovery depended upon a known

danger, or an unknown peril which should have been known by the
exercise of ordinary care under the same circumstances by a
reasonably prudent person.
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In the Underhill case the court held that the plaintiff
~ust

prove negligence and must clearly state the facts of the

alleged negligence. 64

Standards of care.

The courts of California have ruled

1118-0Y times on the question of what standards are to be applied.

In general they agree that the standard is what an ordinarily
prudent person would do under the same circumstances.

Naturally,

this is a question for the jury to decide in any one case.
Some examples of this test are given below.
An eleven year old boy was playing football and ran
into a protruding bolt on a flagpole and as a result of the
injury charged the district with failure to provide safe property and negligence in maintaining said f lagpole.65

The

superior court awarded damages in the sum of $250.00 for the
minor and $179 .oo for the father.

However, the court oi appeals

reversed this decision and stated that it was not reasonable

to build and maintain premises s.o as to preclude the possibility of injury.

The plaintiff must prove that the defendant

had knowledge of the alleged unsafe condition and had failed

to remedy said condition.

Authorities are required to use

only ordinary care in maintaining property.
During the free play noon hour recess a touch football
game between the boys o:f the seventh and the eighth grade was
engaged in by boys ranging in weight from eighty-five to 190
Pounds.6 6

One of the boys was struck in the abdomen necessi-
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tating removal of the spleen and one kidney.

The superior

court in a jury trial awarded damages in the sum of $7,500.00
for the minor and $800.00 for the father.
supreme court reversed the decision.

Upon appeal the

In determining ordinary

care the supreme court found the following facts.

In physical

education classes the boys were instructed in playing football.
The two coaches acted as officials.

The method of grouping

was a convenient, practical and widely used procedure.

The

exponent charts may give a wide range in any one factor.
football is not an inherently dangerous activity.

Touch

The in-

structors were carefully selected, experienced and competent
teachers.
negligence.

Under these facts there could be no legal basis for
Judge Carter, dissenting, maintained that this

was a fact finding case for a jury and their reasonable minds.
In a case where the teacher was out of visual contact
of his class for thirty seconds, the court ruled that this
absence was not a violation of ordinary care.67

As a class

ran around the corner and out onto the playground a boy was
pushed, fell and lost two teeth.

The lower court dismissed

the charge against the teacher but awarded damages of $5,270.00
for the minor and $195.00 for the father.

The court of appeals

held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the lack
of supervision was the proximate cause of the injury.

The

standard of care is what a person of ordinary prudence would
do under the same circumstances.

The school is not liable

for
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the misconduct of the third party.

In a dissent by Judge

vraper it was stated that, if the teacher had been present, it
,.yas a reasonable inference that the injury would have been
avoided because there would have been no running.

It is not

necessary to prove that the very injury was foreseeable.
The school district was held to be using ordinary care
when a third grade boy lost an eye while hiding in an ornamental palm tree in an isolated part of the playground.68
There was a rule prohibiting playing in this area, the plaintiff was familiar with this rule, and there were two teachers
supervising 200 pupils at the time.

The court of appeals re-

versed the lower court which had awarded damages of $15,000.00
to the plaintiff.

The count alleged the maintenance of danger-

oua or defective conditious.

The court held that liability

attaches only when using the public property in the ordinary
and usual manner.

The trees had been there for many years

and no injuries had occurred.
other specific examples of ordinary care were gleaned
from other cases in brief.

The court held that the teacher

was negligent for not using ordinary care in permitting
bicyclists to ride among children playing on the playground. 69
When a girl fractured her skull doing an acrobatic stunt, the
officials were held negligent for not using the same care as
Persons of ordinary prudence charged with the same duty. 70 In
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a case where the tea6ber allowed students to ride home in a
,,110 t rod" and with a reckless driver, the teacher was held not
to be using ordinary care

under the known facts. 71

An act ion

was brought by a kindergarten child alleging the maintenance of
a dangerous and defective condition and a lack of supervision

when the child lost his finger in a gate which was closed by
another pupil. 72

The court said that the amount of care shown

by the district was that of a prudent person.

In a case where

a boy was injured by mixing two explosive chemicals, custom
was not clear as to what ordinary care was and, therefore, the
question should be resolved by the jury.73

When the school

officials knew that the boys were playing "blackout" and did
not prevent or try to prevent this, the court ruled that the

school was not exercising ordinary care under the circumstances. 74

In the case of Satarino v. Sleight a seventeen year old
boy, rushing from class to the gymnasium, had to cross a busy

street and was struck by a car. 75

The appellate court reversed

the superior court's non suit and held that the question of
liability was for the jury to determine.

The court said that

the school owed an amount of care to a seventeen year old because of the herd instinct and competitive spirit.

The auth-

orities are responsible for the safety of children commensurate
With their maturity.

In the instant case, children had to

cross a heavily traveled street without any safety practices,

anJ the question of liability was for t; <:: jury •

.Another principle that the California courts have
followed consistently anJ :tn large numbers is that the schools

are :10t insurers of the safety of the children or persons
usir:; t:1e school.

When a third party pulled a girl frorn a

ledg:c causing her to break a leg, the court held that the school
was not responsible. 76 In a similar ruling the court held the
srll,:i0l not responsible when a boy pushed another boy down on

the rilayground knocking out two teeth. 77
school child was struck by

When an elementary

a baseball bat and this event could

not have been reasonably foreseen, the school was held not to

be the insurer of the safety of the chil:J. 78

The school was

held not responsible for the safety of a child when a piece ?f
metal flew into the eye of the plaintiff .79
1\ six year old boy who suffered from cerebral

palsy

a~1d

congenital heart disease fell from a piece of playground equipment and died. &O

The court held that the question of super-

vision was :for the jury, but that the school is not the insurer
of the safety of any one child.
Dangerous or defective conditi.:in £.!._ buildinqs, grounds,
~ ~1ropertz.

--

Sect ion 53051 o:f tht:> California Annotated Govern-

ment Code imposes liability for the dangerous or defective

conditions of public property.

This section is very similar

to "The Public L1abili ty .Act" passed in 1923.

As one might

e"pect, :nuch litigation ha.s sprung from this section.
The school was held liable under this section when a
faulty oxygen gauge on an oxyacetylene tank exploded and put
out the eye of a student.81
Property must be used only in the customary and usual
waY before liability attaches.

When a boy ran into a bolt pro-

truding from a flagpole, he charged the district with a dangerous condition of its property. 8 2

The court held that it is

impossible to preclude the possibility of injury, and that the
plaintiff must prove knowledge and failure to remedy, a dangerous

condition.
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's

decision for the plaintiff who as a P.T.A. invitee fell on a

waxed floor and broke her leg.83
the floor was

v~ry

slippery.

Testimony established that

The court held that the waxed

floor must be reasonably safe, and the degree of slipperiness
is a fact for the jury.

The knowledge of conditions when per-

formed by an employee is imputed to the employer.

If danger-

ous conditions are produced by natural causes, acts of God,
or third persons, proof of constructive lmowledge must be
established.

That is, it must be shown that the defendant knew

of the danger and did nothing to correct it.
The Novack case is an interesting one. 84

On Sunday a

boy climbed over a fence to get into a locked playground, and
While playing, a large equipment box fell on him.

Action was

lJJ

brought under "The Public Liability Act. 11

The court of appeals

affir111ed the lower court's judgment of non suit holding that

the principle of

~

ipsa loquitur does not apply, and that

there was an absence of evidence of how the accident occurred
or of any defect in the box.
A gate which was pushed shut
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a pupil's fingers was

85
11eld not to be a dangerous or defective instrumentality.

In the Ziegler case an iron stair railing upon which
students would occasionally sit was held not to be a dangerous
condition despite the fact that students had been warned not
to sit upon it. 86
The violation of a safety regulation of the Division of
Industrial Safety was considered negliJence on the part of the
school district. 87

The plaintiff caught his hand in a printing

press in the workshop of a junior high school.

He charged the

school with operatinJ; a press without the required safety
device.

The court held that the regulation applied to schools,

and that this did not place the schools under the direction of
the Division of Industrial Safety.
The school was held liable for permitting a dangerous
Condit ion to exist when it allowed eighteen trucks a week to

cross the playground without any safety precautions. 88

An

ornamental palm tree with sharp thorns was held not to be a
dangerous condition.89

This tree had grown for many years in

an isolated part of the playground, and no injuries had resulted

ttnt i 1 the instant case.
above the

Window le di; cs which were three f cot

floor anJ upon which students occasionally sat were

not considered a dangerous condition. 90

The liability o:f U.o

school district is not limited to the school grounds as held in
tllc Lehmuth case.91

Supervision.

------

Under section 13557 of The California

Annotated Education Code strict supervision is irnposed upon

-

the pupils "for their conduct on the way to and from school,
on the playground, or during recess."

There are many factors
There must

to be investigated in this cause of negligence.

be a duty and a failure to fulfill this duty.

Other related

elements in this section include: adequacy of care, foreseeability, competent personnel, rules and enforcement, after
school hours and location of incident.

'l'he court has held that the purpose of tbe above statute
is to prevent injuries. 92 The court of appeals reversed the
superior court's sustaining of a demurrer filed
ant.

by

the defend-

A girl, while eating lunch in the classroom of an elemen-

tary school, became engaged in a scuff le and had her arm broken.

There was neither a teacher nor an adult present.

The court

held that the mere absence of a teacher was sufficient evidence
of negligence, and that said improper supervision imposed
liability upon the school district.
The supervision must conform to the standard of ordinary

r

I
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care.

When a hoy had his leg broken by another boy twisting

ft, he alleged negligence on the part of the teacher. 9 3
teacher was supervising 100 to 150 students.

One

The court of

appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment of $2,500.00 to
the plaintiff.

The trial court held that the teacher did not

use ordinary care or prudence, and that the children were care1essly, negligently, improperly, and insufficiently cared for
and watched.

The district was negligent for not providing

proper supervision although the specific accident may not be
foreseeable.

Even though willful misconduct on the part of a

third party was the immediate cause, this did not absolve the
district of its liability.

More supervision might have prevented

this misfortune.
The question of adequate supervision was handled in the
Lilienthal case.94

The court of appeals reversed the superior

court dismissal of the case.
by

A personal injury suit was brought

the plaintiff who was struck in the eye by a knife that was

being played with by another student.

The students were sitting

outside in a semicircle reviewing a test.

The teacher was in

front of the class and testified that all the pupils were visible,
there was no disorder and the knife was not visible until after
the injury.

The court ruled that the jury must decide whether

the teacher knew or should have known.

Did the teacher use the

same care as a person of ordinary prudence would have used
under the same circumstances?

The jury could inf er that he

saw the knife or if he had been using care should have seen
the knife.

The adequacy of supervision was questioned in the involved Rodriques case. 95

The court of appeals affirmed the

superior court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant.

A six year old boy was found lying unconscious on

the blacktop beneath a horizontal ladder.

The boy suffered

from cerebral palsy with seizures and a congenital heart disease.
The teacher had discussed these handicaps with the mother who

requested that no one else be told.
that he could not climb on things.

The plaintiff also stated
The court stated that the

question of closer supervision was one for the jury.

The fact

that there was one teacher per seventy-five to one hundred
children in a lot 75 by 110 feet was for the jury.

The purpose

of the law requiring supervision is to regulate students' con-

duct so as to prevent disorderly and dangerous practices.

If

the supervisor could not have reasonably anticipated or prevented the accident, it may be immaterial if he was actually
present.
The determination of the adequacy of supervision was
for the jury in a case where a group of boys were playing
"blackout. n 96

The boy was partially successful, slipped from

his friend's grasp and hit his head and died.

The basic issue

was whether the defendant was using ordinary care.

The court

of appeals affirmed the verdict for the defendant although
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it questioned this finding.

The teacher was held negligent for permitting boys to
ride their bicycles among the children playing at recess time.97
The

appellate court affirmed the superior court's judgment in

favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages in the sum of
$1,500.00.

The teacher who was less than fiftyfeet away had

known of this practice for several months.

The court ruled

that there was sufficient evidence showing negligence on the
part of the teacher.

Again, the test was whether a person of

ordinary prudence under the same circumstances would do this.
What is ordinary care is determined by the instant case.
The court held that the lack of supervision was not the
proximate cause when a class went around the corner out of
the view of the teacher for thirty seconds.98
The school district must reasonably supervise the
student body even though the activity may take place off the
school premises. 99 The establishment of a rule and the supervision thereof was deemed sufficient. 100 The school is required to exercise reasonable supervision.101

The fact that

matching of the boys involved in a touch football game was
done and the game had been supervised by two trained and
competent coaches was sufficient to disallow the charge of
negligence. 102
One of the questions presented in the Ziegler case was
the negligent supervision. 103 The plaintiff, a thirteen year
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old boy, was killed when he fell from an iron railing into a
stairwell.

The facts were not clear as to whether the boy was

pushed by another student or merely

jump~d

backward.

The school

authorities had warned the students about sitting on this rail.

The jury found that the school was not guilty of negligent supervision of this activity.

The issue in the second appeal

d~alt

with the assumption of risk that the boy had taken by sitting
on the rail.

There was some evidence that the boy knew of the

dangers involved.
Procedural matters.

In a state where the machinery of

bringing an action based upon tort liability of the school
district was well established, one of the areas of frequent
litigation was the interpretation of the procedures to be
followed.

Under procedures come such things as the filing

deadline, improper notice, sufficiency of notice, content of
the notice, and knowledge of the claim.
Until 1959 the statutes provided that a claim must be
filed within ninety days after the occurrence of the event.
1959 the deadline was raised to one hundred days.

However,

certain exceptions to this deadline were established.
In general the California courts had strictly adhered
to the deadline of ninety days.

A seventeen year old boy was
injured in a wrestling accident on October 12, 1956. 104 As a
result of the injury he was unable to file until November 5,

In
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1956, but did not file until January 11, 1957.

This filing

.,as accomplished sixty-seven days after the disability ended
and ninety-one days after the injury.

The court of appeals

sustained the demurrer of the defendant.

The court ruled that

the suit was not timely filed nor did the fact of his minority
make a difference.

His disability ended in time for the suit

to be timely filed.
In another suit the claim was denied because of the late
filing.

The plaintiff brought a personal injury suit against
the district for an accident which ~ccurred May 5, 1937. 105

The claim was filed January 27, 1938.

The court of appeals

affirmed the superior court's decision to sustain the demurrer
without leave to amend.

The court said that the statute must

be strictly construed, and unless it is in conformity with the
requirements no action can be had.

The supreme court in a

hearing stated "that it is not necessary to strictly construe
the rule but a liberal construction is valid and should be with
a view to effect its objects and to promote justice." 106

The

object of the court seems to be to allow each case to be treated
individually as to the timeliness of bringing the action, based
on the facts, rather than to allow an injustice to take place
because of a technicality.
When a boy ran his motor scooter into a barricade, placed
in the street for driver education, and filed his claim five
months after the accident, the claim was denied. 107

The filing
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date and other mandatory requirements were essential, and the
pJ.a.intiff must have fulfilled these in order to file a verified
claim even though he was a minor. 10 8
Despite the fact that the board knew of a claim, this
did not negate the need for a verified claim.

A minor boy was

injured in a recreation program conducted by the board of
education. 109 The court of appeals affirmed the superior
court's rejection of the suit.

The board of education and

the adjuster of the insurance company investigated the claim
but did not tell the mother of the need to file a claim.

The

court hel<l that this was not an excuse for a late claim.

The

defendants were not stopped from taking advantage of the failure
to file a claim.
Abatement and/or diminishment

~liability.

The legis-

lature and the judicial system of California have been very
liberal in allowing relief to injured parties.

Dogmatic de-

fenses to the charge of negligence are not available.

This is

not to say that the filing of a suit is an automatic indictment
of the school district.

Several possibilities exist as avenues

to the abatement and/or diminishment of the tort liability.
As stated above and with ample documentation the school
is not the insurer of the safety of a child or person.

This

means that actual negligence on the part of the school must be
the proximate cause of the injury.
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The establishment and reasonable enforcement of adequate,
proper, and reasonable rules and regulations will serve as an
effective defense to the charge of negligence arising from
inadequate supervision.

When there was an enforced rule pre-

venting playing in an isolated part of the playground, the
school was held not liable when a boy lost his eye on a sharp
branch of a tree. 110
Notice of the dangerous or defective condition of the
building, grounds, or premises must be given.

Natural causes,

acts of God, thinipersons, and pure accidents are not foreseeable.111
Contributory negligence is a defense many times used
by

the school as a defendant in a liability suit.

In general,

the courts are critical of this defense particularly when the
plaintiff is a minor.

The courts seem to feel that a school

age child bas not the maturity to be fully aware of his actions
and their consequences.
A boy with a weak leg slipped and broke his leg on a
ramp connecting two parts of the scboo1.112

The boy and the

authorities knew of the condition of the ramp.

The court of

appeals reversed the superior court's non suit decision because of contributory negligence.

The court of appeals held

that inadvertent acts such as momentary forgetfulness did not
constitute contributory negligence.

The jury must decide if

forgetfulness or abstraction was the proximate cause of the

ace idcnt.

J:'orgetf ulness must show a lack vf care on the part

of the plaintiff.

A sixteen year old is bc1und only to

tl1at

duty of care which a normal child of this age would sustaiu in
similar circu.nstances.

Contributory negligence is dependent

upon the age and capacity of the actor.

In a like ruling when

a seventeen year old boy ran into the siJe o! a car as he was
going from class to class, tbe court ruled that a certain
arr1ount of cart: was aecessary on the part of the plaintiff, but

not the same degree as an aJult. 113

In comparison, wrien an

e lcven year old boy ran :i.nt o a flagpole, the court ruled that
t:;c boy knew of the pole and had contributed to the accident.
o~:c

114

of the early cases in California was a case where a boy lost

ti.:.ree fingers in a saw. 115
the district

counter-charg~d

The plaintiff charged negligence and

contributory negligence.

The

court ruled that the district was negligent and should have
taken every precaution agai11st known dangers.

Another defense occasionally used is the assumption of
risk. doctrine.

A personal injury suit was brought against

the school district when the plaintiff was struck in the eye
by a tennis bali. 116 The class was composed of members of the
varsity tennis team.

One day the coach needed the time to

prepare for a tournament and told the class that there woula
be no supervised activity that day.

Som.e of the boys started

playing handball, and others were hitting tennis balls back
and :forth.

When the bell rang, the plaintiff jumped into the

flight of the ball.

The court of appeals upheld the superior

court's judgment of non suit.

The court ruled that neither

bandball nor tennis were inherently dangerous, and that the
plaintiff was aware of the risk and was willing to assume it.

Jn the Zieeler case the court ruled that the plaintiff had
some knowledge of the danger of sitting on an iron railing from
which he fell to his death.117

The giving of such instruction

about assumption of risk was held not to be in error and that
the jury needed this information for its deliberation.
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CHAPl'ER VII
MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN MINNESOTA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON

In these three states there was an early movement toward
tbe modification of immunity of the school district.

However,

for one reason or another a retrograde movement has taken i:lace,
and these states now strictly control, if not completely eliminate the liability of the school district for tort liability.
Ergo, the amount of primary source material was limi te~.
A.

MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN MINNESOTA

Minnesota was one of the first states to pass an express
statute allowing an action to be brought against a school distric
for injuries to the rights of a plaintiff.

Despite this, Minn-

esota has, by judicial interpretations, moved completely away
from this position, and today the school districts in Minnesota enjoy governmental immunity.
Historical development.

As far back as 1851 Minnesota

had a statute which allowed an action to be brought against
the school district for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.

By interpretation the courts have, in fact, annulled
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tbiS statute.
_.8

One of the first and leading cases in the state

heard in 1892.

In this case the interpretation was such

that the doctrine of immunity was not altered.

In 1935 legis-

iation was enacted which authorized the purchase of liability

insurance to cover negligence of employees in operating a motor
vehicle and which permitted the payment of such insurance from
public funds.

In a case heard in 1952 the court upheld the

immunity doctrine although the statute permitted the purchase
of liability insurance in a limited area by the school district.

Minnesota statutes.

The original statute passed in 1851

reads as follows:

An action may be brought against them (any school
district) in their official capacity, either upon a
contract made by such off icera in their official
capacity,and within the scope of their authority, or
from an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, arising
from some act or omission of such officers of the
district .1
The statute as it stands at the present is essentially the

same in wording and intent.

It is as follows:

An action may be brought against any school district
either upon a contract made with the district or its
board, in its official capacity and within the scope
of its authority, or for any inju~7 to the rights of
the plaintiff arising from some act or omission of such
board, whether the members of the board making the
contract, or guilty of the act or omission complained
of, be still in office or not. 2
Section 471.42, enacted in 1935, authorized the school
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district to carry insurance against the liability of its
employees for bodily injuries, death, or property damage by
reason of negligent operation of a motor vehicle.3

A following

section gave the governing bodies permission to pay the above
premium, but expressly stated that this did not impose a
liability upon the municipality. 4
The opinions of the attorney general of Minnesota
succinctly and precisely summarized the attitude toward modification.

The school district was not liable for the torts

of officers, agents or employees done in a governmental capacity. 5

The school district was not liable for injuries to a

pupil injured as a result of the negligent operation of a
school bus. 6 The school district was not responsible for
damages for personal injuries or property damage by reason of
negligence in the operation of a snowplow on a school bus
route. 7
The 1963 legislature enacted Chapter 798 which, with
limitations, essentially abrogated immunity for municipalities.
However, the act specifically excluded school districts, until
January 1, 1968.

However, the only new action taken by the

1965 legislature was to extend the immunity limitation for
school districts and certain types of towns, until January 1,
1970.

It has been extended by each legislature since.
Case law.

In the precedent case of Bank v. Brainard

School District heard in 1892, the attitude toward govern-
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roental immunity was established, and it has remained essentially
the same today. 8

The complaint alleged that the defendant

negligently left two tree stumps, three inches high and two
inches apart, sticking up in the playground.

The minor plain-

tiff tripped over these stumps, breaking a leg which later
was amputated.

The suit asked $20,000.00 in damages.

The

Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal
of the suit.

Ruling upon this case the court said that the

statutes applied to contracts and did not allow liability for
negligence.

The rights of the plaintiff referred to in the

statute were property rights.

Although schools may sue and

be sued, this does not change immunity.

The schools are quasi

municipal corporations, organized for educational purposes.
In another case where a ten year old boy was run over by
a school bus on the school grounds, the school was held not
liable for the negligent operation of the school bus. 9 The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's sustaining of the defendant's demurrer.

The court said that the

school was a quasi governmental agency, performing a public
function and was not liable.

The court rejected the plaintiff 'a

contention stating that it must follow stare decisis.

The

court noted that the legislature has acquiesced in the face
of the ...............
Bank v. Brainerd ruling for thirty-five years •
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A personal injury suit was brought by a plaintiff who
bad

lost the sight of one eye and severely damaged the other. 10

He alleged that the defendant's officers and agents had negligently used unslaked lime to line a football field.

Again

the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court which
bad

sustained a demurrer to dismiss.

The court repeated that

school districts are governmental agencies performing a public
function.

The statute did not authorize suit for personal

injuries due to negligence.

Regardless of whether the term

is nuisance or negligence, it is not actionable.

There is no

difference between mandatory and permissive governmental
functions.

Nor did the fact that a small charge was made impose

liability.
A more recent case was heard in 1952.

The plaintiff

was injured in a collision with a school bus. 11

The plaintiff

contended that the school district carried liability insurance
and that this was a waiver of immunity.

The federal court

held that the operation of a school bus was a governmental
function and that municipal corporations were immune.

Although

the statute allowed the purchase of insurance, the fact that
the school district was the insured did not allow suit against
the school district.

B.

MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN OREGON

Oregon was also one of the first states to pass a statute

r
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allowing an action against the school district :for injuries
to the rights of the plaintiff.
of

Notwithstanding, the courts

oregon have interpreted this statute so as to permit the

doctrine of immunity to continue.
Historical development.

As far back as the year 1862,

oregon has had a statute which imposed liability for negligence
upon governmental agencies.
was tested in the courts.

It was not until 1914 that this law
In this ruling and subsequent rulings,

the courts have nullified this statute.

In 1929 the court made

one exception and allowed a judgment against a school district.

However, within two months the court had reversed its thinking
and was again applying the doctrine of immunity.
minor deviation was noted.

In 1961 a

The liability of the district was

allowed to the extent of the liability insurance carried by
the district.
Oregon statutes.
in this section.

Only four relevant statutes were noted

Section 30.320 reads:

An action or suit may be maintained against any of
the public corporations in this state mentioned in
section 30.310 in its corporate character, and within
the scope of its authority, or for an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or commission of such public corporation • • • • ul2
The other public corporations mentioned are "incorporated cities,
school districts, or other public corporations of like character •• • • ul3 Section ~32.180 authorized the purchase of
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11 a.bili ty insurance to cover the negligence of the district
or its officers and agents.14 This legislation was permissive
tn nature.

If the district did not elect to purchase insurance,

this was not to be construed as negligence on the part of the
school district.
In 1967, the oregon legislature passed a "Tort Actions
Against Public Bodies" abrogation of immunity law, effective
July 1, 1968. 15 This act also set up claim procedures and
established limits of $25,000.00 for property damage, $50,000.00
per individual for bodily injury, and $300,000.00 maximum per
occurrence.

The law also provided for the proration of the

awards if the total claims exceed $300,000.00.
Case law.

The oregon courts have interpreted these

statutory provisions'as the restatement of the common law
rule that a school district is liable for negligence only when
performing a private function.

And then the courts ruled that

the school only performs public functions.
The first case construing section 30.320 was heard in
1914. 16

In this case the court stated that the board of edu-

cation cannot commit a tort, and if they do they are acting
ultra vires.

The Wiest case was the precedent case and has

been followed consistently with one exception.
In the case of Lupke v. School District the plaintiff
brought a personal injury suit against the district.1 7

The
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plaintiff had been employed to paint a flagpole and fell when
the pole collapsed.

The court ruled that the act of painting

was a ministerial function, and the school district was held
liable.

A short time later the same court held that there was

no sound basis for such a distinction and overruled the Lupke
decision.
The district was charged with negligence when a pneumatic
water tank recently installed exploded and killed a nineteen
year old boy. 18 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the complaint.

The court ruled that the

district was nelgigent in not installing a safety device on
the

tan~,

but the tank which was used for school purposes was

aiding a governmental function.

The court appeared to favor

the maintenance of a suit as prescribed by statute but were
committed to stare decisis.

The school acts wholly as a

governmental agency performing those duties imposed by statute.
The school was held to be a quasi corporation performing nothing
but governmental functions; hence, immunity still prevailed.
A similar ruling was handed down by the Oregon Supreme
Court in 1943.

A boy fell on a wooden sidewalk and ran a nail
into his knee injuring it permanently. 19 The appeal was filed

from circuit court which had dismissed the complaint.

The

suit alleged negligence on the part of the district for its
failure to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition.

The
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demurrer admitted the truth of the allegation but pleaded
irnmunity.

The court stated that a "school never performs

anything except governmental functions since a school district
can act pursuant only to statutory authority, express or implied,
through its board of directors, and in so doing it is exercising a governmental function only."20

An interesting comment

was made:

It may be that the common law of immunity is harsh
and unjust in requiring the individual alone to suffer
the wrong in the instant case, and that society in
keeping with the modern trend, should afford relie~ but
that is a legislative and not a judicial question. 1
The legislature, if it so desires, has the power to make the
suggested change.
A 1961 case perhaps points the way toward a relaxation
of the immunity doctrine as it has been interpreted in the
past. 22 A high school football player was hurt and this injury resulted in paraplegia.

The suit was brought when the

plaintiff reached maturity.

The school had a liability in-

surance policy in effect at the time.

The plaintiff alleged

that his injuries were due to the fact that as a 140 pound
freshman he was matched against bigger and superior players.
The lower court had dismissed the claim which was then appealed
to the supreme court.

The defendants in the suit were the

district, the superintendent, principal, and individual board
members were dropped.

The court ruled that the coach had

failed to exercise reasonable care, and the district may be
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liable for the acts of its servants.

The court held that the

statute permitting the purchase of insurance was an expression
of a legislative policy not to abandon the immunity doctrine
but to permit some relief at least to the extent of the insurance
coverage.

The court re-emphasized that the school district is

still immune from suit and disagreed with the Molitor case
heard in Illinois.
C.

MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN WASHINGTON

Washington passed its first abrogation statute in 1869.
This statute read much the same as the statutes of Minnesota
and Oregon.

Unlike the other two states the courts of Wash-

ington did not interfere, but the legislature severely restricte
the application of liability in a subsequent enactment.
Historical development.

The state of Washington was

the second state in the United States to pass express legislation allowing liability suits for negligence to be brought
The statute allowing recovery was
not tested until 1907 in the Redfield case. 23 In this case

against a school district.

the court ruled that the school was liable for negligence
under the statute.

Following this precedent and the history

of litigation as found in other states, many cases were filed
against school districts.

The schools became concerned at the

number of suits and the size of the damages being awarded.

In
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1917 an act was introduced into the state assembly which would
have exonerated the school district from all liability, but
this bill did not pass.

A compromise form passed which limited

liability to actions other than those arising from "any park,
playground, or field house, athletic apparatus or appliance,
or manual training equipment."24 Since that time the court have
interpreted the law in Washington as meaning that a liability
suit for other than the mentioned exceptions may be maintained
against a school district.
Washington statutes.

The original statute passed in

1869 read as follows:
An action may be maintained against a county, or
other of the public corporations mentioned or described
in the preceding section (includes school districts)
either upon a contract ma.de by such county or other
public corporation in its corporate character, and within the scope of its authority, for an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff arising from some a~~ or omission
of such county or other public corporation.
The restrictive statute passed in 1917 is given below:
No action shall be brought or maintained against
any school district or its officers for any noncontractual acts or omissions of such district, its agents,
officers, or employees, relating to any park, playground,
or field house, athletic apparatus or appliance, or
manual training equipment, whether situated in or about
any schoolhouse or elsewhere o~~d, operated or maintained by such school district.
There followed nearly a half century of litigation
about the definition of "athletic apparatus or appliance" and
the other "immune facilities" mentioned in the act.

In 1961
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the state legislature enacted Chapter 136,l which reads as
follows:
The State of Washington, whether acting in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, hereby consents
to the maintaining of a suit or action against it for
damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the sa~'
extent as if it were a private person or corporation.
This did not answer the question and more cases followed.

The

legislature, meeting in 1967, then amended its civil procedure laws to include a section on actions against political
subdivisions, municipal corporations and quasi-municipal corporations. 28 Thus ended the saga of the "athletic apparatus
and appliance."

--

Case law.

The modification of immunity in Washington

presented an interesting phenomenon.

The pattern of liability

has swung from a liberal approach to an attempted complete
restriction and finally

~as

settled near the center of the

continuum.
The Redfield case was the first case to hold the district
liable for negligence. 29 The plaintiff was badly burned when
a bucket of scalding hot water fell on her.
bucket was kept on top of a heating register.

The three gallon
The count

alleged that the defendant and its agents, servants, teachers,
and employees had carelessly and negligently left this bucket
in a dangerous manner.

The question was whether the district

was liable for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees
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in the performance of their duties.

The Washington Supreme

court reversed the superior court which had sustained a demurrer
to the complaint.

The court ruled that an action could be

maintained and that the statute was designed to remove immunity
and make the district responsible for an omission of duty.
In 1915 the court held that the intent of the legislature was to abolish immunity.30

A six year old girl fell

from a horizontal exercise ladder suspended seven feet above
a concrete floor.

The plaintiff broke her arm and received

damages of $500.00 in a lower court decision.

There were no

mats under the ladder, and the children had been warned not to
play on the ladder.

The court held that the statute abrogated

common law immunity for negligence in the performance of governmental duties.

The question of leaving the ladder accessible

to children and the question of contributory negligence were
f

properly submitted to the jury.
The district was held liable and the law of 1917 was
held not retroactive in the Hold case.31

The plaintiff, a

nine year old girl, fell from a slide and fractured her skull.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

The injury occurred

March 31, 1916 and judgment was rendered January 12, 1917.
The act in question was passed in March of 1917.

The Washing-

ton Supreme Court hearing the appeal in 1918 held the act not
retroactive.
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The language of the act of 1917 was defined in the
stovall case.32

The plaintiff was injured while playing on a

---iarge water tank which had been removed from the basement of
the school and left on the playground.

The Washington Supreme

court affirmed the superior court's jury decision for the plaintiff.

The court held that the terminology of the act of 1917

was rather ambigucus.

The court ruled that this act exonerated

only athletic apparatus or appliances used in connection with
any park, playground, or field house.

Since this was not the

case, the district was liable.
An apparent inconsistency was seen in the Morris case.33
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower cour'!: 's decision dismissing the personal injury suit.
had injured his back and spine.

A football player

Three weeks later the coach

let him play again and the boy was reinjured.

As a result of

the injury he developed a tubercular condition.

The dicta

discussed the liability of the school district as found in
stare decisis but did not mention the law of 1917.

was held liable for the negligence of the coach.

The district
Judge Holcomb,

dissenting, said, "I am not willing to concur in the majority
opinion, at least until the effect of R.C.W. sec. 28.58.030
is determined, and it is not discussed therein.•~4

The dis-

senting judge was afraid of the far-reaching effects of this
decision.
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A football

was held not to be an athletic apparatus or

appliance in the Briscoe case. 35

An eleven year old boy

fractured his elbow while playing "keep away" using a football
during recess.

The plaintiff alleged neg;ligence on the part of

the district for inadequate supervision.
knowledge of the roughness of the game.

The district had
Rules of the school

prohibited football, but the school had furnished a football.
The lower court had directed a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed this decision and ordered
a new trial.

The court ruled that the statute had reference

to more or less permanently located equipment, not something as
mobile as a football.

When the act of 1917 was passed, there

were a great number of cases pending which involved playgrounds.
Accordingly, it was the intent of the legislature to restrict
this liability.
In a rape case the school district was held liable for
negligence and lack of supervision.3 6 The plaintiff, a twelve
I

year old girl, sought to recover $25,000.00 in damages from the
school.

During the noon hour recess, several boys carried the

plaintiff into a dark room near the gymnasium, and two of them
forcibly raped her.

There was a teacher appointed to supervise

the noon hour recess, but he had absented himself.

The court

held that the school may be sued under R.C.W. sec. 4.08.120.
The usual rules of negligence must be followed.

It was

apparent that a duty was owed to the child, but there was some
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question as to the foreseeability of the rape.

The questions

were whether the actual harm came from a general field of
danger such as the dark room and the lack of supervision.

The

allegation presented a question for the jury which was so
ordered in a split decision.

Judge Olson, dissenting, could

not subscribe to the fact that the school could have foreseen
such an eventuality.
The district was held liable for an accident which
occurred after school and under the sponsorship of a community
group. 37 Judy Kidwell, a nine year old girl, was permanently
injured when an upright piano fell on her.

The girl was

attending a Campfire Girls meeting under the supervision of
an adult.

The piano was a top-heavy instrument.

Another child

placed himself between the piano and wall and pushed the piano
over on the plaintiff.

The superior court had awarded damages

of $23,372.45 to the plaintiff, and the school appealed the
case.

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision,

stating that the school had a duty to use reasonable care, the
event was foreseeable, and the child was an invitee to whom
the school owed a duty.
When a student was injured many miles from school following a club initiation, the school was held not liable. 38 The
accident happened at 2:00 A.M. Sunday, and there was evidence
that the driver had been drinking.

The Washington Supreme

Court affirmed the superior court's sustaining of the demurrer.
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The court stated that the district was not liable for torts
arising ultra vires, and the complaint was demurrable if
"the degree of

proximity between the breach of duty com.plained

of and the events in the causal chain resulting in the injuries
sustained is so remote that it can be said, as a matter of law,
that the

jury ...39

breach of duty was not a proximate cause of the inThere was no liability unless the act of negligence

was the proximate cause, but the above act was so distant and
remote

that the assumed protective custody was with the parents

and home.
The district was held liable when a boy was killed in an
initiation ceremony conducted on the school grounds during the
school day. 40 The superior court had dismissed the complaint
which alleged that the initiation ceremony of the high school
lettermen society was under the auspices and supervision of the
school district's agents, servants, and employees.

The Wash-

ington Supreme Court reversed this decision and later denied
a rehearing.

The court said that the statute abrogating

immunity made the district liable on the same basis as a
corporation or individual with the exceptions as noted.

A

dissenting judge wanted to know what was within the scope and
authority of the school.
In a 1964 case the court abrogated immunity for municipalities. 41

However, in 1966, the courts held that the

statute waiving its immunity from tort liability "was not

173

repugnant to or inconsistent with the statutory immunity afforded

tne schools by the 1917 statute. u42

I

174

FOOTNOTES
1Minnesota Laws, Ch. 79. Secs. 12-16 (1851).
2 Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Sec. 127.03.

-

3 Ibid., Sec. 471.42.

-Ibid., Sec. 471.43.
-Op. Atty.
5
159-B-3,

4

~·

(1951).

6 1bid., 844-F-6, (1952).
7

-~.,

No. 50, p. 105, (1952).

8

Bank v. Brainerd School District, 49 Minn. 106, 51 N.W.
814 (1892).
9Allen v. Independent School District No. 17, 173 Minn.
5, 216 N.W. 533 (1928).
lONokovich v. Independent School District No. 22, 177
Minn. 446, 225 N.W. 292 (1929).
11 Rittmiller v. School District No. 84, 104 F. Supp. 187
(1952).
120regon Revised Statutes, Sec. 30.320.
13

~., Sec. 30. 310.

14~., Sec. 332. 180.
15

~., Sec. 30. 260 - 30.300.

16wiest v. School District No. 24, 68 Or. 474, 137 P.
749 (1914).
17Lupke v. School District, 130 Or. 409, 275 P. 686
(1929).

18Antin v. Union High School District, 130 Or. 4Gl,
280 P. 664, 66 A.L.R. 1271 (1929).
l9Lovell v. School District, 172 Or. 500, 143 P (2d)
236 (1943).

r

175

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 vendrell v. School District, 350 P. (2d) 282 (1961).
23Redfield v. School District No. 3, 48 Wash. 85, 92 P.
770 (1907).
24 aevised Code of Washington, Sec. 28.58.030.
25 Ibid., Secs. 408. 110 and 408. 120.

---- - - -------·
26

27

Ibid., Sec. 28.58.030.
-Redfield,
loc. cit.

28Revised Code of Washington, sec. 4.92.090.
29 Ibid., sec. 4.96.

----------

30
Howard v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 88 Wash.
1G7, 152 P. 1004 (1915).
31
Holt v. School District No. 71, 102 Wash. 442, 173
P. 335 (1918).
32
stovall v. Toppenish School District No. 49, 110 Wash.
97, 188 P. 12, 9 A.L.R. 908 (1920).
33 Morris v. Union High School District, 160 Wash. 121,
294 P. 998 (1931).

34Ibid.
35Eriscoe v. School District No. 123, 32 Wash. (2d)
353, 201 P. (2d) G97 (1949).
36
McLeod v. Grant County School District No. 128, 42
Wash. (2d) 316, 255 P. (2d) 360 (1953).
37
Kidwell v. School District No. 300, 53 Wash. (2d)
831, 335 P. (2d) 805 (1959).
38

coates v. Tacoma School District, 55 Wash. (2d) 392,
347 P. {2d) 1093 {1960).
39lbid.

r

176

'

40 sherwood v. Moxee School District, 3B3 P. (2d) 143
(1961).

41Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 390 P. (2d) 2 (1964).

42.rardiff v. Shoreline School District, 411 P. (2d)
889 (1966).

r
CHAPTER VIII
LIABILITY IN TUE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Until 1959 school districts in the State of Illinois
enjoyed immunity from tort liability.

It was during this year

that the leading Molitor case was heard by the Supreme Court

of the State of Illinois.

This decision reversed the status

quo held in 1111.nois for over fifty years.

In this chapter

the historical development of liability in Illinois will be
studied along with the relevant statutes and the case law.
In a short period of time the concept of immunity in the State
of Illinois has undergone a series of developmental changes.
In short, it has traversed the continuum from immunity to nonimmunity.

A.

UISTOUICAL DEVELOPMENT

As was stated in an earlier chapter the doctrine of
"the king could do no wrong" was f irat applied to a subdivision
of the state in Russell v.

~~Dover,

Eng. Rep. 359 in the year 1788.

2 Term Rep. 671, 100

In Illinois this doctrine was

--

first applied to towns and counties in the case of Town of
Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 in the year 1870.
case of Kinnare v. City

~Chicago,

177

The leading

171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536
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'

beard in 1898 applied the rule of immunity to school districts.
The court reasoned that the school district, as a governmental
agent of the state, was like the state in its immunity.
Since that decision other cases have given various
reasons for the continuation of the immunity doctrine.

The

charitable trust doctrine immunizing private schools was given
expression in the case of Parks v. Northwestern University,
218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 tried in 1905.

From this case

charitable and non-profit educational institutions have enjoyed
the same immunity as governmental agencies in the state.

The

doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply to charitable
institutions even though they may be private corporations.
In another case the similar protection of public funds was
given as a reason for

immunity.~

As the schools and other agencies began to purchase liability insurance in greater amounts, the argument for the protection of public funds began to lose its urgency.

Also, the

social conscience of the people began to realize some of the
hardships exacted by the immunity ruling.

In 1947 the purchase

of liability insurance by a charitable religious institution
removed immunity. 2 In this case the court inferred that the
purchase of insurance constituted a waiver of immunity.
In the leading case of Moore vs. Moyle, immunity was
removed to the extent of the insurance carried. 3 The suit
alleged the negligences of a private institution, Bradley
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tJniversity.

The facts of the case were that the plaintiff

fell from a trapeze on May 2, 1940 while preparing for a circus
in a physical education class.
insured.

Bradley University was fully

The Supreme Court overruled the lower courts which

had dismissed the case.

The court ruled that the trusts were

not impaired or diminished by the judgment.
seemed to impose liability if insured.
did not really create
of collection.

The

decision

However, the decision

liability; tt only fixed the manner

2

That is, once liability is held, the judg-

ment can only be collected from insurance proceeds.

The law

is not static; it must conform to changing conditions.

The

law needs humanitarian principles, for there is no justification for absolute immunity if the trusts are protected.

This

decision has been criticized as being liberal because it permits the wrongdoer to determine his own liability.
The remova 1 of immunity to the extent of the insurance
was first applied to the public schools in 1952 in the Thomas
v. Broadlands case. 4

The appellate court reversed the Circuit

Court of Champaign County which had dismissed the complaint.
The plaintiff had lost an eye while playing on the playground.
The complaint alleged negligence on the part of the defendant's
agents.

After discoursing on the history of immunity, the

court held that the only justifiable reason for immunity was
to protect public funds.
funds were protected.

There was no justification if the

If the funds were protected by insurance,

f

180

the rationale for immunity was removed.

Although there was

no statute allowing the purchase of insurance by a school
district which would result in a waiver of immunity, this lack
of express statutory authorization did not make any difference.
John L. Franklin writing in the University of Illinois Law
Forum said:
In this case the law in Illinois was interpreted
to remove all tort immunity from the school and to
substitute one of collection only so that it was held
to be unnecessary to aver that insurance existed, the
resultant judgment being held to be collectible only
from insurance proceeds.5
~
Although this case was not tested by the Supreme Court, it
was followed by a district court of the United States in the
Tracy v. Davis case, 6 as required by Federal law.
In 1953 the legislature had enacted a law permitting
the purchchase of liability insurance to protect against any
loss or liability upon the district and its employees resulting
from neg.L1gent or wrongful acts on the part of the officials
or employees of the district.7

The insurance companies were

required to waive the defense of immunity.
,

The district court of the United States held that
immunity existed because of the dissipation of public funds,
but this was not a defense against a tort action if the payments
were limited t.o other than public funds. 8

"An individual

injured by the tortious act of quasi-municipal corporation or
a charitable institution should not individually suffer his
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ioss where there is a source of funds other than public funds,
or trust funds, from which the judgment may be paid. u9
court cited rulings in Tennessee with approval.

The

The school

district's motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity was
denied.
In the State of Illinois, school districts are subject
to liability under Workmen's Compensation Acts.

The Court of

claims Act passed in 1945 made the state liable for torts up
to $7,500.00.

Cities and villages

ligent operation of fire vehicles.

~ay

be liable for the neg-

Municipal corporations

have been liable for proprietary functions.

Illinois school

districts may purchase liability insurance for their school
buses with a rider waiving the immunity defense.

If a school

had such a policy, the injured person may collect; however, if
the school was uuinsured the party could not collect.

In the

above examples it can be seen that there was some dissatisfaction with the immunity doctrine, both on the part of the
legislature and the courts.
On

May 22, 1959 the Supreme Court rendered a decision

which opened another chapter in the field of tort liability.
In the Molitor decision the court held that school districts
were liable for the torts caused by the negligence of their
agents and employees.lo
The General Assembly reacted quickly to this new and
somewhat alarming decision of the court.

Two months later on
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July 22, 1959 an act was approved which pertained to this
subject. 11

This statute was essentially one of limitations.

oeadlines were established, notice of claims procedurew was
set, and a limit of $10,000.00 recovery was instituted. In a
series of decisions, 12 the Illinois Supreme Court completely
emasculated this statute, declaring its main provisions special
legislation and so unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, it has not

yet been repealed.

Because of the confusion in this area,
the legislature in 1965 passed a comprehensive 13 law designed

to deal with this subject.

This law, called the Local Govern-

mental and Governmental Employees Tort Immun:t.ty Act, affects
the application of sec. 821.

B.

RELEVANT STATUTES

The most pertinent statute in Illinois was the act
passed in 1959 relating to the tort liability of school districts
Section 821 provided that "public schools in the exercise of
purely governmental functions'' should be protected from
extreme loss of their funds.

The loss should be distributed

among the public at large rather than upon one individual.
This act also applied to nonprofit private schools.

The

reference to purely governmental functions was not too clear,
as this distinction was uncommon in Illinois.
dealt with limitations of actions.

Section 822

It stated that an action

must be "commenced within one year from the date that the injury
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received or the cause of action accrued."

In Illinois the

general statute of limitations sets two years as the period to
file for a personal injury suit.

The general statute did not

apply against a minor until he reached majority.

Apparently,

this act applies to all persons regardless of age.
view will be given later by another authority.
discussed the notice of injury.

A different

Section 823

A written statement must be

filed within six months of the injury.

The notice must be

filed with the school board attorney or the secretary of tlie

board and shall state the particulars of the action.

Section

824 stated that the failure to file as given above shall be
cause for dismissal.

The amount of damages for each cause of

action shall not exceed $10,000.00 as set forth in section 825.
This act only mentioned injuries; nothing was said about death.
The Wrongful Death Act has a maximum recovery of $30,000.00.
The procedure for filing under the Wrongful Death Act did not
require a notice.

Perhaps the answer was in the phrase "except

as is otherwise provided by L:tw .. "

The public policy provision found in section 821 covered
losses arising from negligence but apparently ruled out intentional torts.

The legislature also gave the court freedom to

restrict this area.

In section 830 the act provided that

nothing "shall be deemed to authorize the bringing of any
action against any school district or non-profit school, nor
the entry of a judgment in any such act ion."
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It was interesting to note that the legislature had
granted immunity to other quaso municipal corporations such as
counties, forest preserves, park districts, and the Chicago
park District recently.

One may wonder why the legislature

acted in such divergent ways.

Schools were different

fro~

the

others in that they were compulsory and that minors were the
chief participants.
Friedman discussed this act as follows:
It has no application in situations wherein a
death may occur. In a death action, under the law of
the State of Illinois at the present time, the wrongful
death act limites the amount of recovery to $30,000.00.
It should be further pointed out that the notice requirements and the requirement that suit be filed within one
year period cannot be effective against a minor. Certainly a person under a legal disability may commence
his suit without meeting the requirement of bringing the
action within one year. The person under legal disability may wait until he reaches his majority and at
that time meet the requirements of l~e Statute for
notice and time to file his action.
Prior to this time the legislature had enacted a law in
1953 which permitted the purchase of liability insurance. 15

This

insurance was to protect against any loss or liability on the
school district and its employees resulting from any wrongful
or negligent acts on the part of the district's officials or
employees.

Since 1963, school districts with a population of

500,000 or more {i.e., the Chicago Board of Education) have
been required to purchase liability insurance, but have no
indemnity obligation, nor do they have to include in the policy
a "waiver of immunity" clause.

All other boards of education
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are required to indemnify their employees, but are not required to purchase insurance in order to do so. 16
But, sec. 9-103 of the Tort Immunity Act of 1965 provides that "every policy for insurance coverage issued to a
1ocal public entity Rhall contain a waiver of the defenses and
immunities provided in the act."

Since this section was enacted

after the insurance provisions of the school code, and since
school districts do not have any "defenses and immunities" other
than those contained in the Tort Immunity Act, this section has
re-instated the waiver of immunity requirement omitted in the
school insurance statutes.
Since the abolition of liability announced in Molitor
applied to all units of local government, the Local Government
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act of 1965 contains
comprehensive rules governing liability, limitations on liability, and procedure applicable to tort actions against all
units of local government.

However, this study is only interest-

ed in how this act relates to school districts.

An analysis

of this act in relation to court interpretations of cases
dealing with schools would be useful.

But one must be careful

here since only about a dozen reported cases exist interpreting
this act, and many of these have nothing to do with school
districts.
The salient points of this act, as it relates to this
study are the following:

'

1.

Article VIII creates a one-year statute of li~itations
and a six-month notice provision. But while the failure
to serve notice within six months of th! injury is a
complete bar to the action, sec. 8-103! 7 this notice
provision is not applicable to minors. 8

2.

Articles III through VI create new immunities or codify
pre-existing common-law immunities in certain specific
situations, such as, except as otherwise provided by the
act, neither a local public entity nor its employee is
liable for failure to supervise an activity on, or the
use of, any public property.
school class is an
activity on "public property". 9

i

3.

Article II, sec. 2-301, speci:fically provides that it
does not affect the duty of • • • school boards to insure
and indeDlllify their employees. The waiver of immunity
requirement was omitted in the insurance statutes of the
School Code, but sec. 2-301 and sec. 9-103 of the Tort
Immunity Act have re-instated it. This means that all
insurance purchased by public entities must contain a
waiver of immunity clause; and that virtually all of
the statutory immunities are waived.
C.

CASE LAW

As was noted in the beginning of the chapter the Kinnare
case set the precedent of immunity of the school district in
the State of Illinois.

Within a short time other cases ampli-

f ied this ruling and the doctrine of immunity was firmly

established.
appeared.

It was in 1947 that the first crack in the wall

In Wendt v. Servite Fathers, a charitable religious

institution, the purchase of insurance was held to constitute
a waiver of immunity. 20 In the case of Moore v. Moyle insurance
by a private non-profit educational institution was held to

be a waiver of immunity. 2 1
earlier in this chapter.

The facts of this case were given
In essence this ruling held that, if
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tbe trust funds were protected by insurance, there was no
reason for the immunity of Bradley University.

The difficulty

•ith this decision was that it allowed the wrongdoer to deter-

mine his own liability.
In the year 1952 the effect of carrying liability in8 urance

was tested in the Thomas v. Broadlands case. 22

This

was the first case that directly tested the effect of liability
insurance upon the immunity of the public school quasi municipal corporation.

Again, the facts of this case were presented

at the initial part of this chapter.

The court stated some of

the reasons for immunity as nolens volens, governmental functions,
and the protection of funds.

McQuillen was quoted, "The reason,

as often expressed, is one of public policy, to protect public
funds and public property." 23 The court held in this case
that, if the public funds were protected by insurance, the justification for immunity was removed.

This ruling was interpreted

to mean that indemnification could only come from insurance
proceeds.

As in the case of Moore v. Moyle, this ruling allowed

the school to determine its own liability.

This case was heard

at the appellate level and was not carried to the Supreme Court
of Illinois.
In a United States district court a similar ruling was
made. 24
accident.

In this case the plaintiff was injured in a school bus
The court stated that the reason for immunity was

the protection of public funds.

An individual need not stand
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tbe loss if there was another source which would not dissipate
the

public funds.

grotmds

The

defendant's motion for dismissal on the

of immunity was denied.

May 22 , 1959 the Supreme Court of Illinois handed
down the decision in the Molitor v. Kaneland case. 25 In this
On

historic and precedent case the highest court in the state
established that the district could be held liable in tort for
negligence.

Eighteen school age children were injured March 10,

1958 when a school bus operated by an agent of the defendant
hit a culvert and burned in Sugar Grove Township, Kane County.
Because of the fact that the decision did not say anything about
the retroactivity of this ruling, much apprehension was created
among school people.

In a rehearing held in December, 1959,

the court ruled that this decision, with the exception of Thomas
Molitor, applied only to future occurrences.

In a later

decision the court held that all the students included in this
particular bus accident may have the immunity of the school
district abolished. 26 In the original complaint the district
was charged with negligence through its agent and servant, the
bus driver.

As a result of the accident, the plaintiff, Thomas

Molitor, received permanent injuries and sought damages of
$56,000.00.

The record showed that the defendant carried lia-

bility insurance with limits of $20,000.00 for each person and
$100,000.00 for each accident.
was purposely omitted.

However, in the complaint this

'lbe court considered many of the tradi-
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tional and historical reasons for immunity.

The court con-

eluded:

We are of the opinion that none of the reasons advanced in support of school district immunity have any
true validity today. Further, we believe that abolition
of such immunity may tend to decrease the frequency of
school bus accidents by coupling the power of transporting pupils with the responsibility of exercising
care in the selection and supervision of the drivers.
We conclude that the rule of school district tort
immunity is unjust, unsupported by any valid reason,
and has no rightful place in modern day society.
For the reasons herein expressed, we accordingly
hold that school districts are liable in tort for the
negligence of their agents and employees and a1~ prior
decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled. 7
Several cases have been heard in courts of record concerning the effective date of the Molitor opinion.
of Terry v. Mount Zion School District

In the case

3 the plaintiff was
injured while doing gymnastic stunts on March 3, 1959. 28 The
~·

final opinion of the Supreme Court was given December 16, 1959
which stated that the ruling applied only to cases arising out
of future occurrences.

Two other cases dealt with injuries
which happened before December 16, 1959. 30 In both cases the
court stressed the application of the Molitor ruling as of
December 16, 1959.
In the case of Price v. York the court held that no new
31
rules of negligence had been created by the Molitor ruling.
The school district operated a school bus which picked up the
decedent, an eight year old child.

'Ibe route was such that the

'
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child had to cross a state highway in order to board the bus.
If the bus had been routed on a rural road which ran in front
of the decedent's house, it would have obviated the need to
cross the highway.

The plaintiff charged the district with

negligence in not using the rural road thereby giving rise to
the proximate cause.

The case was appealed to the appellate

court from the Circuit Court, Coles County.

The court stated

that in order to claim negligence there must be a duty, a
failure to perform the duty, and injury resulting therefrom.
The court held that the district did not owe a duty to the
child to protect her while walking from her home to the point
of pick up.

Nor was there a duty imposed upon the district to

reroute the bus so that no child would need to cross the highway.

It is apparent from this decision that negligence still

must be proven before a liability attaches to the school district.
In the Cook County Court, the Chicago Board of Education
was held not guilty in the first court test of the act making
the board liable up to $10,000.00. 32 The plaintiff sought
damages of $2,000.00 for a stab wound which occurred while he
was attending Bowen High School.
In two cases the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions was attempted.

In the Garrison case

an action was brought against the school board and others when
a "prop" cannon exploded during a theatrical performance.
Damages were asked in the total of

$465,ooo.oo.

33

The appellate
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court affirmed the Circuit Court, Cook County, decision to
dismiss the complaint against the school district.
appeal was denied May 24, 1962.

Leave to

The court ruled that since

the accident happened November 22, 1958, prior to the Molitor
ruling, immunity held.

There was no real distinction between

governmental and proprietary functions even if a small fee was
charged.

The act of 1959 did not create a liability; it limited

the amount of damages.

In another case action was brought

against the Chicago Board of Education for injuries sustained
by an adult patron at a football game. 34 The plaintiff was
injured as a result of the fall at a football stadium.

The

motion to strike and dismiss was sustained by the Circuit Court,
Cook County.

In affirming, the appellate court held that "the

difference between governmental and proprietary functions is
not applicable to school districts •••• " 35 A petition for leave
to appeal was denied by the Supreme Court in September, 1962. 36
In many respects Illinois presented a rather classic
picture of the modification of the tort immunity of the quasi
municipal

co~poration,

the school.

From the traditional

immunity the school district had moved gradually through a
series of developmental stages to the point where the district
can be held liable.
At the time of writing the school district in the state
of Illinois is liable for actions based upon tort.

The Molitor

decision, which reversed over sixty years of immunity, removed

lJ 2

the judicial barrier to liability.

Legislation was passed

shortly thereafter whicli limited liability if the courts found
the school district negligent.
1;ioJif ied

this leg is lat ion.

invalidatect. 37

Dut subsequent litigation

First, the six

~on th

provision was

Then, the $10,000.00 limitation on damages

recoverable from school districts was held unconstitutioua1,3S
and the $10,000.00 limit applicable to non-profit private
schools was ruled unconstitutional also.39
While school districts are not liable for injuries

arising out of the operation of a school safety patroi, 4 0 the
question of supervision was dealt with when a suit was brought

on behalf of aq eight year old girl who was severely injured when
she was kicked in the head uy 2. fellow pupil during class. 41
It was alleged that the teacher had permitted the room to become unreasonably disorderly, and had failed to supervise her

class properly.

The court held that the suit was properly

dismissed, since sec. 3-108 (a) made the public entity immune
from liability for failure to supervise an activity on any
"public property."

The court said that a school class is an

"activity u on "public property" and so cove.red by the Tort
Immunity Act of 1965.

Two other statutes were also used

by this court.

First,

the School Code, sec. 24-24, imposes a duty on the teacher to

maintain order in a classroom, and places tbe teacher in loco
parent is.

This prevents liability in the absence of willful

r
:.1

isconduct, since this is the li:nit of parental lia.bil:tty.

A1so, this is true under sec. 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act.

so

it would seem that in this case, the court used the very

statute which imposes on the teacher the duty to maintain order,
as a shield to protect the school from liability.
The same court used similar reasoning in a case where
plaintiff sought to recover for injuries received in a basketball game where he was struck by one of the opposing players. 42
It would seem that one of the most important problems which will
have to be faced by the Illinois reviewing courts is the relationship between the special statutory

immu~ities

and lia-

bilities and the Tort Immunity Act itself.
While the tlleory of sovereign immunity in the State of
Illinois has been shattered, and school districts may be held
liable, the law is still in its infancy.

The liability-creating

Molitor decision is barely fourteen years old, and the Tort
Immunity Act is only seven years old.

Less than a dozen re-

ported cases exist interpreting this act.

Many more will be

necessary before its boundaries are charted.
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CHAPTER IX
SUUMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

SUMKARY

The concept of the sovereign immunity of governmental
agencies was first promulgated in the year 1788 in the case of
Shortly thereafter, this doctrine was
----incorporated into American jurisprudence. school districts are
Russell v. Men of Devon.

involuntary agencies created and controlled by the state.

As

such they have traditionally shared the immunity concept.

For

such reasons as "the king could do no wrong," loss of public
funds, stare decisis, ultra vires, nolens volens, and public
relations, school districts in the United States have been
immune from tort liability for negligence.

Since the latter

half of the last century, a number of states have embarked
upon a movement away from the traditional immunity.
Although school districts are considered agencies of the
state, it was necessary to define this relationship very carefully.

Generally speaking, the courts have classified school

districts as quasi corporations or quasi municipal corporations.
A municipal corporation proper is a city or town incorporated
primarily for purposes of local government, therefore they must
be

grant~J

considerable powers of a legislative and regulatory
197
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nature.

A quasi corporation, on the other hand, is purely a

political or civil division of the state; it is created as an
instrumentality of the state in order to facilitate the administration of government.

As involuntary agencies, school

districts are not full corporations in the eyes of the law,
but have a limited being.
The legal meaning of the word tort was difficult to
state.

In its simplest form it is a civil wrong perpetrated

upon another, exclusive of contract.

It is not a crime but an

action for which the courts may allow the injured party to
seek recovery.
Although there were other grounds for liability in tort,
this investigation was concerned with the area of negligence
resulting in a liability.

Negligence was defined as conduct

which did not measure up to the "reasonable man" criteria
established by law for the protection of others.

There are

four components prerequisite to an action based upon negligence.
These essentials are:

(1) a legal duty to conform to a

certain standard, (2) a failure to conform to this standard,
(3) a close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury, and (4) an actual loss or damage.

The question

of what was improper conduct was related to what a prudent
person would do under similar circumstances.

What a prudent

person could foresee and do or not do was a question of fact
for the jury.

, _________________
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It was a prime purpose of this dissertation to analyze
the means and the rationale of the movement toward relaxation
of the immunity principle.

The source of this movement comes

from either judicial or legislative authority.

The greatest

abrogations of immunity have been in the fields of school
transportation and workmen's compensation.
have received much
lative authorities.

These two areas

attention from the judicial and legisWorkmen's compensation as a separate field

was not a part of this study.

Personal injuries to pupils

provided the major source of litigation in cases charging the
school district with negligence.
California, Illinois, and New York were the leading
states in the modification of school district immunity for
tort liability based upon a charge of negligence.
of recovery, usually quite limited and specialized,
found in other states and in other jurisdictions.

Other means
may be
The leading

states were analyzed and reported separately with the specific
means of recovery treated individually.
The state of New York, while not the first state to
move toward abrogation, was a leader in the field of modification.

Liability has been imposed upon the school district

in New York by judicial authority.

Certain statutes such as

"save harmless" acts, a court of claims act, and a comprehensive
education section have contributed toward the abrogation.
was in 1907 that the first case was heard in New York which

It

f
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held the school district liable for negligence.

In 1910 a

comprehensive act was passed which furthered the movement.

In

the Herman case, tried in 1922, the court said that the school

was liable for negligence of the board of education.
rulings held that the school district was liable for
but not for those of its employees and agents.

These

.!.!!.

torts,

The statutes

provided a section which outlined the procedure for filing a
claim based upon tort.

A

ninety~y

deadline was established

in order to limit the number of suits.

The New York courts have clearly indicated that all of
the essential elements of a negligence claim

mu~t

be present.

The school was not the insurer of the welfare of a child and was
bound to use only ordinary car.

There existed a duty to main-

tain buildings, grounds and equipment in a reasonably safe
condition, and the failure to do so was negligence.

New York

statutes imposed a duty upon the district to supervise its
students.
negligence.

The failure to do so had been held actionable
The adequacy of the supervision was a relative

question and was usually a point of fact to be determined by

a jury.
Procedural matters have caused much litigation in the
state of New York.

The deadline of filing a claim within

ninety days after the incident has been extended frequently by
the courts, if the rights of the defendant were not prejudiced.
The purpose of the procedural statute was to prevent stale and
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fraudulent claims.
Under permissive statute, school districts in New York
may carry liability insurance or act as self-insurers.

The

manner of insurance has had little effect upon the tort liability of the school district in New York.
California, a comparative late comer to the field of
modification, was the first state to pass express statutes for
the purpose of abrogation.

California has maintained such a

position up to the present.

California and New York vied for

the number of suits brought against the school district.
The first California statute,passed in 1923, made the
district liable for the dangerous condition of buildings,
grounds, and property.

Also in 1923, an act was passed which

1nade the district liable for injuries to pupils caused by the
negligence of officers or employees of the school.

In the motor

vehicle section, the school district was made liable for the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

Under such acts the

liability of a school district in California was very similar to
that of a private corporation.

The deadline for filing a claim,

based upon a tort, in California was set in 1959 as one hundred
days.

Prior to that time it had been ninety days.

Certain

exceptions have been made by the court if the claimant was a
minor or incapacitated in some manner.

The other parts of a

claim were also contained in this statute.
The general approach of the courts of California may be
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described as favoring a complete abolishment of tbe immunity
doctrine.

As in New York, the California courts have held that

all the elements of a negligence claim must be found before a
case can be heard.

A reasonably prudent person must be able

to foresee the event before negligence can be proven.

The

proximate cause of the injury must be under the control of the
district.

Only ordinary care was necessary, as the school was

not tbe insurer of the safety of the children.

A statute im-

posed the duty of supervision upon the teachers and the district.
Again the question of the adequacy of the supervision was
relative to the time, place, and circumstances of the incident
and was a point of fact to be determined by the jury.

Under

the prior statute which provided a ninety day deadline for
filing a claim, the courts strictly constructed this requirement.

Under the recent statute a more liberal construction was

possible.
School districts in the State of California were required
to carry liability insurance.

Cities, over 500,000, may act

as self-insurers.
In the three states of Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington
an early movement toward modification was noted.

However, for

one reason or another this movement bas been controlled or
eliminated.
Minnesota in 1851 passed an act which allowed an action
to be brought against the school district for an injury to the

'
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rights of a plaintiff.

But in a case heard in 1892 the

~inne

sota Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean property

rights, and from that day on, the school districts in Minnesota were immune from vicarious tort liability in negligence.
Oregon has followed a similar path.

In the statute

authorizing suits, the courts have interpreted the authorization
to mean property rights.
was seen in 1961.

A minor deviation from the precedent

In the Vendrell case the district was held

liable to the extent of the liability insurance policy.
Washington enacted its first abrogation statute in 1869.
Following a rash of cases, the legislature in 1917 passed an
act which permitted liability but excluded actions stemming
from playgrounds, gymnasiums, athletics or industrial arts.
Since this enactment tbe courts of Washington have allowed suits
against the school districts for injuries occurring in ways
other than the statutory exclusions.
Illinois was the latest state to hold the school district
liable for tort.
been immune.

Since 1898 school districts in Illinois have

However, in 1959 the Molitor case reversed this

ruling and held that the immunity of school districts was
waived to the extent of any liability insurance.
following the Molitor decision

th~

Immediately

legislature enacted a bill

which related to the damages collectible under a claim of
negligence.

The act established a deadline of six months for

filing a claim, and the action must be commenced within one

'
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year.

This was followed by a patchwork of liabilities,

i•r:n.mi ties, and procedural rules, which did not help clear up

the picture.

In 1935, a joint committee of the Illinois State

and Chicago Bar Association met to study the recently enacted
California Tort Claims Act of 19G3 and to adapt its provision
for use in Illinois.

Tho General Assembly of 1965, enacted

the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 35 sec. 1-101 through 10-101).

'l'wo fundamental features of the act are:

First, its

provisions are applicable to all units of local government,

including school districts.

Second, the rule of the Molitor

case is still the law of Illinois, except as modified

by

the

Tort Immunity Act or some other statute.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that the Molitor
decision applied only to cases arising after December 16, 1959.
Despite the furor of this decision, the court has ruled that
no new basis for negligence had been created, and that it
was still necessary to show the essential elements of a negligence claim.

In certain states and in certain specific and restricted
areas, the school district may be held liable in tort for
negligence.

While the school may be held liable for this

specific charge, the general concept of immunity still prevails.
One of these areas was the so-called "safe place"
statutes.

Two states, Colorado and Wisconsin, had enacted

205

c:tatutes
..,

which impose a liability upon the school district to

build and maintain its buildings and/or equipment so as to

render them safe for general use.

Generally, the courts in-

terpreted these statutes very strictly and recovery was limited.
Four states, (Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and
Wyoming) had passed "save harmless" legislation.

These acts

which cause the board of education to assume the liability of
school employees acting within the scope of their duties may
or may not make the board of education liable in tort for
negligence.

Connecticut courts have interpreted this statute

as one of the indemnification from loss, not liability.

In

other words, a judgment must first be secured against the
employee.

In New Jersey, the court has said that this act did

not create a liability upon the part of the district, and the
school district was held immune from suit.

The statute of

Wyoming contained within itself a statement to the effect that
no new liability had been created.
In a few jurisdictions, the courts have attempted to
classify the functions of the school as either governmental or
proprietary.

If the function was held to be proprietary, lia-

bility may attach.

Such a distinction is hard to make; there-

fore, it is infrequently done.
made this distinction recently.

Pennsylvania and Arizona have
The Illinois Supreme Court

as recently as 1962 would not attempt this artificial distinction
In general, this attempt to circumvent the immunity principle

r
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nas

had little effect.
Many school districts car:cy liability insurance with

or without statutory authorization.

The carrying of insurance

would seem to void one of the reasons for immunity, the

tection of public funds.

~::ro

The bulk of the states did not allow

recovery even if the district was fully insured; however,
several states have departed from this concept.
Tenneseee have so done.

Kentucky and

In 1961 the Oregon Supreme Court per-

mitted recovery against a school district for the amount
covered in the pol:i.cy.

While immunity st ill prevails in these

states, some of the hardships were eased.

In brief a recapitulation of the status of tort liability of school districts in the United States disclosed
that there was a slight movement away from the traditional
immunity.

Three states, California, Illinois, and New York,

have been the leaders in the complete abrogation of immunity.
other states have developed specialized laws for granting
recovery in limited area.

Kentucky, Tennessee, and Oregon

allow recovery to the amount of liability insurance carried.

School districts in the State of Washington were liable except
for injuries occurring in certain specified locations.

A few

states attempted the division of the school's functions into
governmental or proprietary categories.

f-~-------------------,
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B.

CONCLUSIONS

In the conclusions of this study, the salient points
have answered the questions posed at the beginning of the
investigation.

The conclusions are intended for students of

educational administration, be they board members, superintendents, or principals.

It does not take much foresight to

see that school districts and tort liability cases will be a
fertile field for an ever· increasing amount of litigation and
statutory concern.
The immunity doctrine originated in times which were
very dissimilar to the time today.

It was based originally on

the divine rights of kings and that "the king could do no
wrong."

How this reason applied to the United States is a

mystery of American jurisprudence.

From the concept of "the

king could do no wrong" the sovereign immunity of the state
and of the school district grew like Topsy.

Many reasons are

given but the most cogent are the protection of the public
funds and the loss of public confidence.

At the time of writing

the vast majority of the states extend the protection of
immunity to school districts for tort liability.
W!dle a majority of the school districts are immune,
a number of states have moved toward nonimmunity.

In attempting

to understand the rationale of the courts and legislation, the
authorities felt that it was better for the public to bear a
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208

burden which would easily overwhelm an individual.

Many

authorities have referred to the social injustices of the
1mmunity ruling.

Immunity has survived as a historical anach-

ronism and is not suitable for the current sociological sorld
in which we live.

This movement is symptomatic of the trend

away from "classical liberalism."
As was noted in the summary, California, Illinois, and
New York are the leading states in the abrogation of immunity.
By

various means, in a number of other states, the school

district may be held liable in tort.
In a number of decisions, the courts noted that there
were no express statutes enacted by the legislature permitting
liability; therefore, the court, although it was dissatisfied
with immunity, felt that it did not have the power to modify.
Other courts noting the same role of the legislature, have
proceeded to modify on judicial authority.
inois are examples of such modification.

New York and IllIn the realm of

municipal corporations, Michigan and Wisconsin have also so
changed.

In some cases it appeared that neither authority

wished to take the initiative and responsibility for the abrogation of immunity.
In the bulk of the states the purchase of liability
insurance has had little effect upon the liability of the school
district for torts.

However, in Kentucky, Oregon, and Tennessee

the courts have allowed recovery to the extent of the limits

r
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of the insurance policy carried by the school district.

The

purchase of liability insurance by a school in a state where
the school is immune from suit is a questionable practice.
In all three of the leading states, the legislatures
have enacted statutes which attempt to limit the liability of
the school district.

Generally, these statutes set the dead-

lines for filing a claim, designated the proper form of notice,
and the person to whom the notice must be celivered.

New York

courts have interpreted the requirements very strictly; however, recent legislation has been ena::ted which authorizes a
more liberal approach.
The trend of nonimmunity appears to be increasing.

The

three leading states have abrogated immunity within the
century.

New York in 1906, California in 1923, and Illinois

in 1959, three of the more influential states, have moved
towa~n

liability of the school district.

other states have

occupied an interim position which permitted recovery in
specific areas.

Ia the field of municipal corporations, recent

decisions have been rendered which held these agencies liable.
It is the opinion of this writer that the trend toward the
modification of immunity will continue and grow in strength.
C.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This writer believes that school districts and their
personnel will become the target for ever increasing amounts

r -~------------------------------------~
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of litigation for tort liability in negligence.

In the re-

commendations the emphasis will be on the development of guide
lines which will protect, limit, or mitigate the charges against
the defendant.

Two types are made.

The first type of recommendation is legal in nature.
Each administrator should know the statutes and case law of his
state.

The state's attorney or the legal advisor of the state

department of education should be consulted for a particular
case.

Regardless, the advice of local counsel is essential.

Many schools retain an attorney for legal advice.

The legal

experts will know what constitutes negligence as well as the
bars to recovery.

All legal questions should be referred to

qualified attorneys at the earliest possible moment.
Justice as seen in the various cases and statutes points
toward the responsibility of the public toward an individual.
Contemporary social justice, as expressed in such ways as
social security and workmen's compensation, demands a more just
and equitable solution than an individual's assumption of the
loss.

All rights and obligations are conditioned by our society.

This research shows that some of the legal community is accepting the view that it may be better for the public to undertake
this responsibility.
In order to promote justice in the field of school
district liability and to prevent the hardships inherent in
the traditional immunity doctrine, this writer recommends that
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the immunity of the school district for tort liability be
abolished by legislative enactment.

Because of the fact that

the legislative branch is directly responsible to the people
and less bound by precedent, it is clear to the writer that the

legislature is the logical body to take the initiative.
In examining the legislation of California, Illinois,

and New York and the judicial construction thereof, certain
recommendations can be made in the manner of drafting new
statutes.

Of paramount importance is the need to write laws

so as to protect the individual and also protect the school
from fraudulent and stale claims.

The statutes should clearly

state the procedure of filing a claim.

A reasonably flexible

deadline for tiling should be allowed for minors and persons
incapacitated, if the school district is not prejudiced by such

a late claim.

Limit to recovery does not seem to have the

flexibility desirable for the diverse needs of the injured
plaintiffs.

It would seem to the writer that this discriminates

against children since they are the principal plaintiffs in
these cases.

If the damages are more than the amount of the

limit fixed by law, the plaintiff must stand the loss.
In view of the fact that government in its many and
varied forms has pervaded our daily lives in so many ways, it
is the recommendation of this writer that a separate agency be
established to hear the tort claims of all governmental agencies
below the state level.

Each state could establish an agency,
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perhaps similar to a court of claims or special commission to
adjudicate these claims.

Such an agency would have the advantage

of specializing in tort liability claims, thereby insuring a
fairer and more equitable settlement of claims.

Many civil

courts are already overloaded with pending personal injury
suits, and this would alleviate this condition to some extent.
Since this agency would not be a court in the usual sense,
cases could be disposed of more readily.

By hearing all the

cases related to governmental bodies, a balance and perspective
could be maintained which is virtually impossible under the
present situation.
Cases which are brought to the bar are expensive both
in time and money.

In addition they cast a bad light on the

school and on the reputation of the staff and administration.
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of tort
liability suits brought against the school district.

If the

debilitating effects of such litigation are to be controlled,
it is essential that all concerned become cognizant of this
field of law.
The second type of recommendation relates to activities

at the

operational level which the administration may utilize

to control, protect, or mitigate its tort liability.
If the school district may be held liable, the prudent
administrator will see that the operating funds of the school
are protected in some manner.

Most school districts will elect

r -~-----------------------------------------·
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to carry a ,general liability insurance policy of suitable
limits.

In other cases, particularly in large cities, the

school district may act as its own self-insurer.
The past history of tort liability indicates that school
districts did not become bankrupt under the burden of paying
liability claims.

In fact, various references have stated

that the percentage of money disbursed for personal injury
claims was a small part of the total budget.

Some states

expressly provide authority for the payment of such claims.

The

cost of claims or insurance premiums is an integral part of
the total cost of the educational system and should be so
considered.
As was previously 8tated, the school is not the insurer
of tho safety of a child, and it is not reasonable to expect
that no accidents will happen.

Before the school district can

be held liable for negligence, the defendant must be guilty of
negligence.

Certainly the school district has a duty to use

care in safeguarding the well-being of the students.

Various

aspects of school activities present more danger of injury
than others.

It is recommended that the administration be

especially aware of the dangers involved in the following:
transportation, buildings and grounds, physical activities,
vocational training, science laboratories, school patrols,
and driver education.
The administration should be alert for all unsafe

activities and conditions.

A yearly safety inspection by the

safety engineers of the liability insurance company is a
recommended procedure.

Periodic inspections by the fire pre-

vention department will be of value.

Frequent inspections by

the building principal and the head custodian will detect
dangerous conditions before catastrophe strH:es.
When an unsafe or dangerous condition is discovered,
aaximum effort should be made to correct this as soon as possible.

If the condition is critical, evacuation and the closing

of school would be indicated.

The maintenance of buildings,

grounds, and equipment in a dangerous or defective condition
is a condition which can be remedied more readily than some
other conditions.
Schools have a duty to adequately supervise their
students.

Of course, what is adequate supervision is a rela-

tive question, depending upon the time, place, and circumstances
of the event.

But perhaps some general bench marks are in order.

Such rules and regulations as are necessary for the conduct
of the school should be made known, and the administration
should ascertain whether the rules are being carried out.

If

a dangerous instrumentality or activity is involved, a higher
degree of care would be indicated.

A teacher should have the

class under control, but it is not a proof of negligence to be
away from the class for a short length of time.
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Many accidents occur while children are playing on the
playground.

The question of the adequacy of the playground

supervision has been the source of much litigation.

Again, it

is stated that the school is not the insurer of the safety of
its students, and it is reasonable to expect that accidents
will occur even if the supervision is adequate.

The teacher

should be in control of the situation so that if a dangerous
condition develops it may be curbed.

It would be recommended

that the supervisor be in such a position so as to maintain
visual contact with the students being supervised.

It is not

reasonable to expect one teacher to supervise great numbers of
students.

In several cases one teacher per 100 to 150 students

was held to be a reasonable situation.

However, the number

will depend upon the location and the type of student involved.
If an accident or injury occurs there are certain steps
that may be taken to protect the district.

The provision of

proper first aid may prevent more serious damage.

All staff

members should be instructed in first-aid procedures.

If there

is no emergency the teacher should wait for medically trained
personnel.

Each school should have on display, in a prominent

location, the procedures to be followed in handling various
injuries.
Complete records of the incident should be completed by
the personnel involved in the case.

All pertinent facts should
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be recorded as soon as possible.

Regular channels for reporting

serious injuries should be established so that a centralized
and responsible person is notified.

Generally, this person would

contact the insurance company, the attorney, and report this
activity to the superintendent of schools.
If the above recommendations are implemented, the school
districts need not fear the awesome specter of tort liability.
~facto,

the school with this increased liability will find

"necessity's sharp pinch" a stimulus toward providing the
safest conditions ordinarily possible.
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GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Accident - An unforeseen event, occurring without the will or
design of the person whose mere act causes it; an unexpected,
unusual, or undesigned occurrence; the effect of an unknown
cause, or the cause being known, by the unprecedented consequence
of it; a casualty. In its proper use the term excludes negligence; that is, an accident is au event which occurs without the
fault, carelessness, or want of proper circumspection of the
person affected or wnich could not have been avoided by the
use of that kind and degree of care necessary to the exigency
and in t h('I' circumstancett in which he was placed.
J\j

liteil - For the suit; for the purpose• of the suit; peud-

lii'g the suit. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed to
prosecute or defend a suit--On behalf of a party incapacitated
by infancy or otherwise.
Agent - One who represents and acts for another under the
contract or relation of agency.
Assumption of risk - A term or condition in a contract of
employment, either express or implied from the circumstances
of the employment, by which the employee agrees that dangers
of injury ordinarily or obviously incident to the discharge of
his duty in the particular employment shall be at his own
risk.
Attractive nuisance - A doctrine which holds a property owner
liable, when he knowingly leaves a dangerous instrumentality,
which he may be charged with knowing is of a character to
attract children, exposed in a place liable to be frequented
by children, and as a result, a child who did not realize the
danger, is injured.
Case law - The aggregate of. reported cases as forming a body
of jurisprudence, or the law of a particular subject as
evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases, in distinction to
statutes and other sources of law.
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Certiorari - The name of a writ issued by a superior court
directing an inferior court to send up to the former some
pending proceeding, or all the record and proceedings in a
cause before the verdict, with its certificate to the correctness and completeness of the record, for review or trial; or
it may serve to bring up the record of a case already terminated
below, if the inferior court is not one of record, or in cases
where the procedure is not according to the course of the
common law.
Common law - As distinguished from the Roman law, the modern
civil law, the canon law, and other systems, the common law is
that body of law and juristic theory which was originated,
developed, and formulated and is administered in England,
and has obtained among most of the states and peoples of
Anglo-Saxon stock.
As distinguished from law created by the enactment o!
legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those
principles and rules of action, relating to the goverr;Jlent
and security of persons and property, which derive their
autho1·ity solely from usages aud customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming. and enforcing such usages and customs;
and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law
of England.

As concerns its force and authority in the United States,
the ptrase designates that portion of the common law of England
{including such acts of Parliament as were applicable) which
had been adopted and was in force here at the time of the
Revolution. This, so far it has not since been expressly
abrogated, is recognized ae an organic part of the jurisprui:tenc0 of nost of the United States.
In a wider sense than any of the foregoing, the

~'com:.non

law" may designate all that part of the positive law, juristic
theory, and ancient custom of any state or nation which is of
general and universal application, thus marking off special
o~ local rules or customs.
Condition precedent - A condition precedent is one which is to
be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or
some act dependent thereon is performed.

Contt•act - A protnissory agreement between two or more persons
that creates, modifies, or destroys a legal relation.
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Contributory negligence - Contributory negligence, when set
up as a defense to any action for injuries alleged to have
been caused by the defendant's negligence, means any want of
or~inary care on the part of the person injured, (or on the
part of another whose negligence is imputable to him,) which
combined and concurred with the defendant's negligence, and
contributed to the injury as a proximate cause thereof, and
as an element without which the injury would not have occurred.
Ccrporation - An artificial person or legal entity created by
or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation,
composed, in some rare instances, of a single person and his
successors, being the incumbents of a particular office, but
ordinarily consisting of an association of numerous individuals,
who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination,
which is regarded in law as having a personality and existence
distinct from that of its several members, and which is, by
the same authority, vested with the capacity ~f continuous
succession, irrespective of changes in membership, either in
perpetuity or for a limited term of years, and of acting as
a unit or single individual in matters relating to the comm.on
purpose of the association, within the scope of the powers and
authorities conferred upon such bodies by law.
Crime - A positive or negative act in violation of penal law;
an offense against the State. Crimes are those wrongs which
the government notices as injurious to the public, and punishes in what is called a "criminal proceeding," in its own
name.
Damagv - Loss, injury, or deterioration, caused by the negligence, design, or accident of one person to another, in respect
of the latter's person or property.
Damages - a pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be
recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss,
detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or
rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of
another.
Defendant - The person defending or denying; tile party against
whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit.
Dictum - See "obiter dictum."
Employee - One who works for an employer; a person working
for salary or wages.
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Employer - One who ~mploys the services of others; one for
whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries.
Estop - To stop, bar, or to impede; to prevent; to preclude.
Imputed negligence - Negligence which is not directly attributable to the person himself, but which is the negligence of
a person who is in privity with him, and with whose fault he
is chargeable.
Independent contractor - One who, exercising an independent
employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his
own methods and without being subject to the control of his
employer except as to the result of the work.
It is very generally held that the right of control as
·::o the mode of doing the work constructed for is the principal
consideration in determining whether one employed is an
"independent contractor" or servant. If the employee is
merely subject to the control or direction of the employer as
to the result to be obtained, he is an independent contractor;
if he is subject to the control of the employer as to the
means to be employed, he is not an independent contractor.
Infant - A person within age, not of age, or not of full age;
a person under the age of twenty-one years; a minor.
Injury - Any wrong or damage done to another, either in his
person, rights, reputation, or property.
Invitees - One who is at a place upon the invitation of another.
Last clear chance - In the law of negligence, this terms denotes
the doctrine or rule that, notwithstanding the negligence of
a plaintiff, if, at the time the injury was done, it might have
been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of
the defendant, the defendant will be liable for the failure
to exercise such care.. The doctrine cannot iJt' invoked by a
plaintiff unless he himself by his own negligence has proximately brought about the situation which put upon defendant
an extraordinary duty which otherwise would not have rested
on him. In many jurisdictions the rule is that for a person
to be brought within the "last clear chance" doctrine, the
evidence must tend to show that, while his negligence may have
contributed toward getting him in the position of danger, all
negligence on his part had ceased for a sufficient time prior
to the accident to have enabled the defendant, after he knew
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of his situation or peril, to have avoided the accident. In
some jurisdictions, however, the "last clear chance" rule
applies, although the plaintiff negligently exposes himself
to peril, and although his negligences continues until the
accident happens, if the defendant, with knowledge of his

danger and reason to suppose that he may not save himself, may
avoid the injury by exercise of ordinary care, and fails to do
so.
Legal liability - A liability which courts of justice recognize
and enforce as between parties litigant.
Liable - Bound or obliged in law or equity; responsible;
chargeable; answerable; compelled to make satisfaction, compensation, or restitution.
Liability - The state of being bound or obliged in law or
justice to do, pay, or make good something.

Licensee - A person who is neither a paaeenger, servant, or
trespasser, and dces not stand in any contractual relation
with the owner of the premises, and who is permitted to go
therein for his own interest, convenience, or gratification.
Malfeasance - The wrongful or unjust doing of some act which
the doer has no right to perform, or which he has stipulated
by contract not to do.
Master - One having authority; one who rules, directs, instructs, or superintends; a head or chief; an employer.

Misf eance - The improper performance of some act which a man
may lawfully do.
Negligence - The omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily
regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.

Nolens volens - Whether willing or not; consenting or not.
Nonf eaeance - The neglect or failure of a person to do some
act which he ought to do. The term is not generally used to
denote a breach of contract, but rather the failure to perform
a duty towards the public whereby some individual sustains
special damage ••••
Non obatante veredicto - Notwithstanding the verdict. A
Judgment entered by order of court for the plai~tifi, al-
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though there has been a verdict for the defendant, is so
called.
Nuisance - That class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable,
unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person of his own property,
either real or personal, or from his own improper, indecent,
or unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruction or an
injury to the right of another or of the public, and the
producing material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or
hurt.
Anything which is injurio~s to health, or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property, which unlawfully obstructs the free
passage or use, in the customary manner, of any lake or river,
bay, stream, canal, or basin, or other public park, square,
street, or highway is a nuisance.
Nunc pro tune.- A phrase used to express that a thing done at
one time which ought to have been performed at another.
Obiter dictum - A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a
judge, in his decision upon a cause, ''by the way," that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the
question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved
in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument.
Officer - The incumbent in an office; one who is lawfully inAn "officer" is one who is invested
with some portions of the functions of the government to be
exercised for the public benefit.

vested with an office.

Per curiam - By the court. A phrase used in the reports to
Cl'iStinguish an opinion of the whole court from an opinion
written by any one judge.
Plaintiff - A person who brings an action; the party who
complains or sues in a personal act ion and is so named on
the record.
·~

tanto - For so much ; for as much as may be ; as far as it
goes.
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Proximate cause - That which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. That which is nearest in the order of responsible causation.
Quasi corporations - organizations resembling corporations;
municipal societies or similar bodies which, though not true
corporations in all respects, are yet recognized by statutes
or immemorial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations,
with precise duties which may be enforced, and privileges
which may be maintained, bu suits at law. They may be considered quasi corporations, with limited powers, co-extensive
with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage, but
restrained from a general use of the authority which belongs
to those metaphysical persons by the common law.
Quasi municipal corporations - Bodies politic and corporate,
created for the sole purpose of performing one or more muni•
cipal functions. Public corporations organized for governmental purposes and having for most purposes the status and
powers of municipal corporations •••• but not municipal
corporations proper, such as cities and incorporated towns.
Remote cause - In the law of negligence, a "remote" cause of
an accident or injury may be one which sets in motion another
cause, called the "proximate" cause. The "remote cause" is
the one the existence of which does not necessarily imply the
existence of the effect. Remote cause is also defined as a
cause operating mediately through other causes to produce
effect.
Res ipsa loquitur - The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
presumption that defendant was negligent, which arises upon
proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.
Res judicata - A matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
\iPOn or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.
Respondeat superior - Let the master answer. This maxim means
that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts
of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent.
School board - A board of municipal officers charged with the
administration of the affairs of the public schools. They are
commonly organized under the general laws of the state, and
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fall within the class of q;,.iasi corporations, sometimes
coterminus with a county or borough, but not necessarily so.
School district - A public and quasi municipal corporation,
organized by legislative authority or direction, comprising a
defined territory, for tlle erection, maintenance, government,
and support of the public schools within its territory in
accordance with and in subordination to the general school
laws of the state, invested, for these purposes only, with
powers of local self-government and generally of local taxation,
and administered by a board of officers, usually elected by
the voters of the district, who are variously styled ·~chool
directors, " or "trustees," "commissioners," or "supervisors"
of schools.
Servant - A person in the emrcloy of another and subject to
his control as to what work shall be done and the means by
which it shall be accomplished.

Stare decisis - To stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents;
to maintain Iormer adjudications. Doctrine of stare decisis
rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed
should be fixed, definite, and lmown, and that, when the law
is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to
construe it, such declaration, in the absence of palpable
mistake or error is itself evidence of the law until changed
by competent authority.
State - A body politic, or society of men, united together for
the purpose of promoting for their mutual safety and advantage,
by the joint efforts of their combined strength. A political
community organized under a distinct government reco~nized
and confirmed by its citizens and subjects as a supreme power.
Subrogation - The Substitution of one thing for another, or of
one person into the place of another with respect to rights,
claims, or securities.
Tort - A tort is a legal wrong committed upon the person or
property of another independent of contract. It lllay be either
( 1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual;
(2) the infraction of some public duty by which special da1ange
accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private
obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual.
In the former case, no special damage is necessary to entitle
the party to recover. In the two latter cases, such damage
is necessary.
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Tort-feasor - A wrong-doer; one who commits or is guilty of
a tort.
Trespass - An unlawful act committed with violence, actual or
implied, causing injury to the person, property, or relative
rights of another; an injury or misfeasance to the person,
property, or rights of another, done with force and violence,
either actual or implied in law.
In the strictest sense, an entry on another's ground,
without a lawful authority, and doing some damage, however
inconsiderable, to his real property.
Trespasser - One who has committed trespass; one who unlawfully enters upon another's land, or unlawfully and forcibly
takes another's personal property. The term is generally used
in a limited sense to designate one who goes upon the premises
of another without invitation, express or implied, and does
so out of curiosity, and for his own purposes or convenience,
and not in the performance of any duty to the owner.
Ultra vires - A term used to express the action of a corporation
which is beyond the powers conferred upon it by its charter,
or the statutes under which it was instituted.
Vested rights - Rights which have so completely and definitely
accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject
to be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private
person, and which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled according to the then current rules of
law, and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly
be deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure and for the public welfare.
Vis major - A greater or superior force, an irrestible force.
il"Toss by vis major is one that results immediately from a
natural cause without the intervention of man and could not
have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and
care.
Volenti non fit injuria - He who consents cannot receive an
inJury. ---- ---
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